Risk Analysis of Sea Traffic in the Area around Bornholm, 2008. - VTT

Søfartsstyrelsen 

Risk Analysis of Sea 

Traffic in the Area around 

Bornholm 

January 2008

COWI A/S 

Parallelvej 2 

DK-2800 Kongens Lyngby 

Denmark 

Tel +45 45 97 22 11 

Fax +45 45 97 22 12 

www.cowi.com 

Søfartsstyrelsen 

Risk Analysis for Sea Traffic 

in the Area around Bornholm 

January 2008 

Report no. P-65775-002 

Issue no. 0 

Date of issue 25.01.2008 

Prepared 

Checked 

Approved 

ALBL 

IBK 

IBK

Risk Analysis for Sea Traffic in the Area around Bornholm 

2 

Table of Contents 

1 Summary 4 

2 Background 7 

2.1 Motivation 7 

2.2 Target group 7 

2.3 Risk concept 7 

2.4 Work group 8 

2.5 Procedure 9 

3 Limits of the Analysis 11 

3.1 Scope 11 

3.2 Geographical limits 12 

4 Data and Methods 14 

4.1 Ship data 14 

4.2 Ship traffic data 14 

4.3 Ship accident data 18 

4.4 Geographic information 19 

4.5 Collision model 19 

4.6 Grounding model 23 

4.7 Direct cost model 25 

5 Retrospective Risk Assessment of the Bornholm 

Gat Traffic Separation Scheme 27 

5.1 Hazard identification (FSA step 1) 27 

5.2 Risk control options (FSA step 3) 27 

5.3 Comparative risk assessment (FSA step 2 and 4) 27 

5.4 Discussion and recommendations (FSA step 5) 40 

P:\65775A\3_Pdoc\DOC\P-65775A main report final corr prepared for PDF.DOC 

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6 Prospective Risk Assessment of Route 

Specifications for Traffic to and from the Gdańsk 

Bay 41 

6.1 Hazard identification (FSA Step 1) 41 

6.2 Risk control options (FSA Step 3) 41 

6.3 Comparative risk assessment (FSA Step 2) 42 

6.4 Cost-benefit assessment (FSA step 4) 49 

6.5 Sensitivity analysis 50 

6.6 Discussion and recommendations (FSA step 5) 55 

7 References 57 

Table of Appendices 

Appendix A: Collision Model 58 

Appendix B: Grounding Model 71 

Appendix C: Ship Operation Costs and Externalities 78 

Appendix D: Enlarged Figures 80 

Appendix E: Curricula Vitae 101 

Appendix F: Hazard Identification 113 


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Aim 

1 Summary 

The present study has two objectives. Firstly, it assesses the effect of traffic 

separation scheme that was introduced in the Bornholmsgat in 2006. Apart 

from separating the traffic into two separate lanes, it also alters the route geometry. 

Secondly, the study investigates the effect of a possible future traffic diversion 

that would concern vessels passing Bornholm on their way to and from the 

Gdańsk Bay. The concept at question is to move medium draught vessels (7-10 

m) sailing in the shallow waters off Bornholm’s south coast further away from 

the coast and to restrict all large draught vessels (>10 m) to the area north-east 

of Bornholm. 

These two changes are assessed with respect to their costs and benefits. 

Methods and 

procedure 

To this purpose, the risk of ship accidents is calculated for the situation before 

and after a sea route change and successively compared. This requires knowledge 

about the expected frequency and the consequences of several accident 

types, including collisions (in head-on, crossing and overtaking situations) as 

well as groundings (due to imprecise navigation or due to lacking attention). 

The frequency of each of this accident types is calculated by making use of 

state-of-the-art accident models based on the physical conditions leading to an 

accident. The required input data originate from AIS ship movement records 

covering every single ship movement. Data from Lloyd’s Register add the necessary 

information about the physical properties of each single vessel. This 

combination of models and data leads to an extensive coverage of all parts in 

the study area. 

Combining accident frequencies of each accident type with the corresponding 

consequences yields a risk image of the study area. Modelled consequences are 

include loss of life, loss of assets (ship damage, ship loss, loss of revenue, loss 

of cargo) and clean-up costs after oil spillage. Converting risk, i.e. frequency 

time consequences into monetary units (expected costs), provide means of comparison 

and is a prerequisite for cost-benefit analysis. 

In the cost-benefit analysis, expected costs are combined with direct costs, such 

as ship operation costs and externalities because of exhaust fumes. 


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In the process of the study, two workshops were held, the first in order to indentify 

the relevant hazards, the second in order to validate and discuss the results. 

The conclusions of the second workshop served as feedback in order to 

refine the risk model. 

Results: Bornholmsgat 

The introduction of the traffic separation scheme in the Bornholmsgat has had a 

clear effect upon navigational risk. When comparing the situation in 2005 and 

that in 2006, it appears that expected accident costs fell from DKK 29.0 million 

(€3.9 million) to DKK 18.3 million (€2.5 million) per year. This corresponds to 

a decrease by DKK 10.7 million per year or 37 percent. 

The largest part of this effect is due to a strong reduction in head-on collision 

risk. This is an obvious effect of the traffic separation which provides one sailing 

lane for each traffic direction. Besides, crossing collisions were reduced, 

although it can be expected that the actual reduction is even greater. The new 

traffic separation scheme forces traffic from Øresund and from Kadetrenden to 

merge in a designated cautionary area, which makes other ships’ behaviour 

more predictable. However, this effect is not included in the physically-based 

collision model. Groundings are equally reduced, but their contribution to total 

risk is limited due to their comparatively small consequences. 

Accident costs are dominated by clean-up costs due to oil spillage. This dominance 

is clear in the Bornholmsgat itself, where oil tankers are a significant 

traffic contribution, while being weak in the remaining waters surrounding 

Bornholm. 

As a result, it can be said that the introduction of the traffic separation scheme 

has reduced navigational risk significantly. 

Results: Gdańsk 

Bay traffic 

As mentioned, it was conceived to divert vessels sailing to and from Gdańsk, 

Kaliningrad and Klaipėda to different routes, in dependence of their respective 

draught. The corresponding traffic volume is low compared to that in the Bornholmsgat, 

which means that the absolute accident risk reduction is relatively 

low, too. Accident costs can be expected to drop from DKK 2.34 million to 

DKK 2.19 million per year, in the areas north-east and south of Bornholm, 

where the traffic diversion would be implemented. This corresponds to a drop 

by 6 percent. 

When including the heavily frequented, but only marginally affected Bornholmsgat 

in the consideration, total expected accident costs fall from currently 

DKK 18.3 million (€2.47 million) to DKK 18.0 million (€2.42 million) per 

year. This decrease by DKK 285,000 (€38,000) per year corresponds to a reduction 

by 2%. 

However, these numbers reflect only the accident costs, while ignoring direct 

costs, i.e. ship operation costs and externalities. They, too, are influenced because 

ships would on average be forced to take slightly longer routes than presently. 

These costs would rise by DKK 4.00 million (€537.000) per year, which 

clearly outbalances the reduction in accident costs. Out of these 4 millions, 


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more than 50 percent are due to damages caused by additional ship exhaust 

fumes. 

The proposed measure appears unfavourable, unless the scope is limited to accident 

costs alone. In that case, there is s slight benefit. 


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2 Background 

2.1 Motivation 

In 2006, a new traffic separation scheme was introduced in the waters between 

the Danish island of Bornholm and the Swedish mainland (also known as Bornholmsgat). 

This scheme assigns separate lanes to each traffic direction and 

regulates the route geometry. The Bornholmsgat is used by the predominant 

part of all traffic between the Baltic Sea and the North Sea and is therefore 

heavily frequented. 

The first motivation of this report is to compare the situation before and after 

the introduction of the traffic separation scheme. To this purpose, a comparative 

assessment is to investigate the change in risk. The focus is on risk to human 

life, environment and assets due to ship accidents. 

Furthermore, there is an ongoing issue concerning the less intensive, but nevertheless 

significant traffic from the Southeast Baltic Sea. This traffic originates 

mainly from the ports of Gdańsk, Kaliningrad and Klaipėda. In case of an oil 

spillage, sensitive ecosystems and recreational areas in Denmark, Sweden and 

Poland would possibly be affected. 

Here, the motivation is to evaluate the sensibility of a possible future traffic diversion. 

Again, a comparative risk assessment is to investigate the effect upon 

risk. In this case, the status quo needs to be compared to the situation that could 

be expected in the future after an eventual sea route has been introduced. 

2.2 Target group 

The study aims to provide decision support to the Danish Maritime Authority 

(Søfartsstyrelsen), to the Royal Danish Administration of Navigation and Hydrography 

(Farvandsvæsenet) and to the involved Baltic Sea country authorities 

represented in the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM). 

2.3 Risk concept 

In the present study, risk is understood according to its classical definition in 

decision theory: 


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Risk = Probability of unwanted event × Consequences of unwanted event 

If all consequences are converted into monetary units, then “risk” signifies the 

same as “expected costs/expected benefits”. 

2.4 Work group 

All members of the work group are briefly introduced in the following. Their 

CVs can be found in the appendix. 

2.4.1 Consultant (COWI A/S) 

Table 1 

Consultant personnel 

Function 

Project manager 

Key personnel 

Name 

Inger B. Kroon 

Albrecht Lentz 

Henrik Gluver 

Specialist 

External specialist 

Lene Schepper 

Prof. Peter Friis Hansen, DTU 

2.4.2 Client (Søfartsstyrelsen) 

The Client, Danish Maritime Authority (Søfartsstyrelsen) is represented by 

Aron F. Sørensen. 

2.4.3 Participants of Workshop I (Hazard identification) 

Workshop I was held at Hotel Griffen, Rønne, Bornholm on 6-7 June 2007. 

The following persons participated: 

Table 2 

Participant 

Finn Wessel 

Participants of Workshop I 

Position 

Pilot 

Johnny Vang Nielsen 

Kurt Bruun-Villadsen 

Frank Kiel Rasmussen 

Henrik Hammer Jensen 

Henrik Balle 

Aron F. Sørensen 

Flag captain, Bornholmstrafikken A/S 

Chief officer, M/F Ask, Scandlines 

Naval captain, Bornholms Marinedistrikt 

Vice chairman, Bornholms og Christiansøs 

Fiskeriforening 

Chairman, Tejn Yacht Club 

Special consulent, Danish Maritime Authority 

(Søfartsstyrelsen) 


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Michael Skov 

Peter Friis Hansen 


Lene Schepper 


Inspektoratschef, Royal Danish Administration 

of Navigation and Hydrography (Farvandsvæsenet) 

Professor, Technical University of Denmark 

Consultant, COWI A/S 

Consultant COWI A/S 


Since Workshop I was a workshop in the sense of /IMO FSA/, Appendix E 

contains mini-CVs of the mentioned persons. 

2.4.4 Participants of Workshop II (Result validation) 

Workshop II was held at Søfartsstyrelsen in Copenhagen on 6 November 2007. 

The following persons participated: 

Table 3 

Participants of Workshop II 

Participant 

Elo Jacobsen 

Max Ellegaard 

Ulf Lejdebrink 

Pernilla Bergstedt 

Carsten Glen Jensen 

Aron F. Sørensen 

Michael Skov 



Position 

Bornholms Marinedistrikt 

Bornholms Marinedistrikt 

Sjöfartsinspektionen 

Sjöfartsverket 

Danish Maritime Authority (Søfartsstyrelsen) 

Special consulent, Danish Maritime Authority 

(Søfartsstyrelsen) 

Inspektoratschef, Royal Danish Administration 

of Navigation and Hydrography (Farvandsvæsenet) 

Consultant, COWI A/S 


Workshop II was not a workshop in the sense of /IMO FSA/. Therefore, no 

CVs are provided. 

2.5 Procedure 

The procedure is based on IMO’s Guidelines for formal safety assessment 

(FSA) /IMO FSA/, as displayed in Figure 1. 


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Figure 1 

Flow chart of the FSA methodology /IMO FSA/ 

This concept lead to the following succession of work steps during the project: 

Table 4 

Work flow 

IMO FSA system Description Work group 

Step 1 Hazard identification Workshop I 

Step 3 Risk control options 1 Client + Consultant 

Step 2 Risk assessment Consultant 

Step 4 Cost-benefit assessment Consultant 

- Result validation and discussion 

Repeat step 3 

Adjustment of risk control options 

Workshop II 

Repeat step 2 

Repeat step 4 

Step 5 

Adjustment of risk assessment 

Adjustment of cost-benefit assessment 

Decision-making recommendations 

Consultant 

1 Risk control options were predefined to a large degree. 


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3 Limits of the Analysis 

3.1 Scope 

3.1.1 Accidents 

The scope is limited to those types of ship accidents that are directly dependent 

on the local situation and that can be expected to be affected by a change in the 

sea route system. This is typically the case for collisions and groundings, while 

not being the case for fires on board, system failure and similar events. 

Parallel collisions 

Crossing collisions 

Powered groundings 

Drift groundings 

Accidents involving 

small vessels 

This collision type concerns all ships that are sailing on a parallel or almost 

parallel course, as it can be observed along sea routes. There are two types of 

parallel collisions, i.e. head-on and overtaking collisions. 

All other collisions between two moving vessels are classified as crossing 

collisions. 

If a ship runs aground or ashore despite of fully operational propulsion and 

rudder systems, the event is referred to as powered grounding. The study differentiates 

between two types of powered groundings: Those that are due to 

imprecise navigation and those that occur if bridge personnel are unable to follow 

their duty over a prolonged period, leading to a head-on collision with a 

ground or coast. This second grounding type is typically due to alcohol, sleep, 

sudden disease or various distractions. A failure of information systems may 

equally have an effect here. 

This grounding type occurs due to wind and wave action after system failure on 

board of the vessel. It is critical mostly in very narrow navigational channels, 

such as Øresund, where a ship drifts aground after a comparatively short time. 

This cannot be compared to the area around Bornholm, where there is much 

more space. Drift groundings are therefore not investigated in the study. 

The above models are based on traffic data obtained through the Automatic 

Identification System (AIS). Only ships with 300 gross tons and more are 

obliged to use AIS devices, although some minor ships also do. Available data 

is therefore much more limited for small vessels, which mainly include fishing 

boats and yachts (see traffic data description in chapter 4.2). 


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Small vessels are only considered in as far as they directly interact with major 

vessels, i.e. where small and major vessels collide. Groundings of small vessels 

are not included in the study. 

3.1.2 Consequences 

All consequences are converted into monetary units (Danish currency, DKK) in 

order to provide a common means of comparison for the cost-benefit assessment. 

Loss of life 

Cleanup costs 

Loss of assets 

Not accidentrelated 

costs 

Loss of life is converted into monetary units by using the so-called value of a 

statistical life (VSL). Every person has a limited willingness to pay for a possible 

prolongation of his own life or that of a fellow member of society by a 

small time span. Extrapolating the willingness to pay from this time span to the 

duration of an average life yields the VSL. 

These include the costs occurring due to cleanup after spillage of bunker oil or 

an oil tanker’s cargo. 

Ship owners and their insurers face an array of different costs in the wake of an 

accident. These can include repair costs and loss of income during repair (if the 

ship was not lost), replacement of the ship (if it sank or suffered constructive 

total loss) as well as loss of cargo. 

A change in sea routes will typically lead to a change in sailing distances. This 

influences fuel and capital costs- Furthermore, additional engine exhaust fumes 

will heighten societal and environmental damage. 

3.2 Geographical limits 

The study is limited to the area around Bornholm and can be divided into three 

major areas of interest (see Figure 2). Its eastern part is more or less confined to 

the limits of Denmark’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In the west, it reaches 

into the German and Swedish EEZs in order to fully cover the effect of actual 

and (possibly) future changes in the sea route system. 

Bornholmsgat 

The waters between Bornholm and the Swedish mainland is known as 

Bornholmsgat. This is the area where the main traffic between North Sea and 

Baltic Sea runs. In the context of this study, the Bornholmsgat is understood in 

a wider sense, such that it includes the merging points with traffic sailing northeast 

and south of Bornholm (see below). 

North-east of Bornholm These waters are frequented by ships sailing between the Southeast Baltic Sea 

(mainly Gdańsk/Kaliningrad/Klaipėda) and the North Sea via Bornholmsgat. 

South of Bornholm 

These waters are frequented by ships sailing between the Southeast Baltic Sea 

(mainly Gdańsk/Kaliningrad/Klaipėda) and the North Sea, but avoiding Bornholmsgat. 

This route is more direct for many ships, but is not preferable for 

ships with a large draught. 


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The study area is therefore slightly larger than Denmark’s exclusive economic 

zone (EEZ) around Bornholm. 

Accident rates will equally be calculated and illustrated for some surrounding 

areas outside the geographical boundaries in order to give a more coherent picture. 

However, they will not be part of the aggregated results. 

Figure 2 

Geographical limits of the study (sea map from /KMS/) 


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4 Data and Methods 

4.1 Ship data 

Lloyd’s register contains key data for all sea-going, self-propelled merchant 

ships larger than 100 gross tons. These data include a vessel’s dimensions, displacement, 

gross tonnage, dead weight tonnage, vessel type, speed, age, various 

constructive properties (bulb, ice class etc.) and many more. 

In the register, ships can be identified by their IMO number, their past and present 

names or their call sign. 

4.2 Ship traffic data 

The primary 

intent of AIS 

4.2.1 AIS data 

Automatic Information System (AIS) is a system that allows ships and coast 

stations to keep track of all vessels in an area in order to avoid collisions. Every 

AIS user can see the name, IMO number, position, speed, course and other information 

for every other AIS-equipped ship within a certain geographical 

range. 

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) prescribes AIS devices on 

board of all vessels of 300 gross tons and larger. Many vessels below this limit 

are equally equipped with AIS. 

AIS as data 

mining tool 

AIS can also be used in order to record every single ship movement in an area 

during an extended period. The Technical University of Denmark (DTU) has 

processed the AIS data for the study area for the two periods 01.07.2005- 

31.12.2005 and 01.07.2006-31.12.2006. The introduction of the traffic separation 

scheme in the Bornholmsgat falls in between the two measurement periods. 

The effect of the new traffic separation scheme can be clearly seen by 

comparing Figure 3 (before) and Figure 4 (after). The two-lane traffic pattern is 

very well visible in the 2006 picture. 


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Figure 3 Plot of all AIS traffic data from July-December 2005 

Figure 4 Plot of all AIS traffic data from July-December 2006 


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Data preparation 

In order to use the AIS data in a collision and grounding risk analysis, they 

require further preparation. A helpful approach is to define some virtual lines 

and count all vessels that cross them, together with IMO number, speed, course 

over ground, the precise location of the crossing and other information. 

COWI defined a number of those crossing lines, which were chosen in order to 

reflect the traffic patterns in a suiting way (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). Subsequently, 

Technical University of Denmark (DTU) generated crossing statistics 

for each of these lines. These statistics are the basics of all subsequent modelling, 

as described in the following chapters. 

Figure 5 

Crossing lines, 2005 case 


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Figure 6 

Crossing lines, 2006 case 

4.2.2 Other data 

AIS data are not available for minor ships, most specifically fishing ships and 

yachts. Instead, data have been collected from other sources, such as ports and 

authorities. 

Fishing boats 

The Danish Fishing Directorate (Fiskeridirektoratet) keeps record of fishing 

boats calling at Danish ports. Their data include information about the origin of 

the journey, date of arrival, gross tonnage and vessel length. 

The HazID workshop provided valuable information about the most frequented 

fishing grounds in the Bornholm area. 

Yachts 

This group of boats includes both motor and sailing yachts. 

The operator of Nørrekås yacht harbour in Rønne provided a rough number of 

yacht visits both for Nørrekås and the nearby commercial port of Rønne. Detailed 

statistics are available for Nexø. 

As far as all other yacht harbours in Bornholm and Christiansø are concerned, 

information is limited to the number of boat places (total/permanent/guests). 

Since the relation between visits and places is known for Rønne and Nexø, this 

can be used as a very rough estimate of traffic in the respective harbours, in 

combination with other numbers. 

