THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO - Studyplace

u. 358] THE PROBLEM STATED 43
In which class do you place justice
I should say, in the highest, as a thing which anyone who is to
gain happiness must value both for itself and for its results.
Well, that is not the common opinion. Most people would say
it was one of those things, tiresome and disagreeable in themselves,
which we cannot avoid practising for the sake of reward or a good
reputation.
I know, said I; that is why Thrasymachus has been finding fault
with it all this time and praising injustice. But I seem to be slow
in seeing his point.
Listen to me, then, and see if you agree with mine. There was no
need, I think, for Thrasymachus to yield so readily, like a snake
you had charmed into submission; and nothing so far said about
justice and injustice has been established to my satisfaction. I want
to be told what each of them really is, and what effect each has,
in itself, on the soul that harbours it, when all rewards and consequences
are left out of account. So here is my plan, if you approve.
I shall revive Thrasymachus' theory. First, I will state what is
commonly held about the nature of justice and its origin; secondly,
I shall maintain that it is always practised with reluctance, not as
good in itself, but as a thing one cannot do without; and thirdly,
that this reluctance is reasonable, because the life of injustice is
much the better life of the two-so people say. That is not what I
think myself, Socrates; only I am bewildered by all that Thrasymachus
and ever so many others have dinned into my ears; and I have
never yet heard the case for justice stated as I wish to hear it. You,
I believe, if anyone, can tell me what is to be said in praise of
justice in and for itself; that is what I want. Accordingly, I shall
set you an example by glorifying the life of injustice with all the
energy that I hope you will show later in denouncing it and exalting
justice in its stead. Will that plan suit you
Nothing could be better, r replied. Of all subjects this is one on
which a sensible man must always be glad to exchange ideas.
Good, said Glaucon. Listen then, and I will begin with my first
point: the nature and origin of justice.
What people say is that to do wrong is, in itself, a desirable
thing; on the other hand, it is not at all desirable to suffer wrong,