These include estimates on the total number of visits to Bornholm/Christiansø 

as well as the police’s immigration statistics, which contain the date and port of 


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arrival for all yachts arriving from outside the Schengen area. At the time of 

data collection, the “new” EU countries, such as Poland and the Baltic states, 

were not member of the Schengen group yet. 

Other ships 

Rønne port authority provided statistics about the date of arrival and the size of 

all vessels below 300 gross tons (AIS not compulsory) calling at their port. 

Nexø port authority provided statistics of the total gross tonnage that has been 

shipped through the port as well as the total number of visits. 

4.3 Ship accident data 

Principally, accident rates are modelled by means of the collision and grounding 

models introduced in sections 4.5 and 4.6 below. However, it is helpful to 

compare with empirical ship accident data. These data have been collected in 

an applicable form during a relatively short period of time (10-15 years) compared 

to the observed accident rate (often less than one per year for major vessels 

in the area). Therefore, it is not possible to establish an empirical approach 

based on these scarce records. 

However, the accident data are useful when verifying the collision and grounding 

model described further below. 

Enlarged figure 

in Appendix D 

Figure 7 Ship accidents observed 1993-2006 

Figure 7 gives a graphical presentation of the accident data obtained for DMA 

and Sjöfartsverket. Swedish data only include collisions and groundings. The 

data depicted is from the period 1993-2006 and only data for which a geo- 


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graphical position is given is included in the figure. However, descriptions below 

include all accidents irrespective of whether precise location is specified. 

For further analysis only accident data collected from 1997 can be considered 

reliable. Data in DMAs accident statistics from 1993-1996 seems not to be 

complete, which has also been concluded in previous studies, and have not be 

included in the following. 

4.3.1 Collisions 

In the area around Bornholm having interest for present study (largely 13°30' to 

15°50' and 54°40' to 55°30') there has in a 10 year period (1997-2006) been 16 

collisions registered by Danish authorities and 3 by Swedish authorities. One 

accident is covered by both sets of statistics resulting in 18 collisions in 10 

years. 

Of these 18 collisions, 6 are for sure not of interest for this study, since these 

are collisions between vessels both under 300GT and this also seems to be the 

case for an other 5 collisions. Thus, 7 of the 18 collisions involve one or two 

vessels of 300GT or more. 5 of these 7 collisions involve fishing vessels, 1 is 

the severe collision between the bulk carrier Fu Shan Hai and the container ship 

Gdynia in 2003, which resulted in oil spill, and the last collision does not have 

sufficient description for further conclusions. 

4.3.2 Groundings 

In the area around Bornholm having interest for present study (largely 13°30' to 

15°50' and 54°40' to 55°30') there has in a 10 year period (1997-2006) been 

around 10 groundings registered by Danish authorities and 2 by Swedish authorities. 

However 5 of the 10 Danish registered groundings are grounding by 

fishing vessels below 300GT. Swedish authorities have registered 2 groundings 

in the area of interest, however, 1 of these is a small fishing vessel resulting in 

1 grounding of interest west of Sandhammaren. In a 10 year period 6 relevant 

groundings have this been registered. 

4.4 Geographic information 

Geographical information is obtained from Kort- & Matrikelstyrelsens 

“Levende Søkort” (“living sea map”) /KMS/. 

4.5 Collision model 

The collision model describes the yearly rate of ship-ship collisions as well as 

the consequences of such events. A detailed description of the methods and assumptions 

is given in Appendix A. 


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4.5.1 Parallel collision frequency 

When two ships collide while sailing on the same route, this is referred to as 

parallel collision. There are two basic cases: 

• Head-on collisions between two ships heading in opposed directions 

• Overtaking collisions between two ships heading in the same direction 

These two cases are illustrated in Figure 8. 

V2, L2, B2 

µ, σ 

V2, L2, B2 

µ, σ 

µ, σ 

µ, σ 

V 1, L 1, B 1 

V 1, L 1, B 1 

Route length, L 


Figure 8 

Head-on and overtaking collisions 

Parallel collision frequencies depend on 

• the length of the route segment 

• the traffic intensity in each of the two directions 

• width and speed of the ships 

• the deviation of the ships from the route axis 

• causation probability P C , i.e. the probability that none of the ships bound 

for collision undertakes successful evasive action. 

The ship and traffic data described earlier in this chapter provide this kind of 

information. 


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4.5.2 Crossing collision frequency 

Any ship-ship collision that does not involve two ships sailing on the same 

route is classified as crossing collision. 

In a first step, it has to be clarified, whether two ships can theoretically collide. 

This is only the case, if their traces intersect. Essentially, there are two basic 

kinds of crossings: X-crossings (full intersection) and Y-crossings (merging 

traffic): 

Figure 9 

X-type crossing 

Figure 10 

Y-type crossing with and without intersection 

For X-crossings, basic prerequisite for collision is given in every single crossing 

event. For Y-crossings, this applies only to one out of two crossing events 

on average. 

All other, more complex crossing types, such as two-lane Y-crossings or 

roundabouts can be modelled as an array of several X- and Y-crossings (see 

Appendix A). 

On this basis, collision frequency is calculated based on 


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• width, length and speed of the ships 

• the crossing angle 



4.5.3 Collision consequences 

During an earlier COWI project dealing with oil and chemical spillage /COWI 

2007/, Erik Sonne Ravn and Peter Friis Hansen from DTU developed a simulation 

program for the consequences of ship-ship collisions. 

It simulates the consequences of a collision 

• between a large number of ship types and ship sizes 

• for different collision angles 

• for loaded and unloaded ships 

• with and without double hull 

• with and without bunker protection 

• in dependency of the geometry of the respective ship, i.e. number and location 

of compartments, location of bunker etc. 

In the original version, these consequences included 

• loss of cargo in percent (for tankers and bulk carriers) 

• loss of bunker oil in percent (for all ship types) 

The program was extended for the present study in order to also yield 

• the diameter of the penetration hole in the hull of the struck ship 

• the probability of shipwreck (sinking) 

The simulation results are also used as a basis for determining 

• the expected number of lives lost 

• the loss of earnings while a damaged ship is being repaired 

Appendix A provides a more extensive description of the model. 


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Sandhammeren 

Svartgrund 


23 

4.6 Grounding model 

The grounding model describes the yearly rate of ships running aground or 

ashore as well as the consequences of such events. A detailed description of the 

methods and assumptions is given in Appendix B. 

4.6.1 Modelling of the grounds 

Seen from a ship, an island does not appear as a more or less round object as 

from the air, but as a line on the horizon. In geometrical terms, this line is called 

a projection. If the course of the ship aims at a point inside the projection, 

the ship will run ashore, provided it continues on a straight course. 

The same thought is valid for sub-sea grounds, even if they are invisible. The 

only condition is that the ship draught is greater than the water depth at the 

ground location. Therefore, a simple way of modelling grounds is to determine 

their projections with respect to the relevant sea routes, as it is done in Figure 

11. 

Davids 

Banke 

Adler- 

grund 

Figure 11 

Ground projections (with green boarder lines) 

If a ground is relevant for two sea routes, then there are two ground projections 

forming a cross. 


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4.6.2 Modelling of the ships 

When analysing the grounding probability, the relevant characteristic of a ship 

is its draught. In principle, the actual draught of a ship is transmitted via its AIS 

device. However, this piece of information was partly not reliable and partly 

not available for this study. Therefore, it was decided to use maximum draught 

instead. Lloyd’s Register contains this type of information for every single ship. 

Of course, this means that the grounding risk will be systematically overestimated 

in the analysis, i.e. the model is quite conservative in this respect. 

4.6.3 Grounding frequency 

The present study distinguished two basic types of groundings. One is due to 

imprecise navigation (Figure 12). The other one occurs, when bridge personnel 

is lacking attention due to alcohol, sleepiness and other distractions. Failure of 

bridge information systems can have the same effect (Figure 13). 

Figure 12 

Grounding due to imprecise navigation 

turning 

point 

--- sea route --- 

Figure 13 

Grounding due to missed turn 


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In both accident modes, the same parameters determine the grounding probability: 

• ground depth and vessel draught 

• location of vessel and ground 

• distribution of the vessel course (i.e. the weight of the different arrows in 

Figure 12) 

In addition, missed-turn groundings depend on 

• the distance between turning point and ground 

• the frequency, at which bridge personnel checks ship position and course 

Appendix B provides a more detailed description. 

4.6.4 Grounding consequences 

The consequence model for groundings is based on a previous project /COWI 

2007/. The model provides an estimate for the spillage of cargo (oil tankers) 

and of bunker oil (all ship types) based on a statistical approach. 

Furthermore, some relations describing the probability and extent of ship damage 

as well as the expected number of lives lost were needed for the risk assessment. 

These modelling aspects are further explained in Appendix B. 

4.7 Direct cost model 

Accident costs occur with some uncertainty, because accidents are uncertain. 

Therefore they are referred to expected costs. Expected costs are opposed to 

direct costs, i.e. costs that will occur with certainty. 

In the case of traffic re-routing, such direct costs (or benefits) arise mainly because 

of the difference in route lengths, leading to different sailing durations 

between point A and point B. Among others, this affects 

• fuel consumption costs 

• capital costs for owning and running the ship 

• external costs, i.e. damage due to ship engine exhaust fumes 

Appendix C quantifies these factors in DKK per kilometre for a number of ship 

types and sizes. The numbers are based on ship trading data from /Clarksons 

2007/ and environmental data from /Transportmin/. 


.


26 

Apart from the mentioned costs, other factors can contribute in case of a traffic 

re-routing. These are caused by sea map editing, buoy installation etc. 


.


27 

5 Retrospective Risk Assessment of the 

Bornholm Gat Traffic Separation Scheme 

5.1 Hazard identification (FSA step 1) 

The hazard identification was performed during Workshop I. Its result is displayed 

as a list in Appendix F. 

It is common to rank hazards in a qualitative way in order to determine, which 

of them deserve quantitative investigation. However, it turned out that all significant 

hazards are covered by the accident models considered in the present 

study (compare chapter 4). Therefore, ranking is regarded as being futile in the 

present context. 

5.2 Risk control options (FSA step 3) 

The risk control measure, i.e. the introduction of a traffic separation scheme in 

the Bornholmsgat has been introduced prior to this analysis. The present analysis 

is meant to assess its effectiveness in terms of safety and cost-benefit effects. 

5.3 Comparative risk assessment (FSA step 2 and 4) 

This section compares the situation in July-December 2005 (no traffic separation) 

to the situation in July-December 2006 (traffic separation scheme implemented). 

All numbers are based on the number of accidents expected for the 

observed traffic patterns. 

These frequencies are relatively small, i.e. less than one event per year for the 

different accident types. Therefore, comparing with the actual events during 

July-December 2005 and July-December 2006 is not an option. 

In /IMO FSA/, risk assessment and cost-benefit assessment are regarded as two 

separate steps. This is necessary, because accident costs (expected costs) are 

usually not the only costs. A risk-reduction measure usually also leads to direct 

costs that occur independently of any accident, such as implementation costs, 

changes in ship operation costs due to shorter/longer routes etc. 


.


28 

However, direct costs are not relevant for the retrospective view upon the introduction 

of the traffic separation scheme in 2006. When accident costs are the 

only cost/benefit contribution, it becomes meaningless to differentiate between 

a comparative risk assessment (using monetary units) and a cost-benefit assessment. 

Results for 2005 

traffic data 

5.3.1 Effect upon expected accident frequency 

Table 5 provides a concentrated overview over the results obtained for the traffic 

pattern observed in 2005. A more visual illustration is given in Figure 14 

and the following 2 . 

Table 5 

Accident frequencies expected for 2005 traffic data 

Area 

Parallel 

collisions 

Crossing 

collisions 

Imprecision 

groundings 

Missed-turn 


Total 

Bornholmsgat 0.135 0.200 0.190 0.000 0.525 

NE of Bornholm 0.001 0.010 0.087 0.000 0.098 

S of Bornholm 0.006 0.033 0.192 0.000 0.232 

All 0.142 0.243 0.469 0.000 0.855 

Little surprisingly, the largest share of all accidents is expected in the Bornholmsgat, 

where sea traffic is heaviest. The contribution of parallel collisions, 

crossing collisions and groundings due to imprecise navigation is in about balanced 

there. Parallel collisions are made up of head-on collisions and overtaking 

collisions in equal shares (Figure 14). 

This is not the case for the areas north-east and south of Bornholm. There, parallel 

collisions < crossing collisions < imprecision groundings is the case, each 

time with about one order of magnitude in between. Figure 14 and the following 

illustrate that traffic in this area is not only weaker, but also much less concentrated 

when comparing with the Bornholmsgat. Parallel collisions are much 

more likely if traffic for concentrated traffic. With crossing collisions, there is 

no such dependency (see also Appendix A for an explanation of the collision 

models). Grounding is by far the most significant contribution to accident frequency 

in these waters. 

Missed-turn groundings do not appear at all in any of the simulations. This is 

due to the model that was chosen, which is the only scientifically approved 

model available at the moment. However, it is designed for much narrower 

straits and therefore does not describe the present situation sufficiently well 

(discussion in Appendix B). In fact, a number of this type of accident have been 

observed in the Bornholmsgat. 

2 Note that the figures also include results lying outside the geographical limits of the study 

area, unlike the information in the tables (see Figure 2 for description of the study area). 


.


29 

Collisions involving small vessels amount to 5.8% of accidents. The majority 

of these accidents concern fishing boats (5.6%), whereas only a small part involves 

sailing and motor yachts (0.2%). 


traffic data 

Table 6 contains the basic accident frequencies for the traffic pattern recorded 

in 2006. These numbers are illustrated by Figure 15 and the following. 

Table 6 

Accident frequencies expected for 2006 traffic data 


Parallel 

collisions 


collisions 

Imprecision 


Missed-turn 


Total 




All 0.130 0.248 0.452 0.000 0.830 

Judging by Table 6, the relative contribution of the different areas and accident 

types is in about the same as for 2005. Amongst others, this is also the case for 

parallel collisions. Yet, Figure 15 reveals that parallel collisions are dominated 

by overtaking collisions, whereas head-on collisions contribute only a small 

percentage. 

Small vessels contribute in a similar way as in 2005: A share of 4.9% of all accidents 

is due to collisions with fishing boats, 0.2% are due collisions with 

yachts. 

Comparison of 

2005 and 2006 

Judging by the overview in Table 7, the total accident frequency estimate 

changes only little between 2005 and 2006 traffic data. A reduction by 3% is 

not strong enough to be called significant. The result depends upon each single 

ship passage and it has to be considered that no ship sails precisely the same 

way twice. Traffic volume was practically the same in the two years. 

Table 7 Change in expected accident frequencies from 2005 to 2006 


Parallel 

collisions 


collisions 

Imprecision 


Missed-turn 


Total 

Bornholmsgat -11% 2% -11% - -6% 

NE of Bornholm -39% -2% +1% - +0% 

S of Bornholm +47% +5% +1% - +3% 

All -9% 2% -4% - -3% 

However, there are significant differences with respect to the share of the different 

accident types, which is more than relevant, considering that different 

accident types have different consequences (which will prove to have a great 

effect in section 5.3.2). 


.


30 

The most striking change concerns parallel collisions, which are sub-divided 

into head-on and overtaking collisions. Even although parallel collisions became 

only 11% less likely, there is a strong descent in (dangerous) head-on collisions 

together with an increase in (not so dangerous) overtaking collisions. 

This change is a direct consequence of the traffic separation. In fact, the increase 

in overtaking collisions does probably not correspond to the real situation, 

but is due to the nature of the geometrical collision model (see Appendix 

A). The shift between head-on and overtaking collisions can be clearly seen 

when comparing Figure 14 and Figure 15. 

Parallel collisions have changed drastically both north-east and south of Bornholm. 

This change can in part be explained by a relocation of traffic to/from the 

Gdańsk Bay from north-east to south around Bornholm. This relocation is a 

consequence of the traffic separation scheme, because ships arriving from the 

east are brought to merge with the main Bornholmsgat traffic in a different 

way. 

However, the low absolute probabilities of parallel collisions and the low ship 

passage frequency appear to be part of the reasons of the strong relative change: 

Every single ship has a strong influence upon the result, especially when ships 

on route traffic do not sail in a clear sea system, but follow the route in a more 

or less random pattern. 

Crossing collisions remain more or less unchanged. Comparing Figure 16 and 

Figure 17 may give a less clear image, because the pictograms are arranged in a 

different way in order to depict the differing traffic patterns correctly. However, 

Table 7 shows that the numbers are basically unchanged. 

Of course, one would expect less dangerous crossing situation considering that 

the traffic patterns have become more easily predictable for traffic participants. 

This, however, is not covered by the model, which is of a mostly geometrical 

character. 

Expected grounding frequency equally decreased for the 2006 traffic data case. 

This illustrates the effect of the new S-shaped sea route. It avoids two grounds, 

Sandhammaren and Davids Banke (illustrated in Figure 11). This, however, 

only leads to a clear effect in the case of Sandhammeren. 

Collisions with small vessels are affected, too. Collisions between major vessels 

and fishing boats sank by 14%, whereas similar accidents with yachts rose 

by 6% due to the new traffic separation system. This increase is not due to the 

traffic separation scheme, but basically due to increased ferry and fast ferry 

traffic to and from Rønne port (according to AIS records). However, the absolute 

contribution of yachts can be neglected compared to that of fishing boats. 


.


31 



Figure 14 

Expected frequency of parallel collisions for 2005 traffic data 



Figure 15 

Expected frequency of parallel collisions for 2006 traffic data 


.


32 



Figure 16 

Expected frequency of crossing collisions for 2005 traffic data 



Figure 17 

Expected frequency of crossing collisions for 2006 traffic data 


.


33 



Figure 18 Expected frequency of groundings due to imprecise navigation for 2005 

traffic data 



Figure 19 Expected frequency of groundings due to imprecise navigation for 2005 

traffic data 


.


34 

5.3.2 Effect upon risk (cost-benefit assessment) 

Combining the accident frequencies from the previous section with the accident 

consequences yields risk. This study covers a number of different consequences 

that can be measured in different units, such as number of lives lost, damaged 

ship hull area, repair time or amount of oil spilt, as described in chapters 3 

and 4. 

All these consequences and units are converted into a monetary measure. If 

consequences are expressed in monetary units, then risk means expected cost/ 

expected benefit. 

The results will be grouped into two classes in order to provide a better overview: 

• Clean-up costs include all direct costs originating from an oil spill. This 

concerns spillage from oil tankers as well as from the bunker tanks of ordinary 

ships 

• Loss of assets include all other costs concerning the ship owner and crew, 

such as repair costs, loss of business during repair, total ship loss, loss of 

cargo and loss of life 


traffic data 

A look at Table 8 shows that crossing collisions account for approx. 60% of all 

consequences, whereas parallel collisions contribute 30% and groundings 10%. 

This distribution differs somewhat from the accident frequencies in Table 5. In 

particular, it appears that groundings have only comparatively small consequences, 

despite of their relatively high frequency. 

Table 8 

Expected accident costs [DKK] for 2005 traffic data – by accident type 


Parallel 

collisions 


collisions 

Imprecision 


Missed-turn 


Total 

Bornholmsgat 8,812,000 15,747,000 2,205,000 0 26,764,000 

NE of Bornholm 122,000 266,000 303,000 0 692,000 

S of Bornholm 200,000 811,000 549,000 0 1,560,000 

All 9,135,000 16,823,000 3,057,000 0 29,015,000 

Two tendencies are predominant in Table 9, where the results are displayed by 

consequence type: The highest risk occurs in the Bornholmsgat (where traffic is 

strongest) and the dominating consequence type is clean-up costs. A combination 

of both, i.e. clean-up costs in the Bornholmsgat, stands therefore for 

approx. 75% of all expected costs. These results are equally illustrated in 

Figure 20 and Figure 22 3 . 




.


35 

As stated in Section 6.3.1, missed-turn groundings do not appear at all in any of 

the simulations. This is due to the model that was chosen, which is the only scientifically 

approved model available at the moment. However, it is designed for 

much narrower straits and therefore does not describe the present situation sufficiently 

well (discussion in Appendix B). In fact, a number of this type of accident 

have been observed in the Bornholmsgat. 

Table 9 

Expected accident costs [DKK] for 2005 traffic data 

– by consequence type 

Area Loss of life & assets Clean-up costs Total 

Bornholmsgat 4,916,000 21,848,000 26,764,000 

NE of Bornholm 256,000 436,000 692,000 

S of Bornholm 641,000 919,000 1,560,000 

All 5,812,000 23,203,000 29,015,000 

Furthermore, an interesting comparison can be made between consequence 

types in the Bornholmsgat on one side and the area north-east/south of Bornholm 

on the other side: The relation between loss of life & assets and clean-up 

costs is 1:4.5 in the Bornholmsgat, whereas it is 1:1.5 north-east/south of Bornholm. 

In other words, the contribution of clean-up costs is grossly disproportional 

only in the Bornholmsgat. 

Apparently, oil tankers make up a higher share of traffic in the Bornholmsgat 

than elsewhere, resulting in a larger than average spill per accident. This is little 

surprising, given that there is more water depth there. Besides, Bornholmsgat is 

a part of the shortest connection between the Russian oil harbour of Primorsk 

and the entrance to the Baltic Sea. 

The risk contribution of small vessels is practically the same as their contribution 

to accident frequencies. Collisions with fishing boats are responsible for 

5.4% or DKK 1.15 million per year, collisions with sailing and motor yachts 

for 0.6% or DKK 987,000 per year. 


traffic data 

According to the results in Table 10, crossing collisions are responsible for almost 

80% of the expected damage. Comparing the weight of expected accident 

costs (Figure 21 and Figure 23) with that of expected accident frequencies 

(Figure 15 and Figure 17) shows that parallel collisions have only little effect 

despite of their high frequency. However, most parallel collisions are of the 

overtaking collision type, clearly outnumbering the much more hazardous 

head-on collision type. 

Collisions with fishing boats contribute 4.0% or DKK 0.99 million per year to 

the results. For yachts, the contribution amounts to 0.3 % or DKK 105,000 per 

year. 


.


36 

Table 10 

Expected accident costs [DKK] for 2006 traffic data – by accident type 


Parallel 

collisions 


collisions 

Imprecision 


Missed-turn 


Total 




All 1,796,000 13,493,000 2,992,000 0 18,281,000 

Table 11 

Expected accident costs [DKK] for 2006 traffic data 






All 4,514,000 13,767,000 18,281,000 


2005 and 2006 

As illustrated in the tables below, the introduction of the traffic separation 

scheme in 2006 leads to a risk reduction by 37%. The largest contribution originates 

from the decrease of parallel collision risk in the Bornholmsgat. This effect 

is remarkable, considering that the frequency of parallel collisions did not 

change between the two traffic cases. However, the balance between the two 

parallel collisions types – head-on and overtaking collisions – changed fundamentally. 

This fact has already been discussed above in section 5.3.1, but its effect only 

becomes apparent in the face of the risk numbers in Table 12 and Table 13. Little 

surprisingly, head-on collisions are much more dangerous than overtaking 

collisions. The underlying modelling assumptions can be read in Appendix A. 

Table 12 

Change in expected accident costs from 2005 to 2006 – by accident type 


Parallel 

collisions 


collisions 

Imprecision 


Missed-turn 


Total 

Bornholmsgat -84% -21% -5% - -40% 

NE of Bornholm -35% -6% +9% - -5% 

S of Bornholm +38% +4% +2% - +8% 

All -80% -20% -2% - -37% 

The consequences of parallel collisions are equally affected in the areas northeast 

and south of Bornholm. However, these changes are proportional to the 

changes in parallel collisions frequencies (Table 7). As stated above in section 


.


37 

5.3.1, these variations are partly due to a relocation of traffic from the northeast 

to the south and partly due low number of ships in this areas, which attributes 

high statistical weight to the behaviour of each single vessel. Besides, the 

absolute contribution of parallel collision risk is comparatively small when relating 

to the total risk. 

Another significant change concerns crossing collision risk in the Bornholmsgat. 

As with parallel collisions, this is remarkable, considering that the expected 

frequency of crossing collisions did not change. Most likely, the changed route 

geometry reduced the average collisions angle and therefore the severity of the 

consequences. 

Grounding risk changes in line with grounding frequency. This change is most 

significant in the Bornholmsgat, where absolute risk values are highest. Here, 

the effect is mostly due to the S-shape of the new traffic separation scheme, 

leading around the two grounds Sandhammeren and Davids Banke (illustrated 

in Figure 11). The drop in risk is due to the effect at Sandhammeren only. 

Table 13 Change in expected accident costs from 2005 to 2006 



Bornholmsgat -28% -43% -40% 

NE of Bornholm +3% -9% -5% 

S of Bornholm +13% +5% +8% 

All -22% -41% -37% 

According to Table 13, expected clean-up costs fell more strongly than expected 

loss of assets. This effect is most prounounced in the Bornholmsgat, 

where most of the large oil tankers sail (i.e. from Primorsk to the North Sea). 

The risk of accidents involving small ships is reduced by 13%. 


.


38 



Figure 20 

Expected yearly loss of assets (including loss of life) for 2005 traffic 

data 



Figure 21 


data 


.


39 



Figure 22 

Expected yearly clean-up costs for 2005 traffic data 



Figure 23 

Expected yearly clean-up costs for 2006 traffic data 


.


40 

5.4 Discussion and recommendations (FSA step 5) 

According to the analysis, the expected accident costs are reduced from DKK 

29.0 million (€3.9 million) to DKK 18.3 million (€2.5 million) per year due to 

the introduction of the new traffic separation scheme in the Bornholmsgat. This 

corresponds to a reduction by 37%. 

The drop in risk is mostly due to the separated lanes, leading to a radical reduction 

of the expected head-on collision frequency by 84%. As a consequence, 

crossing collisions now remain as the only major risk contributor, despite of 

equally having been reduced. The shape of the traffic scheme has had a positive 

effect upon grounding risk. However, the latter change is small, both in relative 

and in absolute terms. 

In reality, the effect of the traffic separation scheme can be expected to be even 

greater than indicated by the analysis. The analysis is mostly based upon different 

geometrical models, which take human behaviour only into account in a 

general way. Therefore, the psychological effect of a more clear traffic pattern 

with designated precautionary areas is not included in the crossing collision 

analysis. As far as parallel collisions are concerned, only the overtaking component 

is combined with a risk reduction factor, which was deemed conservative 

by Workshop II participants. It accounts for the fact that ships follow each 

other at viewing distance over a long period before potentially colliding. Besides 

they do so in full conscience of sailing on a highly frequented route. 

Judging by the results, it appears that the decision to introduce a traffic separation 

scheme in 2006 was clearly favourable with respect to risk, i.e. expected 

ship accident costs. 


.


41 

6 Prospective Risk Assessment of Route 

Specifications for Traffic to and from the 

Gdańsk Bay 

6.1 Hazard identification (FSA Step 1) 

The hazard identification was performed during Workshop I. Its result is displayed 

as a list in Appendix F. 

It is common to rank hazards in a qualitative way in order to determine, which 

of them deserve quantitative investigation. However, it turned out that all significant 

hazards are covered by the accident models considered in the present 

study (compare chapter 4). Therefore, ranking is regarded as being futile in the 

present context. 

6.2 Risk control options (FSA Step 3) 

6.2.1 Description of the risk control measures 

Danish Maritime Authority asked for assessing the effect of a possible vessel 

draught limitation in the area north-east and south of Bornholm. This affects 

mainly traffic related to the ports of Gdańsk, Kaliningrad and Klaipėda. The 

limitations are meant to 

• take all ships sailing north-east of Adlergrund with a draught between 7 

and 10 m and divert them to the area south of Adlergrund (both located 

south of Bornholm, as illustrated in Figure 11) 

• take all ships sailing south of Bornholm with a draught above 10 m and 

divert them to the area north-east of Bornholm. 

The geographical arrangement is illustrated in Figure 2 at the beginning of the 

report. 

6.2.2 Modelling of the risk control measures 

As a first step, the above-described risk control measures need to be integrated 

into the model. This is done by taking the observed traffic and rearranging it 

according to the traffic diversion described above. 


.


42 

In principle, this means that all ships that are going to be diverted are deleted 

from their present routes in the traffic data base and added to their alternative 

routes. In the course of this process it is assumed that the additional ships will 

behave the same way as those ships that have previously been sailing on the 

alternative route. This concerns mainly their distribution over the width of a 

route and differs between ships of different draught. 

6.3 Comparative risk assessment (FSA Step 2) 

This section compares the actually observed situation in July-December 2006 

(traffic separation scheme implemented) to the situation that can be expected if 

the above-described measures are implemented. All numbers are based on the 

number of accidents expected for the observed traffic patterns. 

These frequencies are very small, i.e. less than one event per year for the different 

accident types. Therefore, comparing with the actual events during July- 

December 2006 is not an option. 

Results for observed 

2006 traffic 

6.3.1 Effect upon expected accident frequency 

The results for these traffic data are illustrated and described in the retrospective 

analysis of Bornholmsgat, section 5.3.1. Table 6 is reproduced in order to 

facilitate comparison: 

Table 14 

Accident frequencies expected for observed 2006 traffic data 


Parallel 

collisions 


collisions 

Imprecision 


Missed-turn 


Total 




All 0.130 0.248 0.452 0.000 0.830 

Results for redistributed 

2006 traffic 

Table 15 provides an overview over the situation expected after the introduction 

of a traffic diversion. It is equally illustrated in Figure 24 and following 4 . 

W 

hen regarding the areas that are dominated by traffic to/from the Gdańsk Bay, 

i.e. the areas north-east and south of Bornholm, it appears that parallel collisions 

< crossing collisions < groundings is the case. The relative difference between 

these accident types is more pronounced in the north-east, where traffic 

is weaker. This is little surprising, given that grounding frequency is linear dependent 

upon traffic intensity, whereas parallel and crossing collisions frequencies 

are quadratic functions. 




.


43 

Table 15 

Accident frequencies expected for redistributed 2006 traffic data 


Parallel 

collisions 


collisions 

Imprecision 


Missed-turn 


Total 




All 0.128 0.245 0.438 0.000 0.811 


the two cases 

As expected, diverting large vessels from south of Bornholm to north-east of 

Bornholm reduces accident frequencies in the former area while augmenting 

them in the latter (Table 16). 

The same effect is occurs for medium-draught vessels sailing south of Bornholm. 

They remain in the south, but are forced to pass Adlergrund shallow on 

the south side instead of the north side (compare ground locations in Figure 

11). This, too, is reflected by the accident numbers, as can be seen when comparing 

the status quo (Figure 15 and following) to the redistributed situation 

(Figure 24 and following). 

Table 16 

Change in expected accident frequencies in case of a traffic diversion 


Parallel 

collisions 


collisions 

Imprecision 


Missed-turn 


Total 

Bornholmsgat -1% +0% +4% - +1% 

NE of Bornholm +17% +4% +7% - +7% 

S of Bornholm -3% -10% -14% - -13% 

All -1% -1% -3% - -2% 

The total is effect well noticeable, since accident frequencies drop by 13% 

south of Bornholm while rising by 7% in the north-east. In total, this corresponds 

to a drop by 7% for accidents related to traffic to/from the Gdańsk Bay. 

This shows that the proposed traffic diversion does not simply redistribute accidents, 

but actually reduces them on an overall level. 

The effect gets a little diluted when including the numbers for Bornholmsgat, 

which have a very high weight due to the much more heavy traffic (reduction 

by 2%, see Table 16). 

When regarding the effect upon parallel collisions, it might appear that accident 

frequencies grew disproportionally north-east of Bornholm (+17%) with respect 

to the reduction south of Bornholm (-3%). However, it has to be seen that 

absolute frequencies are almost one decade lower in the north-east, such that 

percental changes automatically look more significant than the change actually 

is. 


.


44 



Figure 24 

Expected frequency of parallel collisions for redistributed traffic 



Figure 25 

Expected frequency of crossing collisions for redistributed traffic 


.


45 



Figure 26 

Expected frequency of groundings due to imprecise navigation for redistributed 

traffic 

There is a slight reduction in collisions with fishing boats (-1.6%) and an even 

more slight increase in collisions with yachts (+0.4%). This is hardly relevant, 

considering that fishing boats contribute only 5% to all accident and yachts less 

than 1%. 

6.3.2 Effect upon expected accident costs 

Combining the accident frequencies from the previous section with the accident 

consequences yields risk. This study covers a number of different consequences 

that can measured in different units, such as number of lives lost, damaged ship 

hull area, repair time or amount of spilt oil, as described in chapters 3 and 4. 

All these consequences and units are converted into money. If consequences are 

expressed in monetary units, then risk means the same expected cost/expected 

benefit. These results will be used in the cost-benefit analysis in section 6.4. 

Results for observed 

2006 traffic 

The results for these traffic data are illustrated and described in the retrospective 

analysis of Bornholmsgat, section 5.3.2.. 

Table 10 and Table 11 are reproduced in order to facilitate comparison: 


.


46 

Table 17 

Expected accident costs [DKK] for observed 2006 traffic data 

– by accident type 


Parallel 

collisions 


collisions 

Imprecision 


Missed-turn 


Total 




All 1,796,000 13,493,000 2,992,000 0 18,281,000 

Table 18 

Expected accident costs [DKK] for observed 2006 traffic data 






All 4,514,000 13,767,000 18,281,000 

Ship operation costs (including externalities) result from adding the operation 

costs of all ships sailing on the different routes that run north-east of and south 

of Bornholm. These routes reunite at some point in the east (off the Polish 

coast) and at some point in the west (between Germany and Sweden). There, 

they redistribute into new routes (Kadetrenden and Øresund routes in the west, 

Gdańsk/Kaliningrad route and Klaipėda route in the east). 

Between these redistribution points, which are located 170-180 nm from each 

other (depending on the chosen route), ship operation costs (including externalities) 

amount to DKK 794,500,000 per year. The corresponding traffic volume 

amounted to approx. 6400 vessel passages in 2006, when counting all ships 

sailing to and from Gdańsk/Kaliningrad/Klaipėda. 


2006 traffic 

Table 19 and Table 20 provide an overview over the situation expected after the 

introduction of a traffic diversion. It is equally illustrated in Figure 27 and 

Figure 28 5 . 

Although grounding is the accident type with the highest frequency in the areas 

north-east and south of Bornholm (Table 15), its contribution to expected accident 

costs is smaller than that of crossing collisions in the area to the south 

(Table 19). In the north-east, the grounding contribution is only little higher 

than that from crossing collisions, even although the frequency is 10 times as 




.


47 

high. In other terms, grounding consequences are simply much less severe than 

collision consequences. 

Table 19 

Expected accident costs [DKK] for redistributed 2006 traffic data 



Parallel 

collisions 


collisions 

Imprecision 


Missed-turn 


Total 




All 1,747,000 13,276,000 2,973,000 0 17,996,000 

Table 20 

Expected accident costs [DKK] for redistributed 2006 traffic data 






All 4,465,000 13,531,000 17,996,000 

Ships sailing to and from Gdańsk/Kaliningrad/Klaipėda would face operation 

costs of DKK 798,500,000 per year including externalities. 


accident costs 

When regarding the area north-east and south of Bornholm, i.e. there where 

traffic from Gdańsk/Kaliningrad/Klaipėda is dominating, the following picture 

emerges: Expected accident costs rose in the north-east and fell in the south. In 

total, this amounts to a net reduction in expected costs, which fell from DKK 

2.34 million (€0.31 million) to DKK 2.19 (€0.29 million) per year, corresponding 

to -6.5%. This result is composed of a risk reduction in the south and a less 

strong risk increase in the north-east. 

Including Bornholmsgat dilutes the result because of the much higher traffic 

volume in this area (-2%, see Table 21). 

Within the area predominantly affected by Gdańsk Bay traffic (north-east and 

south of Bornholm), the total risk from parallel collisions remains basically unchanged. 

There is, however a clear net risk reduction in this area as far as crossing 

collisions and groundings are concerned. 


.


48 

Table 21 

Change in expected accident costs in case of a traffic diversion 



Parallel 

collisions 


collisions 

Imprecision 


Missed-turn 


Total 

Bornholmsgat -4% -1% +2% - -1% 

NE of Bornholm +23% +4% +10% - +9% 

S of Bornholm -6% -12% -17% - -13% 

All -3% -2% -1% - -2% 

Table 22 

Change in expected accident costs in case of a traffic diversion 



Bornholmsgat +0% -1% -1% 

NE of Bornholm +9% +10% +9% 

S of Bornholm -12% -14% -13% 

All -1% -2% -2% 

Loss of assets and clean-up costs are in the same order of magnitude in the areas 

north-east and south of Bornholm (Table 20) and change in about the same 

way in both areas, if a traffic diversion is introduced Table 22). 




.


49 

Figure 27 


data 



Figure 28 

Expected yearly clean-up costs for redistributed traffic 

As far as collisions with small vessels are concerned, the situation is the same 

as for accident frequencies: There is a slight reduction in collisions with fishing 

boats (-1.6%) and an even more slight increase in collisions with yachts 

(+0.4%). Besides, fishing boats contribute only 5% to total risk and yachts less 

than 1%. 

6.4 Cost-benefit assessment (FSA step 4) 

Costs and benefits can occur in two ways: 

• as expected costs/benefits, i.e. as a result of uncertain events, such as ship 

accidents. 

• as direct costs/benefits, i.e. as a result of scheduled events, such as operating 

a ship (fuel, capital investment, external damage due to ship engine exhaust 

fumes, see section 4.7). 

In fact, the step from a comparative risk assessment towards a cost-benefit 

analysis is relatively small, considering that expected costs and benefits have 

already been analysed in section 6.3. 


.


50 

In Table 23 direct costs are added. Apparently, the picture is different than in 

the case of the comparative risk analysis: Although direct costs rise only little 

in relative terms (+0.5%), this has a very strong effect in absolute terms. Table 

23 shows that operation cost including externalities rises by almost DKK 4 million 

per year due to the conceived traffic diversion. This clearly outbalances the 

accident risk reduction of DKK 285,000 per year. 

Table 23 

Change in total costs in case of a traffic diversion. Values in DKK 

per year 

Area Original traffic Redistributed traffic Balance 

Loss of life & assets 4,514,000 4,465,000 -49,000 

Clean-up costs 13,767,000 13,531,000 -236,000 

Operation costs & 

externalities 

794,518,000 798,477,000 +3,959,000 

All 812,799,000 816,473,000 +3,674,000 

The increase in operational costs and externalities is a direct consequence of the 

proposed re-routing. A large part of the traffic is directed away from the shortest 

route, which runs north of Adlergrund (south of Bornholm, see Figure 11). 

Here, all medium and large draught vessels are affected. Furthermore, medium 

draught vessels are moved from the area south of Adlergrund (south of Bornholm) 

to the routes running north-east of Bornholm, which equally corresponds 

to e few extra miles. 

The tables in Appendix C show that operation costs and externalities are distributed 

roughly in the following way: Externalities contribute 50-65%, 

whereas 20-30% are due to fuel costs and 15-20% are due to capital costs, depending 

on ship type and size. 

6.5 Sensitivity analysis 

In the future it can be expected that the large vessel traffic will increase between 

the Gdańsk/Kaliningrad/Klaipėda and the entrance of the Baltic Sea. 

Therefore, it was decided to perform a sensitivity analysis comparing 

• the case where the traffic from 2006 is redistributed according to the vessel 

draught limitations from section 6.2. 

• and the case where the redistributed traffic contains 30% more large ships 

(draught > 10 m) than in 2006. 


.


51 


& increased 

traffic 

Table 24 and following present the expected accident frequencies and costs after 

an increase in large ships sailing to/from the Gdańsk Bay. These numbers 

are equally illustrated by Figure 29 onwards 6 . 

Table 24 

Accident frequencies expected for redistributed and increased 

2006 traffic data 


Parallel 

collisions 


collisions 

Imprecision 


Missed-turn 


Total 




All 0.128 0.248 0.448 0.000 0.824 

Table 25 

Expected accident costs [DKK] for redistributed and increased 

2006 traffic data – by accident type 


Parallel 

collisions 


collisions 

Imprecision 


Missed-turn 


Total 




All 1,769,000 13,565,000 3,047,000 0 18,381,000 

Table 26 

Expected accident costs [DKK] for redistributed and increased 

2006 traffic data – by consequence type 

Area Loss of assets Clean-up costs Total 




All 4,536,000 13,845,000 18,381,000 

Comparison between 

original and increased 

traffic volume 

According to the traffic diversion scheme under investigation, all large ships 

>10 m draught sailing to/from the Gdańsk Bay would be forced to sail northeast 

around Bornholm. Therefore, the main effect of an increase in this type of 




.


52 

traffic can be seen in the area north-east of Bornholm: Total accident frequency 

increases by 7% in this area, while risk (expected cost) increases even by 12%, 

i.e. from DKK 722,000 (€97,000) to DKK 810,000 (€109,000) per year. 

The fact that risk increases more strongly than the accident frequency means 

that the average cost per accident has risen. This is clearly because the additional 

accidents all involve large ships >10 m draught, which naturally leads to 

above-the-average consequences. 

Not surprisingly, an increase in traffic >10 m draught does not affect the area 

south of Bornholm, which is exempted from this type of traffic due to the proposed 

traffic diversion. 

Table 27 

Change in expected accident frequencies in case of a traffic increase 


Parallel 

collisions 


collisions 

Imprecision 


Missed-turn 


Bornholmsgat 0% 1% 2% - 1% 

NE of Bornholm 11% 5% 7% - 7% 

S of Bornholm 0% 0% 0% - 0% 

All 0% 1% 2% - 2% 

Total 

Table 28 

Change in expected accident costs in case of a traffic increase 



Parallel 

collisions 


collisions 

Imprecision 


Missed-turn 


Bornholmsgat 0% 2% 1% - 2% 

Total 

NE of Bornholm 20% 6% 14% - 12% 

S of Bornholm 0% 0% 0% - 0% 

All 1% 2% 2% - 2% 

Table 29 

Change in expected accident costs in case of a traffic increase 


Area Loss of assets Clean-up costs Total 

Bornholmsgat 1% 2% 2% 

NE of Bornholm 9% 14% 12% 

S of Bornholm 0% 0% 0% 

All 2% 2% 2% 


.


53 



Figure 29 

Expected frequency of parallel collisions for redistributed traffic and 

30% more vessels with >10 m draught 



Figure 30 

Expected frequency of crossing collisions for redistributed traffic and 

30% more vessels with >10 m draught 


.


54 



Figure 31 

Expected frequency of groundings due to imprecise navigation for redistributed 

traffic and 30% more vessels with >10 m draught 



Figure 32 

Expected yearly loss of assets (including loss of life) for redistributed 

traffic and 30% more vessels with >10 m draught 


.


55 



Figure 33 Expected yearly clean-up costs for redistributed traffic and 30% 

more vessels with >10 m draught 

Overall result 

6.6 Discussion and recommendations (FSA step 5) 

A diversion of traffic sailing to and from Gdańsk/Kaliningrad/Klaipėda in the 

initially described way would have a risk reducing effect. If the traffic diversion 

is implemented, yearly accident costs can be expected to drop from currently 

DKK 2.34 million to DKK 2.19 in the mainly affected areas north-east/south of 

Bornholm, corresponding to a reduction by 6.5%. 

When including the heavily frequented, but only marginally affected Bornholmsgat 

in the consideration, total expected accident costs fall from currently 

DKK 18.3 million (€2.47 million) to DKK 18.0 million (€2.42 million) per 

year. This decrease by DKK 285,000 (€38,000) per year corresponds to a reduction 

by 2%. 

However, ship operation costs including the external effects of exhaust fumes 

would rise by 0.4%, which might appear little in relative terms, but amounts to 

DKK 4.00 million (€537.000) per year in absolute terms. This clearly outweighs 

the cost reduction by more than a factor 10, leading to a negative balance 

of DKK 3.7 million per year. 

Effect of a possible 

traffic increase 

In case of a 30% increase of large ship passages sailing to and from Gdańsk/ 

Kaliningrad/Klaipėda, accident costs are expected to rise back up to DKK 18.4 

million (€2.47 million) per year. In other words, the traffic diversion would in 

about neutralize the detrimental effect of additional large ships sailing to/from 

the Gdańsk Bay, if operation costs and externalities are not taken into account. 


.


56 

Even in that case, it needs to be considered that this result is possibly influenced 

by one of the assumptions in the consequence model. In accordance with 

/Safedor/, clean-up costs per ton of spilt oil have been taken as a constant, 

which is independent of the size and circumstances of the spillage. In reality, it 

much more difficult and expensive to clean a rock coast as in the north-east of 

Bornholm than to clean a sand coast as in the south of the island. 

Yet, the favourable effect of the traffic diversion is based on a moderate risk 

augmentation in the north-east that is outbalanced by a stronger risk reduction 

in the south. Therefore, it might occur that the assumed moderate risk increase 

in the north-east is not that moderate after all. If that should be the case, the effect 

of the traffic deviation would become detrimental instead of favourable. 

Final statement 

In general, it appears that the projected traffic deviation can have weakly 

positive effect that can compensate for a possible future increase in large vessel 

traffic from the Gdańsk Bay, as long as additional ship operation costs and 

damages due to ship engine fumes are not considered. Taking them into account 

leads to a negative cost-benefit balance and does not make the proposed 

measure appear recommendable. 


.


57 

7 References 

/Clarksons 2007/ Clarkson Register CD-ROM, 2007 

/COWI 2002/ 

/COWI 2007/ 

COWI for Søfartsstyrelsen and Farvandsvæsenet: “Risikovurdering af 

sejladssikkerheden i de dankse farvande” (Risk assessment of navigational 

safety in the Danish waters), COWI report no. 54380, June 2002 

COWI for the Danish Ministry of Defence: “Risikoanalyse: Olie- og 

kemikalieforurening i danske farvande” (Risk analysis: Oil and chemical pollution 

in Danish waters), COWI report no. 63743-1-01, March 2007 

/Drogden 2001/ Københavns Havn (Copenhagen Port): “Drogden feasibility studie 2001, 

Aktivitet 3.9, Søuheld”, HLD Joint Venture, December 2001 

/Fujii/ 

/IMO FSA/ 

/KMS/ 

/Rømer/ 

Yahei Fujii et al.: “Survey on vessel traffic management systems and brief 

introduction to marine traffic studies”, Electronic Navigation Research Institute 

Papers no. 45, 1984.4, 1984 

International Maritime Organization (IMO): “Guidelines for formal safety 

assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making process”, London, 2002, 

http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D5111/1023- 

MEPC392.pdf 

Kort- & Matrikelstyrelsen: “Det levende søkort” (The living sea map), CD- 

ROM, 2007 

H.G. Rømer: “Risk assessment of marine transport of dangerous goods”, PhD 

thesis, Dept. of Chemical Engineering, Technical University of Denmark, 1996 

/Safedor/ Safedor: “Risk evaluation criteria”, 2005 

/Transportmin/ 

Danish Ministry of Transport: “Nøgletalskatalog – til brug for 

samfundsøkonomiske analyser på transportområdet” (Key number catalogue – 

for use in socio-economic analyses in the field of transportation), 

http://www.trm.dk/sw78715.asp 


.


58 

Appendix A: Collision Model 

‣ Collision frequency model 

Basic concepts 

Parallel collisions 

When two ships collide while sailing on the same route, this is referred to as 

parallel collision. There are two basic cases: 

• Head-on collisions between two ships heading in opposed directions 

• Overtaking collisions between two ships heading in the same direction 

These two cases are illustrated in Figure 8. 

V2, L2, B2 

µ, σ 

V2, L2, B2 

µ, σ 

µ, σ 

µ, σ 

V 1, L 1, B 1 

V 1, L 1, B 1 



Figure 34 

Head-on and overtaking collisions 

Parallel collision frequencies depend on 

• the length of the route segment 


• width and speed of the ships 

• the deviation of the ships from the route axis 




.


59 

Data input 

The ship and traffic data described in section 4.2 provide this kind of 

information for each crossing line. Crossing lines are virtual lines. Each vessel 

crossing them is counted, together with IMO number, speed, course over 

ground, the precise location of the crossing and other information. These lines 

are displayed in Figure 5 and Figure 6. 

Special attention has been paid to the precise crossing location, i.e. ship deviation 

from the route axis. Commonly, this deviation is modelled as a distribution 

function similar to those in Figure 34. The present study includes many cases, 

where the actual distribution strongly differs from any common distribution 

function. Therefore, it was chosen to use the real distribution instead, which 

corresponds to a more or less random histogram (see Figure 35). This involves 

more computing, but leads to more reliable results. 

sailing direction 

Figure 35 

Transversal traffic distribution for both sailing directions (data originate 

from one of the crossing lines in the model) 

Calculation 

In the course of calculation, every ship (ship 1 ) is combined with every possible 

collisions partner (ship 2 ). Then, their collision probability is calculated. 

Both ship 1 and ship 2 have an array of properties such as ship type, speed, size, 

breadth which are all taken into account. Some of this properties are directly 

relevant for the collision probability (breadth, speed), whereas others are relevant 

for the consequences of the collision (ship type and size). 

Two ships within one width segment (as those in Figure 35) collide with a yearly 

frequency of 

P = P P 

X 

T 

G 

P 

C 

k 

RR 

where 

P T … yearly frequency of meeting within one route segment 

(a matter of time and route length) 

P G … geometrical collision probability (a matter of width) 

P C … causation probability 

k RR … risk reduction factor 


.


60 

These partial probabilities are obtained as 

Meeting frequency 

P T 

= LN 

1 

N 

2 

V1 

−V 

V V 

1 

2 

2 

where L … length of route segment 

N 1 , N 2 … yearly number of passings (ship 1 , ship 2 ) 

V 1 , V 2 … vessel speed (ship 1 , ship 2 ) 

Geometrical collision 

probability 

B 

B 

c 

P + 1 2 

G 

= 

where c … width of one width segment (corresponding to the width 

of one histogram bar in Figure 35) 

B 1 , B 2 … vessel breadth (ship 1 , ship 2 ) 

Of course, it is also possible to hit ships sailing in one of the neighbouring 

width segments. However, this effect can be neglected, as long as the width 

segments are significantly larger than the average vessel breadth, which is the 

case for the data set used in the analysis. 

Causation probability 

The probability that two ships sailing on collision course do not undertake any 

evasive measures is called causation probability P C . This quantity is based on 

statistics and modelling by Fujii /Fujii/. In the context of the Storebælt link investigation 

Fujii’s result was adapted to the situation in Danish waters, resulting 

in a value of P C = 3.2·10 -4 . This value is comparatively high when comparing 

with that in more recent navigation studies, e.g. /Drogden 2001/, where P C 

= 1.3·10 -4 was chosen. However, P C depends upon the modelling assumptions, 

especially those concerning the distribution of the vessels. As a consequence, a 

value of 

P 

C 

= 3.0 ⋅10 

−4 

was chosen in the analysis of oil and chemical spill risk in Danish waters, because 

it was found consistent with the observed accident rate during the past 

10-15 years /COWI 2007/. This value is also used in the present context. 

Risk reduction factor 

Different factors can have a reducing factor upon collision risk. One of them is 

due to the effect of pilotage, local experience or increased safety standards. If 

one out of two potentially colliding ships feature pilotage (or local experience 

or increased safety standards), the collision probability is multiplied by a factor 

k RR = 0.75. If this is the case for both ships, the factor is k RR = 0.5. The crew of 

ferries sailing frequently in the waters around Bornholm is considered to have 

similar experience as a pilot. 

Table 30 displays the frequency of fulfilling one of the criteria for different ship 

types and sizes. It is based on the pilotage analysis included in /COWI 2007/. 


.


61 

Table 30 

Probability that a ship features a pilot or local experience or enhanced 

safety standards /COWI 2007/ 

Pilotage rate Ship type 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 

Length Bulk 

Oil 

product Chemical Container Crude oil General Gas Ro-Ro Fishing Passenge 

Support 

Length [m] Class carrier tanker tanker ship tanker cargo ship tanker cargo ship ship r ship Fast ferry ship Other ship 

10 1 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 

30 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 

50 3 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.02 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.01 

70 4 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.02 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.01 

90 5 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.02 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.01 

110 6 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.07 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.01 

130 7 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.62 0.00 0.07 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.01 

150 8 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.62 0.00 0.07 1.00 1.00 0.03 0.01 

170 9 0.24 0.54 0.54 0.00 0.54 0.14 0.62 0.00 0.07 1.00 1.00 0.03 0.03 

190 10 0.24 0.54 0.54 0.06 0.54 0.14 0.62 0.00 0.07 1.00 1.00 0.03 0.03 

225 11 0.24 0.54 0.54 0.06 0.54 0.14 0.62 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.24 

275 12 1.00 0.88 0.06 0.88 0.62 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 

325 13 1.00 0.88 0.35 0.88 0.62 1.00 1.00 1.00 

Another factor describes the situation of ships following the same direction 

within a traffic separation scheme. Ships sail on exactly the same route over 

dozens of miles (due to the small speed difference) before overtaking one another. 

Besides, they know that they will only meet other ships sailing in the 

same direction as themselves. Therefore, it is very unlikely that ships do not 

notice each other prior to a potential collision situation. According to the conclusions 

at Workshop II, this effect is accounted for by a risk reduction factor 

of k RR = 0.5. 

Note that the different risk reduction factors can not be combined. Therefore, 

risk reduction is never higher than 50%, which means that 0.5 ≤ k RR ≤ 1. 

Crossing collisions 

Any ship-ship collision that does not involve two ships sailing on the same 

route is classified as crossing collision. 


Its frequency is calculated based on 

• the crossing pattern 


• width, length and speed of the ships 

• the crossing angle 



• the probability that the traces of both ships intersect 

Calculation 

Based on these considerations, yearly collision frequency can be written as 

P = P P 

X 

I 

G 

P 

C 

k 

RR 


.


62 

where P I … probability that the traces of the two ship 1 and ship 2 

intersect 

P G … geometrical collision frequency (per year) 



Crossing pattern 

The first step is to clarify, whether two ships can theoretically collide. This is 

only the case, if their traces intersect. Essentially, there are two basic kinds of 

crossings: X-crossings (full intersection) and Y-crossings (merging traffic): 

Figure 36 

X-type crossing 

Figure 37 

Y-type crossing with and without intersection 

For X-crossings, basic prerequisite for collision is given in every single crossing 

event (P I = 1). For Y-crossings, this applies only to one out of two crossing 

events on average (P I = 0.5). 


.


63 

All other, more complex crossing types can be modelled as an array of several 

X- and Y-crossings. Figure 38 illustrates this for case of a two-lane Y-type 

crossing. This constellation has been observable in the Bornholmsgat since the 

establishment of the traffic separation scheme. 

X 

Y 

Y 

Figure 38 

Two-lane Y-type crossing 


probability 

The possibility of a collision between two ships following intersecting routes 

depends upon the angle θ between the routes, the geometry of the ships and 

their speed. This possibility can be expressed by means of a critical time interval 

∆t or a critical length L K = ∆t V 2 for ship 2 . The meaning of these quantities 

is illustrated in Figure 39: 

V 2 ∆t 

θ 

V 2 

V 2 ∆t 

V 2 

V 1 V 1 

V 2 

V 2 

θ 

Figure 39 

Geometrical determination of the critical time interval/route length for 

a crossing collision 

The critical time interval is determined as 


.


64 

1 ⎡ V2 

V1 

V1 

V2 

∆t 

= ⎢B2 

− + B1 

− + L1 

V2 

+ L2 

V1 

V1V 

2 ⎣ sinθ 

tanθ 

sinθ 

tanθ 

The passage of ships on one of the two routes is assumed to be a Poisson process. 

As a consequence, the geometrical collision frequency follows as 

P 

G 

= N 

1 

− N2∆t 

( 1− 

e ) 

≈ N N ∆t 

1 

2 

⎤ 

⎥ 

⎦ 


This quantity is chosen as 

P 

C 

= 3.0 ⋅10 

−4 

for the same reasons as for parallel collisions above. 



due to the effect of pilotage, local experience or enhanced safety standards. If 

one out of two potentially colliding ships feature pilotage (or local experience 

or heightened safety standards), the collision probability is multiplied by a factor 

k RR = 0.75. If this is the case for both ships, the factor is k RR = 0.5. 

Table 30 above displays the frequency of fulfilling one of the criteria for different 

ship types and sizes based on /COWI 2007/. 

Small vessels in 

general 

Crossing collisions involving small vessels 

The above-described collision model cannot be used for small vessels (fishing 

boats, yachts) in an analogous way for the following reasons: 

• Fishing boats and yachts (especially sailing yachts) mostly do not sail on a 

straight route between to points, but cruise in frequently changing directions, 

partly moving at low speed. Most vessels return to the port, where 

the cruise took its origin. 

• These vessels are neither covered by AIS records, nor by Lloyd’s Register 

(compare data description, section 4.2.2). 

Therefore, the crossing collision model needs to be modified in accordance 

with the following assumptions: 

Fishing boats 

It is assumed that fishing boats sails to a fishing ground and remains there 

during several hours. During that time, it moves only slowly and can be modelled 

as static. It is assumed that a fishing shift lasts 12 hours. 

The collision frequency is thus a function of the maximum extension of the 

fishing vessel (i.e. boat length), the width and frequency of the main traffic 


.


65 

flow as well as the frequency and duration of an average fishing work shift. It is 

assumed that the typical fishing boat is 12 m long and 4 m wide. 

Yachts 

For yacht traffic it is the most relevant to know, how frequently a single yacht 

crosses the main traffic flow during its trip. On a journey from A to B, this will 

typically occur only once. On a cruise originating and ending at A, there will be 

two crossings. However, in the case of Bornholm it is unlikely that a yacht will 

sail the whole way across a main traffic route and back, simply because the distances 

would be to long for an ordinary one-day cruise. Besides, many yachts 

just follow the coast and never get to cross any sea route at all. 

Therefore, it is realistic and as a tendency on the conservative side to assume 

that every yacht crosses the main traffic route in its area twice. This assumption 

is used in the analysis. 

A typical yacht is assumed to be 12 m long and 4 m wide, which is probably 

larger than the actual average and therefore leads to a more conservative result. 

‣ Collision consequence model 

Simulation program 

During an earlier COWI project dealing with oil and chemical spillage /COWI 

2007/, Erik Sonne Ravn and Peter Friis Hansen from DTU developed a simulation 

program for the consequences of ship-ship collisions. They developed a 

neural network in order to determine 

• the penetration depth at the struck ship (due to contact with both bulb and 

bow of the striking ship) 

• the width and height of damage at the struck ship 

• the vertical position of the penetration 

Based on this information and on the number and position of cargo compartments 

and of the fuel bunker (Figure 40), the model yields furthermore 

• the loss of cargo (for tankers) – see Figure 41 and Figure 42 

• the loss of bunker fuel 

• the probability of sinking 

Single hull 


.


66 

B 

Maskinrum Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo cargo D Maskinrum 

HFO 

HFO 

LUO LUO LUO 0.1D 

3% 15% 12.8% 12.8% 12.8% 12.8% 12.8% 12.8% 5% 

L 

HFO HFO 

Maskinrum 

HFO HFO 

0.7m isolering 

Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo 


Cargo 

Cargo 

0.1D 

Single hull with 

double bottom 

B 

Maskinrum Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo D Maskinrum 

HFO 

HFO 

LUO LUO LUO 0.1D 

3% 15% 12.8% 12.8% 12.8% 12.8% 12.8% 12.8% 5% 

L 

HFO HFO 


HFO HFO 




Cargo 

Cargo 

0.1D 

Double hull 

B 

Maskinrum Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo D Maskinrum 

HFO 

HFO 

LUO LUO 0.1D 

3% 15% 12.8% 12.8% 12.8% 12.8% 12.8% 12.8% 5% 

L 0.1B 

HFO HFO 0.1B 



HFO HFO 



Cargo 

Cargo 

0.1D 

Figure 40 

Example of an idealised tanker for determining cargo spillage in case 

of hull damage. The design differs for other ship types and sizes. 


.


67 

NO SMOKING 

D 

T 

L 

B 

B 

½ bunker 

½ bunker 

Tank 

Figure 41 

Example of a penetration above the water line. The shaded part runs 

out. The dotted part remains inside the tank. 

NO SMOKING 

D 

T 

L 

B 

B 

½ bunker 

½ bunker 

Tank 

Figure 42 

Example of a penetration below the water line. The whole tank fill runs 

out (the area below the penetration is washed out by the waves) 

This type of simulation is performed for the following cases and all their combinations 

(~ 400.000): 

• 20 different striking ships 

• 593 different struck ships 

• striking ship loaded/unloaded 

• struck ship loaded/unloaded 

• struck ship with single/double hull 


.


68 

• struck ship with/without bunker protection 

• angle between 30 and 90°/between 90 and 150° 

Application of the simulation results 

Applying the results of the simulation in the risk analysis requires some extra 

data input and assumptions. Besides, all consequences are meant to be converted 

into monetary units in order to provide a common means of comparison. 

General assumptions 

One important assumption is that ships do not penetrate each other, if the 

collision occurs at a very acute (150°). Instead, 

they just grind alongside. This, however, does not mean that parallel collisions 

are by any means harmless. Two ships in a head-on situation having failed to 

make an evasive manoeuvre in good time will typically try to change their direction 

as a last resort prior to impact. This means, that one or both ships “open 

up” by presenting their side to the other ship. If the evasive manoeuvre fails, 

one of the two ships will be struck in a vulnerable constellation (30° < angle < 

150°). 

Yet, this reasoning is only fully realistic for head-on scenarios. In an overtaking 

situation, the overtaken ship is typically less tempted to change course and thus 

to “open up”. Assuming that this behaviour nevertheless occurs in 10% of all 

cases is actually very conservative according to the experts participating in 

Workshop II. 


An earlier analysis /COWI 2002/ showed that the expected number of fatalities 

in case of oil spillage is the same for collisions and groundings: 

E[N LOL |spillage] = 0.01 persons 

Dividing this number with the average number of persons on board yields an 

individual crew member’s probability of dying in such an accident, i.e. 

P(LOL|spillage). This number can be multiplied with the number of persons on 

board (Table 31). 

Table 31 

Expected number of persons on board (based on an estimate by 

Søfartsstyrelsen) 

Expected # of Ship type 

persons on board 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 

Length Bulk 

Oil 

product Chemical Container Crude oil General Gas Ro-Ro Fishing Passenge 

Support 

Length [m] Class carrier tanker tanker ship tanker cargo ship tanker cargo ship ship r ship Fast ferry ship Other ship 

10 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 100 100 5 5 

30 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 100 100 5 5 

50 3 9 9 5 9 9 9 9 9 9 500 500 9 9 

70 4 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 500 500 9 9 

90 5 20 9 9 20 9 20 20 20 20 500 500 20 20 

110 6 20 20 20 20 9 20 20 20 20 2000 20 20 

130 7 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 2000 20 20 

150 8 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 2000 20 20 

170 9 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 2000 20 20 

190 10 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 2000 20 20 

225 11 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 2000 20 20 

275 12 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 2000 20 20 

325 13 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 2000 20 20 


.


69 






Safedor /Safedor/ indicates the VSL as USD 3 million ≈ DKK 16 million. 

Ship damage 

Ship damage has several aspects including 

• repair costs (if the ship did not sink) 

• loss of earnings during the repair period (if the ship did not sink) 

• loss of cargo (due to leakage or in case of sinking) 

• total loss of ship (if the ship sank) 

The information concerning the penetration area [m 2 ] can be used for calculating 

the repair costs, when multiplying with the average hull thickness, the steel 

thickness and the repair price per weight. Upon enquiry, Tryg insurance company 

(Denmark) estimated hull thickness to 10 mm and recommends to add 

another 50% in order to account for damages to structural components underneath 

the hull. Together with a steel density of 8000 kg/m 3 , this ensues in 120 

kg steel replacement per 1 m 3 of damage. Tryg estimates the repair price to be 

100 DKK/kg, which is also consistent with value used in an earlier analysis 

/COWI 2002/. 

Loss of earnings depends upon the average repair time and the daily capital 

costs, as displayed in Table 32 and Table 33. 

Table 32 

Repair time, as estimated by the professionals attending Workshop II 

Damage area < 1 m 2 1-10 m 2 10-20 m 2 >20 m 2 

Repair time 2 days 7 days 14 days 21 days 

Table 33 

Capital costs in DKK/day for different ship types and sizes, based on 

/Clarksons 2007/ 

Capital costs Ship type 

(in DKK/day) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 

Length Bulk Oil product Chemical Container Crude oil General Gas Ro-Ro Fishing Passenger 

Support 

Length [m] Class carrier tanker tanker ship tanker cargo ship tanker cargo ship ship ship Fast ferry ship Other ship 

10 1 8691 2593 29723 27005 10901 2533 

30 2 5753 4106 5779 3305 14761 20679 17702 2919 27981 11720 2559 

50 3 6685 4493 7044 24428 15694 21221 22143 2284 38723 32805 10969 2581 

70 4 15805 17900 19039 30704 41994 26365 52857 80924 24942 7348 

90 5 16845 18981 21658 35226 38414 29491 53429 8644 82513 67928 32055 

110 6 27512 20633 44950 38150 19140 28450 123756 56294 10773 128653 83552 73126 

130 7 26639 91979 55589 51736 93460 62636 92964 58254 29493 253819 209072 

150 8 27514 95016 51375 56818 93144 63320 100555 57727 25777 282664 203947 58056 

170 9 29881 33185 69681 34312 76819 158157 200769 520683 236982 

190 10 58686 73061 158280 72866 69824 700659 246189 

225 11 81679 121164 1061573 

275 12 134961 

325 13 


.


70 

If a ship leaks oil from its cargo compartments (tanker) or from its bunker (all 

ships), this basically a matter of pollution and clean-up (see below). However, 

such an event also means that cargo and therefore worth is lost. The loss of 

cargo worth is obtained by multiplying the oil volume with the crude oil price. 

For 2007, USD 70 per ton corresponds to the situation observed throughout the 

year. The price of bunker fuel (low sulphur fuel, as prescribed in the Baltic Sea) 

is only little above this price. 

The simulation program yields furthermore the probability of sinking in case of 

a collision (values between 0 and 0.56 depending on the properties of the striking 

and the struck vessel). The monetary effect of such an event is obtained by 

multiplying this probability with the present value of the ship. Averaging some 

sales numbers from the past decade and for ships of different age leads to the 

numbers in Table 34. 

Table 34 

Sales prices for ships of different sizes (average of different ages) in 

USD 

Purchase cost Ship type 

(in mill. USD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 

Length Bulk Oil product Chemical Container Crude oil General Gas Ro-Ro Fishing Passenger 

Support 

Length [m] Class carrier tanker tanker ship tanker cargo ship tanker cargo ship ship ship Fast ferry ship Other ship 

10 1 1.2 4.5 9.8 

30 2 6.3 3.4 3.9 12.5 13.7 13.3 13.8 19.4 19.2 19.2 19.6 23.7 

50 3 6.3 26.5 23.1 12.9 20.3 13.3 17.2 21.2 14.5 16.7 7.7 

70 4 6.3 17.3 17.1 8.3 4.3 18.2 21.4 17.2 28.6 26.1 37.0 6.6 

90 5 12.1 10.6 9.9 13.3 40.3 16.2 29.4 16.1 14.3 8.8 20.8 5.6 

110 6 18.8 13.1 21.4 24.6 25.8 20.8 37.5 9.7 21.6 20.0 27.6 16.2 

130 7 24.3 21.7 19.2 10.1 25.8 20.9 41.5 5.5 28.2 7.8 

150 8 19.1 20.4 4.8 17.0 25.8 26.6 45.5 9.9 22.2 7.0 

170 9 19.8 23.2 13.6 16.8 25.8 22.2 52.8 25.1 15.2 

190 10 22.1 20.1 28.8 30.8 14.5 60.0 23.6 47.5 

225 11 24.7 31.2 32.1 33.3 40.3 28.3 9.2 11.8 

275 12 36.7 2.5 19.3 42.2 

325 13 59.6 

Clean-up costs 

Small vessels 

Clean-up costs are obtained by multiplying the oil spillage (both from oil 

tankers and bunkers) with Safedor’s value for cleaning up one ton of crude oil, 

which is 12700 USD/t /Safedor/. 

For small vessels, the available models and data are less sophisticated. 

However, the focus of interest is limited to two consequences, loss of life and 

loss of vessel. A collision with any larger vessel (i.e. one that is covered by the 

AIS records) will in nearly all cases lead to a loss of the involved yacht or fishing 

vessel. In a conservative sense, it is assumed that this is always the case. 

Table 35 

Consequence parameters for small vessels 

Small vessel type 

Vessel worth 

[DKK] 

Expected number of 

persons on board 

Fatality rate given 

collision 

Fishing boat 500,000 1-2 1.0 

Yacht (sailing or motor) 500,000 3-4 1.0 


.


71 

Appendix B: Grounding Model 

‣ Grounding model 

The grounding model describes the yearly rate of ships running aground or 

ashore as well as the consequences of such events. 

Modelling of the grounds 

Seen from a ship, an island does not appear as a more or less round object as 

from the air, but as a line on the horizon. In geometrical terms, this line is called 

a projection. If the course of the ship aims at a point inside the projection, 

the ship will run ashore, provided it continues on a straight course. 

The same thought is valid for sub-sea grounds, even if they are invisible. The 

only condition is that the ship draught is greater and the water depth at the 

ground location. Therefore, a simple way of modelling grounds is to determine 

their projections with respect to the relevant sea routes, as it is done in Figure 

11 (section 4.6). 

Modelling of the ships 

The present study distinguished two basic types of groundings. One is due to 

imprecise navigation. The other one occurs, when bridge personnel is lacking 

attention due to alcohol, sleepiness and other distractions. 

When analysing the grounding probability, the relevant characteristic of a ship 

is its draught. In principle, the actual draught of a ship is transmitted via its AIS 

device. However, this piece of information was partly not reliable and partly 

not available. Therefore, it was decided to use maximum draught instead. 

Lloyd’s Register contains this type of information for every single ship. 

Of course, this means that the grounding risk will be systematically overestimated 

in the analysis, i.e. the model is quite conservative in this respect. 


Groundings due to imprecise navigation 

This grounding type typically occurs in difficult waters, especially when the 

personnel is not fully aware of precisely where the ship is sailing, due to lack of 

local experience, bad navigational equipment, lack of training and other causes. 


.


72 

Figure 43 

Grounding due to imprecise navigation 

As opposed to the collision model, it is not possible to use the actual ship density 

at the location of a potential accident in order to determine the grounding 

frequency. The data basis would become much too small, since it would only 

contain those very few ships that actually grounded. 

Geometrical grounding 

probability 

Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the behaviour of ships a few nautical miles 

before they pass a ground. A small number of the ships can be observed to head 

right for the ground. The corresponding frequency is shaded orange in Figure 

44 and can be obtained as 

P G 

= F( α1) 

− F( 

α 

2 

) 

where α 1 and α 2 are the upper and lower bound of the critical angle range. F = 

N(µ,σ) is a normal distribution describing the course over ground of all ships in 

one draught class. The distribution parameters are based on AIS data. 

σ 

σ 

µ 


.


73 

Figure 44 

Determination of the geometrical grounding frequency 


Of course, most of these “aberrant” vessels will correct their course in due time. 

Still, there is a risk that they do not, similar to the probability that two vessels 

on collision course fail to take evasive action. Therefore, the same causation 

probability as for collisions is used: 

P 

C 

= 3.0 ⋅10 

−4 

Obviously, the result equally depends upon the distance between the observation 

point (where the distribution of course over ground is measured) and the 

ground. If the observation point is to close, grounding probability will become 

very low, because most ships will already have corrected their position. If it is 

to far away, a large number of ships that in reality have plenty of time and 

space to manoeuvre will be assumed to head for the ground. Therefore, a realistic 

distance can be expected to be in the area of half an hour to one hour travel, 

corresponding to 6-20 nm. 

Distance correction 

Instead of guessing, a distance factor was introduced and calibrated against the 

grounding frequency observed during the past 10-15 years: 

k DC 

= 

x 

distance 

where x = 10 nm = 18.522 km. 



due to the effect of pilotage, local experience or enhanced safety standards. 

This contribution has already been taken into account previously /COWI 2007/. 

If a ship features pilotage (or local experience or heightened safety standards), 

the grounding probability is multiplied by a factor k RR = 0.5. 

Table 30 above displays the frequency of fulfilling one of the criteria for different 

ship types and sizes. 

Calculation 

The yearly grounding frequency is obtained by multiplying the above factors as 

P 

X 

= N P 

G 

P 

C 

k 

DC 

k 

RR 

where N is the yearly number of vessel passings. 


Groundings due to missed turns 

This grounding type is typical for locations, where sea routes make a turn, 

especially if the area is generally easy to sail and does not demand special attention 

from the crew. In this situation lack of attention due to alcohol, sleepi- 


.


74 

ness and other distractions can lead to a missed turn. If there is a ground or 

coastline ahead, the ship is bound to run aground. 

turning 

point 

--- sea route --- 

Figure 45 

Grounding due to missed turn 

Calculation 

The frequency of such an event is calculated as 

P 

X 

= N P 

NT 

P 

G 

P 

C 

k 

RR 

where N … yearly number of passing ships 


P NT … yearly frequency at which a ships misses a turn and does not 

correct its error at a later, but sufficiently early point 

P G … geometrical collision probability 


Missed-turn frequency According to Prof. Peter Friis Hansen, Technical University of Denmark as 

well as COWI experience from earlier projects, a previously used and verified 

approach consists in calculating 

P NT 

= e 

x 

−λ 

V 

where λ … check frequency (0.5-1 minutes) 

x … distance between missed turning point and ground 

V … vessel speed 

However, this approach has been calibrated in order to suit narrow navigation 

channels, such as Drogden in Øresund. Obviously, a check frequency of between 

½ and 1 minute is characteristic for a crew doing its normal duty. 

However, the missed-turn accidents in the Bornholm area are of a different nature. 

There is plenty of space, so that accidents can only occur, if the personnel 


.


75 

in charge is lacking attention during an extended period (due to sleepiness, alcohol 

etc.). Nevertheless, the above-presented model is an accepted state-ofthe-art 

approach and will therefore be used in the analysis. 


As for collisions and imprecision groundings, causation probability is estimated 

as 

P 

C 

= 3.0 ⋅10 

−4 


probability 

Even if a ship missed a turn, this does not automatically mean it hits the nearest 

ground or coastline. The corresponding probability is calculated in the same 

way as P G for imprecision groundings above (see also Figure 44): 

P G 

= F( α1) 

− F( 

α 

2 

) 


Same as for groundings due to imprecise navigation. 

Drift groundings 

Drift groundings are not included in the analysis but deserve some general 

comments. 

Drift groundings occur, if a vessel loses its manoeuvring capacity due to engine 

or rudder brake down, power outage etc. If this state cannot be repaired or 

moved by tugs in good, the vessel will eventually run aground or ashore. 

Drift groundings can be analysed in a very similar way to groundings due to 

imprecise navigation. The only principle difference is that the vessel speed vector 

has to be replaced by a wind distribution expressing wind speed and direction. 

Furthermore, the outage frequency and a distribution function of the time 

until recovery needs to be modelled. 

The main difficulty is of practical, not principle nature. In fact, a sensible drift 

grounding analysis would have to include a much greater number of observation 

points (crossing lines) than the above-described model for imprecise navigation 

groundings. For that grounding type, the ship’s behaviour few kilometres 

ahead of the ground is most relevant. For drift groundings, any point along 

a route is relevant. 

‣ Grounding consequence model 

Basic model 

During the analysis on oil and chemical spillages /COWI 2007/, the spillage 

model for grounding accidents was derived from a PhD thesis by H.G. Rømer 

/Rømer/. This lead to the basic relations summarized in the following. 


.


76 

Spillage of tanker 

cargo (oil) 

Spillage of cargo (oil) is expected in 20% of the groundings where single-hull 

oil tankers are involved and 15% of the cases where double-hull oil tankers are 

involved. 

Table 36 

Spillage from tankers: 

Probability of a certain spillage size given spillage P(spillsize|spillage) 

Spillage 

fraction Single hull Double hull 

0.001 9.74E-01 9.40E-01 

0.050 1.30E-02 3.00E-02 

0.150 6.50E-03 1.50E-02 

0.250 3.25E-03 7.50E-03 

0.350 1.63E-03 3.75E-03 

0.450 8.14E-04 1.88E-03 

0.550 4.06E-04 9.36E-04 

0.650 2.03E-04 4.68E-04 

0.750 1.01E-04 2.34E-04 

0.850 5.20E-05 1.20E-04 

0.950 5.20E-05 1.20E-04 

Spillage of bunker oil 

Spillage of bunker fuel is expected in 1% of all groundings. 

Table 37 

Spillage of bunker oil (all ship types): 

Probability of a certain spillage size given spillage P(spillsize|spillage) 

Spillage fraction 

Bunker protection: 

LowLim UpLim Average No Yes 

0.000 0.005 0.003 0.00E+00 8.75E-01 

0.000 0.167 0.083 9.50E-01 1.19E-01 

0.500 1.000 0.750 5.00E-02 6.25E-03 


Application of the basic model 

An earlier analysis /COWI 2002/ showed that the expected number of fatalities 

in case of oil spillage is basically the same for collisions and groundings: 

E[N LOL |spillage] = 0.01 persons 

Dividing this number with the average number of persons on board yields an 

individual crew member’s probability of dying in such an accident, i.e. 

P(LOL|spillage). This number can be multiplied with the number of persons on 

board (see Table 31). 






Safedor /Safedor/ indicates the VSL as USD 3 million ≈ DKK 16 million. 


.


77 

Ship damage 

Ship damage has several aspects including 

• repair costs (if the ship did not sink) 

• loss of earnings during the repair period (if the ship did not sink) 

• loss of cargo (due to leakage or in case of sinking) 

• total loss of ship (if the ship sank) 

Repair costs are based on an estimate (Table 38). This estimate was confirmed 

as being realistic by the participants of Workshop II. 

Table 38 

Probability of damage size given grounding, damage cost and repair 

time 

Ship damage Probability | Grounding Damage relative to ship worth Repair time 

Minor 0.98 0.02 7 days 

Major 0.02 0.20 21 days 

Loss of earnings depends upon the average repair time (Table 38) and the daily 

capital costs, as displayed earlier in Table 33. 

If a ship leaks oil from its cargo compartments (tanker) or from its bunker (all 

ships), this basically a matter of pollution and clean-up (see below). However, 

such an event also means that cargo and therefore worth is lost. The loss of 

cargo worth is obtained by multiplying the oil volume with the crude oil price. 

For 2007, USD 70 per ton corresponds to the situation observed throughout the 

year. The price of bunker fuel (low sulphur fuel, as prescribed in the Baltic Sea) 

is only little above this price. 

In the case of Bornholm, it is very unlikely that a ship sinks after grounding 

according to the experts participating in Workshop II. 

Clean-up costs 

Clean-up costs are obtained by multiplying the oil spillage (both from oil 

tankers and bunkers) with Safedor’s value for cleaning up one ton of crude oil, 

which is 12700 USD/t /Safedor/. 


.


78 

Appendix C: Ship Operation Costs and 

Externalities 

The following costs are used in order to calculate the costs of diverting ships to 

other routes of diverging route length: 

Length 

Length [m] Class 

Table 39 Fuel cost in DKK per kilometre, derived from /Clarksons 2007/ 

Ship type 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 

Oil 

Bulk product Chemical Container Crude oil General Gas Ro-Ro Fishing Passenge 

Support 

carrier tanker tanker ship tanker cargo ship tanker cargo ship ship r ship Fast ferry ship Other ship 

10 1 

30 2 23 23 23 35 23 35 35 96 23 64 89 23 23 

50 3 23 23 23 35 23 35 35 96 23 64 89 23 23 

70 4 23 23 23 35 23 35 35 96 23 64 89 23 23 

90 5 50 50 50 79 50 79 79 165 50 144 198 50 50 

110 6 50 50 50 79 50 79 79 165 50 144 198 50 50 

130 7 82 82 82 138 82 138 138 407 82 242 333 82 82 

150 8 102 102 102 186 102 186 186 433 102 314 432 102 102 

180 9 102 102 102 186 102 186 186 433 102 314 432 102 102 

190 10 139 139 139 379 139 379 379 736 139 533 735 139 139 

225 11 197 197 197 738 197 738 738 1,239 197 899 1,238 197 197 

275 12 324 324 324 1,210 324 1,210 1,210 2,033 324 1,474 2,030 324 324 

325 13 324 324 324 1,210 324 1,210 1,210 2,033 324 1,474 2,030 324 324 

Length 


Table 40 Capital cost in DKK per kilometre, derived from /Clarksons 2007/ 

Ship type 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 

Oil 


Support 


10 1 

30 2 14 10 15 43 10 36 40 46 6 55 28 6 

50 3 14 10 15 43 10 36 40 46 6 55 28 6 

70 4 14 10 15 43 10 36 40 46 6 55 28 6 

90 5 31 33 37 50 33 80 45 81 14 121 58 14 

110 6 31 33 37 50 33 80 45 81 14 121 58 14 

130 7 47 35 73 50 35 49 181 75 23 187 86 22 

150 8 47 148 82 63 148 93 141 71 44 353 135 42 

180 9 47 148 82 63 148 93 141 71 44 353 116 135 42 

190 10 51 58 88 84 58 121 214 240 58 463 177 55 

225 11 95 116 103 171 116 223 93 440 106 848 324 182 

275 12 139 199 141 233 199 304 127 601 145 1,159 442 103 

325 13 139 199 141 233 199 304 127 601 145 1,159 442 103 

It was not possible to obtain realistic capital cost values for fast ferries. However, 

there are presently none of these sailing between Gdańsk/Kaliningrad/ 

Klaipėda and the entrance of the Baltic Sea. Therefore, this does not have any 

effect upon the result. 


.


79 

Table 41 

External cost in DKK per kilometre, based on /Transportmin/ 

Length 


Ship type 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 

Oil 


Support 


10 1 

30 2 54 54 54 84 54 84 84 104 54 48 52 54 54 

50 3 54 54 54 84 54 84 84 104 54 48 52 54 54 

70 4 54 54 54 84 54 84 84 104 54 48 52 54 54 

90 5 120 120 120 190 120 190 190 180 120 107 117 120 120 

110 6 120 120 120 190 120 190 190 180 120 107 117 120 120 

130 7 196 196 196 331 196 331 331 443 196 180 197 196 196 

150 8 243 243 243 446 243 446 446 472 243 234 255 243 243 

180 9 243 243 243 446 243 446 446 472 243 234 255 243 243 

190 10 333 333 333 907 333 907 907 802 333 397 434 333 333 

225 11 473 473 473 1,767 473 1,767 1,767 1,351 473 669 731 473 473 

275 12 776 776 776 2,898 776 2,898 2,898 2,216 776 1,098 1,199 776 776 

325 13 776 776 776 2,898 776 2,898 2,898 2,216 776 1,098 1,199 776 776 


.


80 

Appendix D: Enlarged Figures 

Enlargement of Figure 7 from p. 18: 


.


81 



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82 



.


83 



.


84 

Enlargement Figure 17 from p. 32: 


.


85 



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86 



.


87 



.


88 



.


89 



.


90 



.


91 



.


92 



.


93 



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94 



.


95 



.


96 



.


97 



.


98 



.


99 



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100 



.


101 

Appendix E: Curricula Vitae 

Name 

Position 

Company 

Company address 

Finn Vessel 

Pilot 

Danpilot 

Marmorvej 

2100 København Ø 

Short description of relevant 

job description 

1969 – 1980 deck officer, EAC 

1980 Pilot in the Sound, stationed at Bornholm 

1984 responsible for equipment and safety 

Potential other related 

activites 

Statistics BPAC 

Author on ‘Fartøjhåndbog for bådsmænd’ 

Author on brochure on BPAC/pilots 


.


102 

Name 

Position 

Company 

Johnny Nielsen 

Master (chefkaptajn) 

Bornholmstrafikken A/S 

Company address Dampskibskajen 3 – 5 

3700 Rønne 



Master of POUL ANKER 


activites 


.


103 

Name 

Position 

Company 

Kurt Bruun-Villadsen 

Chief officer 

Scandlines DK 

Company address Dampfærgevej 10 




Working on M/V ASK in trade between Rostock and 

Ventspils. 2 trips per week. 


activites 


.


104 

Name 

Position 

Company 

Frank Kier Rasmussen 

Naval captain – Danish rank ‘orlogskaptajn’ 

Admiralty Danish Fleet – Bornholms Marinedistrikt 

Company address Segenvej 31 

3700 Rønne 



Educated master mariner 

Experience from merchant shipping and from naval 

ships sailing in Danish waters. 

Second in command at Bornholms Marinedistrikt 

with responsibility of monitoring the traffic in the 

traffic separation scheme in Bornholmsgat. Responsible 

for the local SAR service and for environmental 

surveillance in the Baltic Sea in corporation with the 

Danish Admiral Fleet. 


activites 

Native from Bornholm fishing off Bornholm 


.


105 

Name 

Position 

Company 

Henrik Hammer Jensen 

Vice chairman 

Bornholms og Christians Ø Fiskeriforening 

Company address Øernes Kaj 2 

3700 Rønne 



Fisherman from Bornholm 

Former deck officer on merchant ships 


activites 

Voluntary rescue person (Rønne) 


.


106 

Name 

Position 

Company 

Henrik Balle 

Tejn Yacht Club 

Bornholms og Christians Ø Fiskeriforening 

Company address Sdr. Strandvej 14 

3770 Allinge 



Yachtsman 


activites 

Voluntary rescue person (Rønne) 


.


107 

Name 

Position 

Company 


Aron Sørensen 

Special consultant 

Danish Maritime Authority 

Vermundsgade 38C 




Master Mariner 

Former Lecturer on Danish Navigational Colleges 

Responsible for SOLAS – safety of navigation – 

(Chapter V) in Denmark 


activites 

Author of commented COLREG issued by the Danish 

Maritime Authority 

Author on voyage planning for master mariners – 

used on navigational colleges 


.


108 

Name 

Position 

Company 




Michael Skov 

Inspektoratschef 

Farvandsvæsenet 

Overgaden o. Vandet 62 B 

Postboks 1919 

1023 København K 

Aids to navigation management 

In charge of publication of Danish NtM, NtDW, 

Dansk Fyrliste 

Management of Wrecks 

Master Mariner 

Hydrographic surveyor 


activites 

Former editor of Danish NtM 


.


109 

Name 

Position 

Company 

Peter Friis-Hansen 

Professor 

Technical University of Denmark 

Company address Building 403 

Niels Koppels Alle 

2800 Kongens Lyngby 



Safety assessment of marine systems 

Risk analysis of general water way management 

(primarily related to collisions and groundings) 

Risk and reliability of ships operations 


activites 

Formulation of rational principles for acceptance 

criteria setting 


.


110 

Name 

Position 

Company 


Senior Specialist Risk Assessment 

COWI A/S 

Company address Parallelvej 2 




Risk assessment in general and for ship collision 

with bridges and other infrastructure and for oil spill 

in Danish waters. 

16 years of experience in risk, reliability and decision 

analysis 


activites 


.


111 

Name 

Position 

Company 

Lene Schepper 

Senior Specialist Risk Assessment 

COWI A/S 





More than 25 years of experience in hazid analysis 

of offshore facilities etc. 

Detailed analysis of pipelines, railways, shipping 

traffic, chemical plants, frequency and consequence 

assessment. 


activites 


.


112 

Name 

Position 

Company 


Specialist Risk Assessment 

COWI A/S 





Engineer specialised in risk analysis and risk assessment. 


activites 


.


113 

Appendix F: Hazard Identification 

Workshop I (Hazard identification) was held in Danish, which therefore is the 

language of the HazID list. 


.

Sejladssikkerheden omkring Bornholm 

Hazopmøde på Bornholm den 6. og 7. juni 2007 

Side 1 

Skib Beskrivelse af uheld Sikkerhedsforanstaltninger Hyppighed Konsekvens Kommentar 

Skib 

Et skib og dets retning beskrives ved tre bogstaver svarende til det område skibet kommer fra, det område skibet befinder 

sig i og det område skibet sejler mod. 

P:\65775A\3_Pdoc\DOC\hazopskema 10 aug 1.doc



Side 2 


VAB 

VAB 1.1 

VAB 1.2 

VAB 1.3 

VAB 1.4 

VAB 1.5 

Skib kommer fra vest gennem Kadetrenden og passerer område A med kurs mod Bornholms Gat 

Kollision med færge 

Krydsende færge fra styrbord med 

retning fra Swinoujscie til Trelleborg. 

Vinkel 90 grader 


Krydsende færge fra bagbord med 

retning fra Trelleborg til Swinoujscie. 




retning fra Swinoujscie til Ystad. 




retning fra Ystad til Swinoujscie. 


a) Regel om at VAB normalt skal 

vige i sigtbart vejr *) 

b) Der er god plads til at manøvrere, 

vanddybden er stor nok 

c) Der er lang tid til at reagere. 

Der vil oftest være langt mellem 

skibene. Men der kan være 

en klump og andre gange 

ingen som helst 

d) Der er en risikoreducerende 

effekt i, at færgen nu i højere 

grad ved, hvor de skibe, man 

skal krydse, sejler 

a) Regel om at færge normalt 

skal vige i sigtbart vejr *). Det 

er bare den sidste tur inden 

vagtskifte, hvor fokus er flyttet 

lidt hen på om afløseren nu 

kommer, der kan være en 

øget risiko ved. 

Også VAB 1.1 b), c) og d) 





skal vige i sigtbart vejr *) 


Kollision med andet skib 

Krydsende skib fra styrbord, der 

kommer syd om Bornholm og skal 

på tværs af den nordgående del af 

den separerede zone og sejle videa) 

Regel om at VAB normalt skal 

vige i sigtbart vejr *). Dvs. 

skibet, der kommer fra sydøst 

har retten til at fortsætte. Men 

VAB kunne være af den opfat- 

Burde ikke være 

et problem 

Sandsynligheden 

for en kollision er 

lavere nu end 

tidligere 

Som VAB 1.1 

Som VAB 1.1 

Som VAB 1.1 

Mindre sandsynlighed 

nu end før 

fordi VAB kun 

møder skibe fra 

styrbords side 

Hvor der er vand nok, skal en færge 

placere sig, så der er mest muligt plads 

til et stort skib 

En kollision i et snævert farvand kan 

forklares, men her er der mulighed for 

at dreje styrbord (almindelig procedure 

for at undvige). Der er vanddybde nok 

Hvis det er usigtbart vejr, så skal alle 

vige for alle 

Det er bekymrende, at nogle store 

skibe er af den opfattelse, at søvigepligten 

er trådt ud af kraft, når 

de sejler i en trafiksepareret zone 

Hvis vinklen er over 10 - 15 grader kan 

man betragte det som en slags krydsning. 

Men mindre vinkler kan sammenlignes 

med lige ud, dvs. +/-5 grader 

head-on kollision. Ved 5-7 grader er 




Side 3 


VAB 1.6 

VAB 1.7 

VAB 1.8 

VAB 1.9 

re mod sydvest (Kadetrenden). 

Vinkel ca. 20 grader 

Kollision med skib i medgående 

trafik 

Kollision med skib i modgående 

trafik 

Kollision med fiskefartøj 

Man kan også sejle ind i drivgarn 

Kollision med lystsejler 

Der er en del lystsejlere, der sejler 

direkte Rønne - Møn 

telse, at hans skib er på en rute 

og derfor måtte have første 

ret. Den største fare er vurderingen 

af hvor tæt man synes, 

man vil sejle på hinanden. Man 

må som SFA være forberedt 

på undvigemanøvrer 

b) Kryds under lille vinkel, nærmest 

modgående trafik 

a) Små fiskekuttere er begyndt at 

bruge AIS aktivt, og så viger 

fragtskibene 

a) En moderne sejlbåd er hvid 

med hvide sejl. Den ligner bølger, 

og man ser den vanskeligt 

fra et stort skib og slet ikke i 

hårdt vejr 

Mindre sandsynligt 

nu end før 

fordi der nu er 

færre (næsten 

ingen) modgående 

skibe at møde 

længden af krydsningen meget lang 

Folk der sejler på floder synes 50 m er 

en stor afstand. Men dem der sejler et 

stort skib har en anden opfattelse. Her 

er 200 m en lille afstand 

Der er en del travlfiskeri lige til slut i 

forløbet 

Fragtskibene kan til tider have svært 

ved at aflæse en fiskerbåds hensigter 

Der er også lystbåde, der sejler op 

langs den svenske kyst. Om sommeren 

er der nok i snit 70 både om dagen fra 

den kant. Dvs. minimum 10 både om 

dagen, der krydser ind over. Nogen gør 

det i precautionary area (B) nogen 

langs svenskekysten og nogen på 

tværs af trafiksepareringen. Der kommer 

også et stigende antal tyskere op 

Der er i snit 3-4 personer på en lystbåd 

VAB 1.10 Kollision med dykkerfartøj Der er dykkere, men de holder til længere 

oppe. Nærmere i område B 

VAB 1.11 

Kollision med trafik i forbindelse 

med etablering af vindmøllepark 

a) Der er god plads Tyskerne vil bygge en vindmøllepark 

på Adler Grund. Det kommer i fremtiden 




Side 4 


VAB 2.1 

Grundstødning 

VAB ændrer ikke kurs men fortsætter 

lige ud og rammer Hasle 

Navigationsfejl, styrmanden sover, 

eller han glemmer hvor han skal 

hen 

Skibet forventes at grundstøde 

med en hastighed på 9 knob. 

Grunden består af sand, istidssten 

(nogle meget store), ral, klippeskær, 

stenrev. Dvs. bunden er 

hård med en begrænset mængde 

kanter 

a) Et skib der tidligere glemte, 

hvad det var i færd med var 

primært udsat for at kollidere. 

Her havde de andre skibe så 

en mulighed for at opdage at 

der var en farlig situation på 

vej, hvorfor de undveg. Nu er 

denne kollisionsrisiko afløst af 

en risiko for at gå på grund inde 

ved Hasle. Her er der ingen, 

der hjælper med at undgå 

ulykken 

VAB 2.2 Grundstødning nær rute a) Der er ikke noget at gå på 

grund på i dette område 

VAB 3.1 

Ulykke pga. færdsel i skydeareal 

under skydning 

a) Når der skydes er området 

spærret 

b) Hvis nogen sejler ind i området, 

må man vente med at 

skyde, kalde dem op og så 

true med politianmeldelse, 

hvis de ikke forlader området 

frivilligt 

c) Spærring varsles i efterretninger 

for søfarende, men dem 

man henvender sig til, ser ikke 

altid de medier 

Det er nu blevet 

en signifikant 

større risiko, at 

skibet glemmer 

at skifte kurs. 

Risikoen er ændret 

fra en kollisionsrisiko 

før trafiksepareringen 

til en grundstødningsrisiko 

Ingen 

Der har været 2 grundstødninger ved 

Hasle af denne årsag 

Der har ikke været udslip fra de grundstødte 

skibe, men det vurderes kun at 

være held. Det er dog således, at 

stævnen rammer først, og der skal 

ødelægges en hel del før tankene beskadiges. 

Men det er jo muligt at bunden 

rives op, hvis der er sten, der rager 

op 

Ved Hasle og nordpå er holdebunden 

ikke god for at kaste anker 

Vi har ikke set den større båd grundstøde 

endnu, kun coastere. Tankskibene 

kommer almindeligvis mest fyldte 

den anden vej (vigtigt mht. konsekvenser)- 

men det er da set. Et stort 

skib vil grundstøde længere ude - med 

mulighed for at ødelægge bundtanke 

med olie. Sandsynligheden for udslip 

vurderes at være højere end ved 

grundstødning på en sandbanke 

Det skydeareal, der er markeret på 

søkortet er ved at blive flyttet, således, 

at det ikke længere skærer ind i trafiksepareringen 

Området anvendes ca. 30 dage om 

året. 

VAB 3.2 Ødelæggelse af kabel a) Kablerne krydser zonen, hvor Et drivende skib, der vil bremse kan 




Side 5 


Kabelfelt løber på tværs af trafikzonen 

Beskadigelse af kablerne kan betyde 

en afbrydelse af el til Bornholm. 

vanddybden er stor (ca. 50 

m). Men der er en yderligere 

konsekvens af en grundstødning 

ved Hasle. Her kommer 

kablerne i land og vanddybden 

ved kablerne er ikke så stor 

finde på at kaste anker. Det er en anden 

mulighed for at beskadige et kabel 

VAB 3.3 

ABC 

ABC 1.1 

Når man sejler hen over el-kabler 

sker der et udslag i et magnetkompas 

(kan være 10 grader). Et 

skib kan derved komme ud af kurs 

a) Der er adskillige kabler i området, 

men vanddybden er stor 

Skib kommer fra Kadetrenden og sejler gennem precautionary area for at sejle videre gennem Bornholms Gat 


Fletning med skib, der kommer 

fra Øresund 

a) Regel om at disse skibe (NBC) 

normalt skal vige i sigtbart vejr 

*). Men her skal man være 

opmærksom på, at NBC jo også 

skal passe på CBA. Dvs. 

NBC er ikke en forudsigelig 

faktor for ABC, for NBC skal 

også tilpasse sig anden trafik 

b) Det er væsentligt, at der nu 

står precautionary area på søkortet 

c) Man kan også aftale på VHF, 

hvad man vil gøre 

d) Det er dog alt i alt lettere at 

flette ind nu end tidligere. NBC 

kunne jo ikke bare dreje ind, 

for man vidste ikke hvad man 

ville møde. Det virker som om 

fletningen går nemmere i dag. 

Man kan evt. ikke følge den 

slaviske kurs, Man er nødt til at 

have en buffer 

e) Det er ulige lettere at forholde 

sig til, at man ved hvilken vej 

skibene sejler og hvor 

f) Imod taler at alle skibe nu skal 




Side 6 


flette over et mindre område 

end tidligere. Det giver større 

trafikintensitet, der hvor der 

flettes 

ABC 1.2 


Indflettet kysttrafik, der tidligere 

kunne sejle langs Sveriges sydkyst 

Øget antal skibe 

skal nu flettes 

ind. Hyppigheden 

stiger mindst 

proportionalt med 

antallet 

Området ind under Sveriges kyst er 

alene bestemt for skibe med destination 

til svenske havne. Efter trafiksepareringen 

er indført tvinges små skibe, 

der kunne sejle kystnært, ud i trafiksepareringen 

mellem de store skibe 

ABC 1.3 



retning fra Rønne mod Øresund 

a) Regel om at ABC normalt skal 


b) Færger er mere stedkendte og 

har en anden brodisciplin. Der 

træffes aftale om hvorvidt man 

skal gå agten om eller fortsætte 

c) Færger manøvrerer bedre end 

skibe generelt 

ABC 1.4 



retning fra Øresund til Rønne 



ABC 1.5 



retning fra Rønne til Ystad 

a) Regel om at ABC normalt skal 

vige i sigtbart vejr *) for færge 

Ystad-Rønne sejler lige ind i området 

der, hvor der er separeret, færgen 

synes at søfartsreglerne vel også må 

gælde når de er til færgens fordel 

Ruten er efter separeringen lidt omlagt 

i forhold til Bøjen ved Svart Grund for 

Bornholmstrafikkens færge Villum 

Clausen. Til dels også fordi færgen 

sejler hurtigere på lavt vand. Færgen 

sejler meget tæt på separationen i den 

nordøstlige del af precautionary area 

ABC 1.6 



retning fra Ystad til Rønne 

a) Regel om at færgen normalt 





Side 7 


ABC 1.7 Kollision med medgående skib 

ABC 1.8 Kollision med modgående skib 

ABC 1.9 

ABC 1.10 

ABC 1.11 

ABC 2.1 


Der er fiskeri i området 


Det forekommer at lystsejlere 

bevæger sig ind i precautionary 

area 

Kollision med dykkerfartøj 

Der kan være dykkere i området 


Svart Grund 

a) Regel om at motor viger for 

sejl, men det forudsætter at 

sejlskibet kan ses 

a) Vurderes ikke at være et problem. 

Selv ved motorstop vil 

ABC næppe kunne drive helt 

op til Svart Grund 

ABC 2.2 Grundstødning nær rute a) Der er ikke noget andet at gå 

på grund på 

ABC 3.1 Beskadigelse af telekabel a) Telekablet ligger dybt i havbunden 

og løber syd for rute. 

Vurderes ikke at være et problem 

BCD 

BCD 1.1 

Bornholms Gat nordøst gående trafik 

Der ikke længere så mange fiskefartøjer 

ved Svart Grund som tidligere. Men 

omlægningen af færgeruten er også 

sket pga. fiskefartøjerne. Om natten 

kan man ikke se, hvilken vej en fiskerbåd 

vender 

Det ses ofte, at fritidssejlerne krydser 

indover dette område. Det vurderes, at 

det kommer til at gå galt. Nogle skibe 

har ikke radar, og det er ikke altid muligt 

at se de små hvide både 

Vanddybden på Svart Grund er mindst 

14 m. Svart Grund består af sand. Kun 

de helt store skibe er i fare for at sidde 

fast. De mindre går fri igen, når de 

stopper 

Trafiksepareringen betyder, at man især undgår "head-on" kollisioner. Det er den type kollisioner, man ser meget ude i Verden, men i Danmark er 

det også den krydsende trafik, der volder problemer 

Lods tages op og sættes af i området omkring Hammeren. Skibe, der kommer fra øst, og skal have lods ombord, sejler i kystzonen syd for trafiksepareringen 

og fletter først ind nede i precautionary area (B). 



retning fra Allinge til Simrishamn 

a) Regel om at BCD normalt skal 

vige i sigtbart vejr *). 

b) Færger manøvrerer bedre end 

skibe i almindelighed. 

Der er generelt ikke meget krydsende 

trafik, men det er ikke forbudt at krydse 

trafiksepareringen. Man må gerne, 

dog skal krydsningen ske så vinkelret 




Side 8 


BCD 1.2 



retning fra Simrishamn til Allinge 

a) Regel om at færge normalt skal 


på sejlretningen som muligt 

I danske farvande er der snævert i 

Bornholms Gat, men slet ikke så smalt 

som i Storebælt. Der er relativt meget 

plads. Man følger kursen som skipper 

har sagt. Man har ikke på forhånd diskuteret, 

hvordan man går af vejen 

BCD 1.3 Kollision med medgående skib Trafiksepareringen betyder en større 

koncentration af trafik. Skibene ligger 

på et jernbanespor. De sejler bare. 

Navigatøren bliver fokuseret på landevejen 

og at man ikke kommer ud i 

rabatten 

BCD 1.4 Kollision med modgående skib Mange af skibene sejler her oftere end 

lodserne gør. De skibe, der sejler usikkert 

er de der "cowboydere", der ligger 

og jonglerer mellem ruterne og ikke 

mener, de har brug for en lods 

Det er ikke en ny fare hvis et skib skulle 

sejle ind i zonen mellem de to trafikzoner. 

Denne zone er reelt ca. 1 sømil 

bred 

BCD 1.5 


Fiskerbåde tager opmærksomhed 

og giver manøvrebegrænsning 

Der fiskes en del i selve ruten, 

men mest på Davids Banke 

a) Fiskefartøjer skal i trafiksepareringszonen 

trawle i sejlretningen. 

Deres hastighed er dog 

lav og de udgør således stadig 

en risiko 

Garnfiskeri fra hammeren til nord om 

Davids Banke 

De bedste fiskepladser ligger i drejepunkterne 

Fiskerne har 4 VHF-anlæg, der som 

regel alle er indstillet på fiskekanalerne, 

så de hører ikke efter, hvad der 

ellers sker omkring dem 

Drivgarn og laksekroge kan være generende. 

Der har været problemer. Fra 

2008 forsvinder de sidste drivgarn, idet 

man vil undgå at fange marsvin. Lak- 




Side 9 


BCD 1.6 

Kollision med trollingbåd 

Der ligger trollingbåde i området, 

men de må ikke sejle ud i trafiksepareringen 

sedrivkrogen forsvinder også 

Trollingbåde er lystfiskere, der sejler 

langsomt, når de fisker og hurtigt, når 

de sejler hjem. De tror de har særlige 

rettigheder, når de fisker, men det har 

de ikke. Der er nok 10 - 15 stykker, 

når man sejler forbi på en god fiskedag. 

BCD 1.7 Kollision med lystsejler Der er nogle lystsejlere, der sejler direkte 

fra Rønne til Hanöbukten. 

BCD 2.1 

Grundstødning på Davids Banke 

Davids Banke har altid været afmærket, 

så hvis man sejler på 

den, er det fordi man drejer for 

tidligt. 

a) Davids Banke er afmærket, 

fordi vandet er lavt (vanddybden 

er ca. 11 m). Her er derfor 

mindre manøvrerum. 

b) Davids Banke er sand. 

c) Mange af tankskibene er i ballast 

på vej tilbage til Primorsk. 

Dvs. de stikker mindre dybt. 

Første gang man støder på afmærkning 

på ruten er ved Davids Banke. 

BCD 2.2 Kontakt med Hammeren Vinden er det farligste ved havari i 

dette område. Skibet kan blive kastet 

ind mod Hammeren 

BCD 3.1 Kabel 

Ingen kabler identificeret 

CDØ 

CDØ 1.1 

CDØ 1.2 

Skib sejler fra Bornholms Gat mod øst 

Et skib, der sejler i fortsættelsen af den trafikseparerede rute møder ingen grunde, men mange modsejlende skibe. Skibene kommer ind fra sydøst 

bl.a. ad dybvandsruten, dvs. skråt ind fra siden. CDØ kommer fra en separeret rute (motorvej) og ind på en landevej 







a) Regel om at DCØ normalt skal 

vige i sigtbart vejr *). 

b) Færger manøvrerer bedre 






Side 10 


CDØ 1.3 


Skib der kommer fra Klaipeda og 

skal over i den modgående rute. 

Skibet kommer fra styrbords side 



Det er bemærket, at det forekommer 

sært, at man på søkortet lader dybvandsruten 

(DW) løber helt frem til 

trafiksepareringen starter. Ruten burde 

stoppe et stykke inden trafiksepareringszonen 

CDØ 1.4 


Skib der kommer fra havne øst for 

Klaipeda af mere nordlig rute og 

skal over i den modgående rute. 

Skibet kommer fra styrbords side 



CDØ 1.5 


Skib der kommer fra øst via dybvandsruten 

og skal over i den 

modgående rute. Skibet kommer 

fra styrbords side 

Skib kommer ind under spids vinkel, 

så det nærmest er modgående 

a) Regel om at CDØ normalt skal 


CDØ 1.6 


Kysttrafikken langs Sveriges sydkyst 

skal dreje fra mod nord igen 

I den nye situation møder man mere 

trafik, fordi man skal have krydset 

kysttrafikken ind, den må ikke gå langs 

kysten mere. Så der er mere trafik 

derude nu. 

Langt de fleste af disse skibe vil vælge 

at sejle i venstre del af den østgående 

rute, men de må krydse de vestgående 

skibe 2 gange. 

Det vurderes at ca. 10 % af skibene 

skal op langs Sveriges østkyst 

CDØ 1.7 


Større skib, der har udvekslet lods 

i Hammerområdet sejler på tværs 

af trafiksepareringszonen for at 

flette ind i den sydvest gående 

trafik 

a) Det er ikke normal procedure. 

Skibet vil fortsætte til precautionary 

area og flette ind der 

på lige fod med trafikken fra 

syd 

En del af de store skibe, der benytter 

dybvandsruten, sejler syd om trafiksepareringszonen 

for at sætte lods af og 

på 

Det drejer sig i snit om 3 skibe om 

dagen, idet nogle tager lods andre 




Side 11 


CDØ 1.8 Kollision med medgående skib 

CDØ 1.9 Kollision med modgående skib Tidligere mødte 

DCØ flere modgående 

skibe 

CDØ 1.10 

CDØ 1.11 

CDØ 2.1 


Der er fiskere i området, men ikke 

specielt mange. På en rigtig god 

dag er der 10 - 15 stykker, men 

heroppe er det færre 


Der er ikke så mange lystsejlere 

her 


Davids Banke 

steder. Det store pres slipper øst for 

Bornholm 

Der mistes en del bøjer af den årsag 

Lodserne ser gerne, der tages Østersølods 

Man oplever hurtigt modgående trafik 

efter Bornholms Gat. Andre skibe 

kommer jo ind fra siden fra flere retninger 

Evt. burde der sættes nogle flere knudepunkter 

ind i beregningsmodellen 

Grundstødning kan kun ske ved Davids 

Banke 

CDØ 3.1 

CDØ 3.2 

ØDC 

ØDC 1.1 

Beskadigelse af kabel 

Der er ingen kabler her 

Beskadigelse af gasledning 

Er endnu ikke etableret 

Ny gasledning skal lægges sydøst om 

Bornholm. Slet ikke i dette område. 

Etablering langt ude i fremtiden. 

Skib fra Øst sejler gennem Bornholms Gat 

Ca. 50.000 fartøjer om året 

På ruten møder skibet den krydsende trafik, der kommer fra vest og skal op langs Sveriges østkyst samt den flettende trafik, der kommer fra de sydlige 

sejlruter i Østersøen 



Krydsende færge fra bagbord med vige i sigtbart vejr *) 




Side 12 


ØDC 1.2 

ØDC 1.3 

ØDC 1.4 

ØDC 1.5 

ØDC 1.6 

ØDC 1.7 






Skib der kommer fra Klaipeda og 

skal flette. Skibet kommer fra 

bagbords side 


Skib der kommer fra havne øst for 

Klaipeda af mere nordlig rute og 

skal flette. Skibet kommer fra 

bagbords side 


Skib der kommer fra øst via dybvandsruten 

og skal flette. Skibet 

kommer fra bagbords side 

Skib kommer ind i så lav vinkel, 

at det nærmest er medgående 


Kysttrafik langs Sveriges sydkyst 

skal dreje fra mod nord igen. Dvs. 

skibene skal krydse og kommer 

ind nærmest modgående fra bagbord 


Kysttrafik langs Sveriges sydkyst 

skal flette ind fra styrbords side. 

ØDC 1.8 Kollision med medgående skib 

a) Regel om at ØCD normalt skal 


a) Regel om at andet skib normalt 






a) Regel om at disse skibe normalt 


for ØCD 

a) Regel om at ØDC normalt skal 


ØDC 1.9 Kollision med modgående skib Tidligere mødte 

man flere modgående 

skibe 

ØDC 1.10 


Der er fiskere, men ikke specielt 

mange. På en rigtig god dag er 

Der er ikke længere så mange skibe op 

til Øland Sødre. Det tynder ud 

Man kan vælge at gå inshore med lille 

skib nede fra Møn og op langs svenskekysten. 

Det er tilladt, hvis man skal 

til en svensk havn 




Side 13 


ØDC 1.11 

ØCD 2.1 

ØDC 2.2 

ØDC 3.1 

ØDC 3.2 

DCB 

DCB 1.1 

DCB 1.2 

der 10 - 15 stykker syd for ruten, 

men heroppe er det færre 


Der er ikke så mange lystsejlere 

her 


Davids Banke 


Sandhammeren 


Kabler er der ikke nogen af. 

Beskadigelse af gasledning 

Ny gasledning skal ligge sydøst 

om Bornholm. Slet ikke i dette 

område. 

a) Grundstødning kan kun ske 

ved Davids Banke og den ligger 

langt væk 

Skib fra Sveriges østkyst, fra øst eller fra syd sejler gennem Bornholms Gat mod sydvest 









a) Regel om at DCB normalt skal 


Sandhammeren er en sandbanke ligesom 

Due Odde 

Skibe med stor dybgang går på grund 

inde ved Sandhammeren på svenskekysten, 

hvis det ikke ændrer kurs. De 

har jo sejlet længe ligeud, så der er en 

risiko. 

Langt ude i fremtiden 

DCB 1.3 Kollision med medgående skib Dem der kommer oppe fra Hanøbugten 

er sejlet ind i enden af trafiksepareringszonen. 

En del af de mindre fartøjer 

vil vælge at blive inde langs kysten 

DCB 1.4 Kollision med modgående skib 

DCB 1.5 Kollision med fiskefartøj 




Side 14 


Der er lidt svenske fiskefartøjer i 

området. Vurderes ikke at være et 

stort problem 

DCB 1.6 Kollision med lystsejler 

DCB 2.1 Grundstødning 

Davids Banke 

DCB 2.2 

DCB 3.1 

CBA 

CBA 1.1 

CBA 1.2 

CBA 1.3 

CBA 1.4 


Svart Grund 

Man kan komme til at ramme 

Svart Grund, hvis kursen vestpå 

ikke lige er den rigtige 


Ingen kabler her 

a) Davids Banke ligger på den 

anden side af den modsatte 

sejlretning. Her ender man 

næppe 

a) 14 m vanddybde på Svart 

Grund, så en stor del af skibene 

kan sejle lige hen over 

Se yderligere ABC 2.1 

Skib sejler fra Bornholms Gat mod Kadetrenden 















a) Regel om at CBA normalt skal 






Negligibel 

Ingen 

Hvis man dummer sig og taster forkert 

på sit instrument uden at kontrollere, 

kan man komme til at gå på grund, 

hvis man sejler lidt mere nord 

Færgen Ystad-Rønne sejler lige ind i 

området og skærer der, hvor der er 

separeret. Færgen er af den opfattelse, 

at søfartsreglerne vel også gælder for 

dem. 

Ruten er lidt omlagt i forhold til bøjen 

ved Sorte Grund for hurtigfærgen Villum 

Clausen. Men det er også fordi 

færgen sejler hurtigere på lavt vand 




Side 15 


CBA 1.5 Kollision med medgående skib 

CBA 1.6 Kollision med modgående skib 

CBA 1.7 

CBA 1.8 


Lidt fiskeri. Ved ikke hvor meget, 

der bliver fisket. Måske ikke så 

meget. 


Nogen i precautionary area 

Lystsejlere bør holde sig væk fra området, 

især hvis det er tåget. CBA har 

ikke en jordisk chance for at se et lille 

skib. Man kan høre skruen, men ved 

ikke hvor lyden kommer fra 

CBA 1.9 


Der er lejlighedsvis dykkere i området 

CBA 2.1 


Svart Grund 




Se også ABC 2.1 

CBA 3.1 


Telekabel 

a) Telekabel ligger dybt og sønden 

for 

Negligibel 

BAV 

BAV 1.1 

BAV 1.2 

Skib sejler fra precautionary area mod Kadetrenden 



retning fra Swinoujscie til Trelleborg. 




retning fra Trelleborg til Swinoujscie. 


a) Færge normalt skal vige i sigtbart 

vejr *). Der er god plads 

til at manøvrere. 

a) Regel om at BAV normalt skal 

vige i sigtbart vejr *) for de 

sydgående færger 

Færgen sejler hver 6. time 

BAV bliver linet op i forhold til færgerne 

på et sent tidspunkt nu i forhold til før. 

Ystad færgen mødes lige med det 

samme. Man har måske nok tid, men 

altid når der er en kursændring er det 

svært at forudse, hvordan trafikken vil 




Side 16 


BAV 1.3 

BAV 1.4 



retning fra Swinoujscie til Ystad 




retning fra Ystad til Swinoujscie 


BAV 1.5 Kollision med andet skib 

Flettende skib fra bagbord, der 

kommer syd om Bornholm og skal 

på tværs af den nordgående del af 

den separerede zone og sejle videre 

mod vest 

Flet under lille vinkel 

BAV 1.6 Kollision med medgående trafik 



a) Regel om at BAV normalt skal 


a) Regel om at skib fra syd normalt 


BAV 1.7 Kollision med modgående trafik Mindre sandsynligt 

i dag pga. 

separeringen 

BAV 1.8 

BAV 1.9 

BAV 1.10 

BAV 1.11 


En del travlfiskeri. Lige i starten af 

forløbet 


Der er en del, der sejler direkte 

Rønne - Møn 


Der er dykkere, men de holder til 

nær B 



udvikle sig. Der er ca. 20 minutter. 6 

sømil. Der er normalt ikke 3-4 skibe på 

rad. Typisk vil der være et enkelt skib 

Kritisk når skibe kommer ind medgående 

fra syd. Vil skibet overhale eller 

krydse Der kan opstå tvivl 






Side 17 


BAV 2.1 

BAV 2.2 

NBC 

NBC 1.1 

NBC 1.2 


Grundstødning nær rute 

Glemme at ændre kurs 

Kollision med skib i modsat sejlretning 

a) Der er ikke noget at gå på 

grund på 

a) Sandsynligt at andet skib vil 

erkende situationen og undvige. 

Det opdager sandsynligvis 

ret hurtigt, at skibet er på gale 

veje. Besætningen på BAV er 

jo nok også vågnet op oppe i 

precautionary area. Men der 

kunne jo være et vagtskifte på 

samme tid 

b) Skibe der er vant til at sejle i 

området, ved jo nok, hvad der 

skal gøres 

Skib fra Øresund sejler mod Bornholms Gat 

Efter trafiksepareringen skal NBC nærmest frem til et bestemt punkt før skibet må begynde at dreje 

Kollision med andet skib, der sejler 

ABC, under indfletning 

Kollision med andet skib, der sejler 

CBA, under kryds af sydvest 

gående rute 

a) Regel om at NBC normalt skal 


b) Der er god plads, og NBC er 

ikke presset af nogen grunde 

c) NBC skal ikke ved indfletningen 

som før holde øje med den 

modgående trafik. Endvidere 

er der nu et slip uden skibe 

imellem de to sejlretninger, 

hvor NBC kan manøvrere om 

nødvendigt 


vige i sigtbart vejr *). Det kan 

evt. tvinge CBA op på Svart 

Grund 

Tidligere skulle 

NBC holde øje til 

alle sider. Fletningen 

er meget 

mere overskuelig 

nu. Før kunne 

man ikke vide 

hvorfra de andre 

kom 

Det kan være lidt svært at afgøre om 

NBC er overhalende eller krydsende. 

Det ligger lige på grænsen. Der kan 

opstå nogle tvivlssituationer. Vinklen 

skal dog være mere spids for at det er 

et reelt problem 

Om NBC vælger at gå for eller agter 

afhænger af farten 

NBC 1.3 






b) Der er god plads, og NBC er 

ikke presset af nogen grunde 

Det er mindre farligt at møde en færge 

end et andet skib, for mandskabet er 

godt kendt med farvandet og vil vige, 

hvis de kan se, at NBC har problemer 




Side 18 


NBC 1.4 




c) Færger er mere stedkendte og 

har en anden brodisciplin. Der 

træffes aftale om hvorvidt man 

skal gå agten om eller fortsætte 

d) Færger manøvrerer bedre end 

skibe generelt 


vige i sigtbart vejr *) for færge 

Også NBC 1.3 b), c) og d) 

Ruten er efter separeringen lidt omlagt 

i forhold til Bøjen ved Svart Grund for 

hurtigfærgen Villum Clausen. Men det 

er også fordi færgen sejler hurtigere på 

lavt vand 

NBC 1.5 

NBC 1.6 

NBC 1.7 

NBC 1.8 

NBC 1.9 

NBC 1.10 

NBC 2.1 




Kollision med medgående skib 

Herunder færge fra Øresund til 

Rønne 

Kollision med modgående skib, 

dvs. skib, der sejler CBA 


Der er lidt fiskeri i området, muligvis 

meget lidt 


Det forekommer at lystsejlere 

bevæger sig ind i precautionary 

area 


Der kan være dykkere i området 


Svart Grund 

Man kan ikke gå på grund på 

Svart Grund, hvis man kommer 

ind fra Øresund, dertil er skibets 

a) Regel om at færgen normalt 


a) Selv ved motorstop vil NBC 

ikke kunne drive helt op til 

Svart Grund 

Negligibel 




Side 19 


dybgang for lille 

NBC 2.2 Grundstødning nær rute a) Der er ikke noget andet at gå 

på grund på 

NBC 2.3 

Grundstødning pga. manglende 

kursændring 

Hvis man ikke får drejet rammer 

man syd for Hasle. Her er der små 

og store sten på grunden 

NBC 3.1 Beskadigelse af telekabel a) Telekablet ligger dybt i havbunden 

og løber syd for rute 

CBN 

CBN 1.1 

CBN 1.2 

CBN 1.3 

Skib fra Bornholms Gat sejler mod Øresund 


Fletning med færge fra bagbord 

med retning fra Rønne mod Øresund 







CBN 1.4 Kollision med medgående skib 

CBN 1.5 

CBN 1.6 

Kollision med modgående skib, 

herunder modgående færge med 



Lidt fiskeri. Ved ikke hvor meget, 

der bliver fisket. Måske ikke så 

meget. 





a) Regel om at CBN normalt skal 


Ingen 

Negligibel 

Færgen Ystad-Rønne sejler lige ind i 

området og skærer der, hvor der er 

separeret. 

Ruten er lidt omlagt i forhold til bøjen 

ved Svart Grund for hurtigfærgen Villum 

Clausen. Men det er også fordi 

disse færger sejler hurtigere på lavt 

vand 




Side 20 


CBN 1.7 

CBN 1.8 

CBN 2.1 


Nogen i precautionary area 


Der er lejlighedsvis dykkere i området 


Svart Grund 




CBN går nok ikke på grund på Svart 

Grund, men det er en mulighed, hvis 

CBN drejer for tidligt 

CBN 2.2 

CBN 3.1 


Stevns 

Glemt at ændre kurs 


Telekabel 

a) Telekabel ligger dybt og sønden 

for 

Negligibel 

SED 

SED 1.1 

SED 1.2 

Skib fra den sydøstlige del af Østersøen går nord om Bornholm og fletter ind i trafikken øst for Bornholms Gat 

Dette er den ene af de tre ruter, som skibe, der har ærinde i den sydøstlige del af Østersøen, kan benytte for at komme forbi Bornholm: 

• Rute nord om Bornholm via Bornholms Gat. Denne rute har de største vanddybder og skibe med en dybgang > 10 - 12 m er nødt til at anvende 

denne rute 

SED må gå nord om Christiansø for at komme ind i trafiksepareringszonen uden at skulle krydse inde i zonen. Det betyder at trafikken holdes uden 

for de indre farvande nord for Bornholm 


Skib, der sejler mod vest, men 

syd for den nordøst gående trafikzone, 

pga. afsætning/optagning af 

lods i området omkring Hammeren 


Skib, der sejler mod øst men syd 

for den nordøst gående trafikzone, 

pga. afsætning/optagning af lods i 

området omkring Hammeren 

SED 1.3 Kollision med modgående skib 

a) Regel om at SED normalt skal 







Side 21 


SED 1.4 Kollision med medgående skib 

SED 2.1 

SED 2.2 

SED 2.3 


Christiansø. Øerne ligger ret tæt 

på sejlruten, ca. 3 sømil. Der er 

dybt vand til ganske tæt på øerne 


Davids Banke 

Skydeområde øst for Bornholm 

Skib rammes ved skydeøvelse 

Øerne er udlagt som reservat, så man 

bør have en større sikkerhedsafstand. 

Her er yngleområder, og der er væsentlige 

miljøinteresser, som man kan 

komme i konflikt med. Græsholmene er 

nok de mest sårbare. Vind og strøm 

bestemmer, hvad der kommer hvor af 

et spild 

Habitatområder har regler for hvilken 

afstand, man må færdes i. COWI undersøger. 

Området er lukket ca. 30 dage om 

året. Så er det vanskeligt at lægge en 

anbefalet rute gennem det 

EDC 

EDC 1.1 

EDC 1.2 

EDC 1.3 

Skib fra den sydøstlige del af Østersøen krydser østgående trafik fra Bornholms Gat og fletter med vestgående trafik for selv at gå 

gennem Bornholms Gat 


Krydsende skib, CDØ, på vej mod 

øst ud af trafiksepareringszonen 

SED rammer i meget spids vinkel 

og er nærmest modgående 


Fletning med skib, der kommer 

fra øst 

Vinklen er meget spids og skibet 

er nærmest medgående 


Kysttrafik, der drejer mod nord op 

a) Regel om at CDØ normalt skal 

vige i sigtbart vejr *), der er 

god plads, hvis CDØ er kommet 

forbi Davids Banke 

a) Regel om at SED normalt skal 

vige i sigtbart vejr *). SED har 

mulighed for at vige i midterområdet 

mellem de to sejlretninger, 

hvor der stort set ikke 

er nogen trafik 

a) Regel om at dette skib normalt 

skal vige i sigtbart vejr *) for 

Det kan være lidt vanskeligt for CDØ at 

forholde sig til SED. CDØ har lige forladt 

trafiksepareringen og kommet fri 

af Bornholm. CDØ føler sig fri, men er 

også særlig opmærksom. Hvis CDØ 

ikke er kommet forbi Davids Banke er 

der mulighed for at gå på grund her, 

hvis dybgangen er større end 11 m 

Kan evt. kompliceres af trafikken med 

mindre fartøjer, der skal op langs den 

svenske østkyst 

Forslag: Flyt indfletningen længere 

østpå, så man kommer fri af kysttrafikken 

til Sverige og CDØ får tid til at 

orientere sig 




Side 22 


langs den svenske kyst og skal 

krydse den sydvest gående trafikzone 

den sydvest gående trafik 

EDC 2.1 Grundstødning a) Her er god plads Negligibel 

CDE 

CDE 1.1 

CDE 2.1 

DES 

DES 1.1 

DES 1.2 

Skib fra Bornholms Gat drejer af mod den sydøstlige del af Østersøen 


Den rute CDE følger skulle ikke 

medføre, at CDE krydser andre 

skibe 


Davids Banke 

Skib sejler nord om Bornholm mod den sydøstlige del af Østersøen 


Skib, der sejler mod vest, men 

syd for den nordøst gående trafikzone, 

pga. afsætning/optagning af 

lods i området omkring Hammeren 


Skib, der sejler mod øst, men syd 

for den nordøst gående trafikzone, 

pga. afsætning/optagning af lods i 

området omkring Hammeren 

DES 1.3 Kollision med modgående skib 

DES 1.4 Kollision med medgående skib 

DES 2.1 

DES 2.2 

DES 2.3 


Christiansø. Øerne ligger ret tæt 

på sejlruten, ca. 3 sømil. Der er 

dybt vand til ganske tæt på øerne 


Davids Banke 

Skydeområde øst for Bornholm 

Skib rammes ved skydeøvelse 

a) Regel om at skib normalt skal 


a) Regel om at DES normalt skal 


Se SED 2.1 

Se SED 2.3 




Side 23 


SFA 

SFA 1.1 

SFA 1.2 

SFA 1.3 

SFA 1.4 

SFA 1.5 

SFA 1.6 

Skib fra den sydøstlige del af Østersøen sejler mod vest i en rute syd om Bornholm 

Der er to ruter, som skibe, der er på vej til/fra den sydøstlige del af Østersøen, kan benytte for at sejle syd om Bornholm: 

• En rute syd om Adlergrund. Denne rute kan anvendes af skibe med en dybgang op til 10 - 12 m. For de største af disse kræver det dog hjælp 

af moderne navigationsudstyr, idet det er nødvendigt at zigzagge for at gå fri af nogle grunde. Disse kursændringer kan være problematiske, 

da det er vigtigt, at skibe kommer ind på en ny kurs lang tid før, at de eksempelvis møder en grund (altså at de bliver linet op). Gør de ikke 

det, så stiger risikoen for ulykker. 

• En rute nord om Adlergrund. Denne rute kan anvendes af skibe med dybgang < 7 m 

I tysk farvand er det tilladt at benytte kystzonen, også selvom skibet ikke har ærinde til en havn på kysten 

Nord om Adlergrund 



retning fra Rønne til Sassnitz 


Syd om Adlergrund 







retning fra Sassnitz til Rønne 



retning fra Ystad til Swinoujscie 




retning fra Swinoujscie 

til Ystad. Vinkel 90 grader 




a) Regel om at SFA normalt skal 

vige i sigtbart vejr *). Der er 

god plads til at manøvrere for 

skibe med så lav dybgang som 

er nødvendig for at gå over 

Rønne Banke 


vige i sigtbart vejr *). Der er 

god plads til at manøvrere 


skal vige i sigtbart vejr *). Der 

er god plads til at manøvrere 






vige i sigtbart vejr *) for de 

sydgående færger 

Færgen sejler hver 6. time 

SFA skal ændre kurs lige, hvor man 

møder trafikken fra Trelleborg, og det 




Side 24 


SFA 1.7 

retning fra Trelleborg til Swinoujscie 





retning fra Swinoujscie 

til Trelleborg 


SFA 1.8 Kollision med medgående trafik 

SFA 1.9 Kollision med modgående trafik 

SFA 1.10 


Der er meget fiskeri på Rønne 

Banke syd for Due Odde 

SFA 1.11 Kollision med lystsejler 

SFA 1.12 Kollision med trafik i forbindelse 


SFA 2.1 

SFA 2.2 


Grundstødning på Rønne Banke 


Grundstødning på Adlergrund 

a) Færge normalt skal vige i sigtbart 

vejr *). Der er god plads 

til at manøvrere 

a) Der er god plads, idet der er 

rigelig vanddybde 

er ikke helt så rart. Men her er ikke så 

meget trafik, og man er forbi de lavere 

dele på ruten 

Der er nogle organiserede fisketure om 

sommeren, hvor man ligger og fisker 

på et godt sted. Der er begyndt at 

komme nogle polske både. De ligger 

mest på Rønne Banke 

Tyskerne vil bygge en vindmøllepark 


Denne analyse skal ikke vurdere de 

problemer skibene evt. må have længere 

mod øst, hvor de kan have lidt 

vanskeligheder med at komme ind i 

ruten, når de sejler kystnært 

Hvis man skal klare turen uden at kigge 

på søkort er den største dybgang 7 

- 8 m. I det tilfælde er sandsynligheden 

for grundstødning på Rønne Banke 

meget lille 

Det forudses, at der vil komme en 

vindmøllepark på Adlergrund 

SFA 2.3 


Grundstødning på Adlergrund 

a) I dag burde det ikke være forbundet 

med fare for grund- 

Hvis GPS svigter, har SFA dog et problem. 

Man er derfor nødt til at etablere 




Side 25 


stødning at benytte denne rute, 

fordi man har langt bedre 

navigationsudstyr end tidligere 

andre muligheder. Man kunne stille et 

fyrtårn op 

SFA 2.4 

FAV 

FAV 1.1 

FAV 1.2 

FAV 1.3 

VAF 

VAF 1.1 


Grundstødning på Oderbank 

SFA skal ændre kurs syd for Rønne 

Banke. Hvis dette ikke sker, 

går skibet på grund på Oderbank 

Skib, der er sejlet syd om Bornholm, skal flette ind i trafikken mod Kadetrenden 

Hasarderne BAV 1.6, BAV 1.7, BAV 1.9 og BAV 1.11 er også relevante for disse skibe 

Der ligger et væsentligt naturområde 

nordvest for Rygen 

Skibe, der går nord om Adlergrund krydser færgen mellem Swinoujscie og Trelleborg i område A, dvs. hasarderne BAV 1.1 og BAV 1.2 er også relevant 

for disse skibe 



Krydsning på tværs af trafikzonen 

med nordøst gående trafik, VAB 




Krydsning på tværs af trafikzonen 

med nordøst gående trafik, VAB 



Fletning med skibe fra styrbord på 

vej mod Kadetrenden 


Skib fra Kadetrenden drejer syd om Bornholm 





a) Regel om at FAV normalt skal 


Hasarderne VAB 1.6, VAB 1.7, VAB 1.9 og VAB 1.11 er også relevante for disse skibe 

Indfletningen vil ske ret tæt på indgangen 

til Kadetrenden helt henne syd for 

Møn, hvor trafiksepareringen hører 

op/starter. Man bør overveje at revidere 

indgangen til Kadetrenden. Det er 

vanskeligt at navigere her, der ligger 3 

vrag og renden flytter sig 

Skibe, der går nord om Adlergrund krydser færgen mellem Swinoujscie og Trelleborg i område A, dvs. hasarderne VAB 1.1 og VAB 1.2 er også relevant 

for disse skibe 


a) Regel om at VAF normalt skal 

Kollision med medgående skib i vige i sigtbart vejr *) 




Side 26 


AFS 

AFS 1.1 

AFS 1.2 

AFS 1.3 

AFS 1.4 

AFS 1.5 

forbindelse med kursændring mod 

syd 

Skib fra Kadetrenden går syd om Bornholm 

Der er to ruter, som skibe, der er på vej til/fra den sydøstlige del af Østersøen, kan benytte for at sejle syd om Bornholm: 

• En rute syd om Adlergrund. Denne rute kan anvendes af skibe med en dybgang op til 10 - 12 m. For de største af disse kræver det dog hjælp 

af moderne navigationsudstyr, idet det er nødvendigt at zigzagge for at gå fri af nogle grunde 

• En rute nord om Adlergrund. Denne rute kan anvendes af skibe med dybgang < 7 m 



retning fra Swinoujscie til Trelleborg 




retning fra Trelleborg til Swinoujscie 




retning fra Sassnitz til Rønne 








retning fra Swinoujscie til Ystad. 




b) Der er god plads til at manøvrere, 

vanddybden er stor nok 

c) Der er lang tid til at reagere. 

Der vil oftest være langt mellem 

skibene. Men der kan være 

en klump og andre gange ingen 

som helst 



Også VAF 1.1 b) og c) 










Som VAF 1.1 

Som VAF 1.1 

Som VAF 1.1 

Som VAF 1.1 

AFS 1.6 Kollision med færge a) Regel om at færge normalt Som VAF 1.1 




Side 27 


AFS 1.7 

AFS 1.8 

AFS 1.9 


retning fra Ystad til Swinoujscie. 


Kollision med skib i medgående 

trafik 

Kollision med skib i modgående 

trafik 


Meget fiskeri på Rønne banke syd 

for Due Odde 



AFS 1.10 Kollision med lystsejler Der er et stigende antal lystfartøjer i 

det tyske område 

AFS 1.11 

AFS 2.1 

AFS 2.2 




Adlergrund 


Rønne Banke 



*) Søvejsreglerne er ret komplekse. Situationen forandres fx, når det er usigtbart vejr. Måden hvorpå skibene skal forholde sig, er meget forskellig i sigtbart 

og usigtbart vejr. Dette giver da også problemer i praksis, idet man ofte oplever, at kollisioner sker i usigtbart vejr. Endvidere vil der i sigtbart vejr i 

særlige tilfælde kunne forekomme eksempler på et skib, som befinder sig i en særlig situation (eksempelvis kan det være begrænset i sin evne til at manøvrere), 

hvilket kan gøre situationen være omvendt, således at skibet nu ikke skal gå af vejen. 




Side 28 


Generel beskrivelse 

Skibes antal og størrelse 

• Der forekommer timer eller andre kortere perioder, hvor koncentrationen af skibe visse steder omkring 

Bornholm er ekstremt stor. Hvornår det sker, er en ren tilfældighed 

• Trenden er større skibe og et svagt stigende antal 

• Trafikkompositionen er ændret meget de seneste år, fordi de store tankere er blevet flere. Dvs. miljøkonsekvenserne 

af ulykker er meget større i dag end tidligere 

• Færgetrafikken til og fra Bornholm og også mellem østersølandene er øget de seneste år. F.eks. er der 

kommet en ny hurtigfærge mellem Allinge og Simrishamn. Der kommer evt. også flere færger til Polen 

• Der forventes at komme flere polske lystsejlere, størrelsen af disse er opadgående 

Dybgang 

• Skibe med lille dybgang kan gå gennem Øresund og Kielerkanalen. Det er langt de fleste af disse skibe, 

der skal ud gennem Kielerkanalen til Hamborg. Der går ca. 50.000 skibe/år til Kiel og 25.000/år op gennem 

Storebælt 

Vandstand 

• Der er ingen tidevand af betydning i området 

• Vandstanden varierer kun i forbindelse med storm. Vindstuvning kan betyde -1.2 m i Allinge havn 

Dårlig sigt 

Miner 

• Det er usigtbart, hvis man ikke kan se så langt som radaren 

• Tåget vil sige under 500 m sigt 

• Også regnbyger kan være årsag til nedsat sigt 

• Ved dårlig sigt, skal man ned på manøvrefart, ellers så får man skylden, hvis der sker noget. Hvis man er 

midt ude i vandet, sætter man dog ofte ikke hastigheden ned i tåget vejr. Det tør man godt, hvis man har 

en god radar 

• Man viger aldrig til bagbord, når det er tåget 




Side 29 


• I Kadetrenden ligger vrag på 19 m med miner, der ikke er eksploderet. Men det er generelt ikke miner, der 

ligger på havbunden, men sennepsgas, granater, bomber og nysegas. Der er ingen sprængladning tilbage 

og de ligger så dybt, at det kun er fiskerne, der kan få fat i dem 

Årsager til fejl 

• Ca. 90 % af de fejl, der fører til ulykker vurderes at være menneskelige fejl. En typisk årsag er at kommandovejen 

er for lang og styrmanden tør ikke vige. Alternativt er styrmanden faldet i søvn 

• Blackout sker 1 gang om året på ethvert skib. Det kan tage flere timer, men varer typisk 1 - 5 minutter. 

Hvis man skal have vækket nogen til at starte nødgeneratoren tager det ekstra tid. Man må kaste anker, 

hvis det varer længe. Hvis man ikke kan starte nødgeneratoren er det et problem 

Generelle sikkerhedsforanstaltninger 

Uddannelse af broens besætning 

• Nogle styrmænd har underlødige certifikater (købecertifikater), reelt har en del ikke nogen uddannelse. 

Især filippinerne er dårlige. Der er set adskillige eksempler på, at styrmanden ikke ved hvorledes man bestemmer 

sin position med udstyret. Tilsvarende gælder for visse polakker. Skibenes besætninger sættes 

ofte af bemandingsselskaber, så der kan være mange nationaliteter på broen 

• Har man et certifikat, har man ret til at sejle uden lods. Men falske eller underlødige certifikater kan købes 

Navigationsudstyr 

• Den elektroniske samkøring af skibenes positioner med søkortet er en meget god ting, for man får en bedre 

forståelse for situationen. Men ikke alle skibe har udstyret 

• Et skib med en god radar kan agere lidt mere dristigt 

• En gammel radar, skal man se på i mindst 3 minutter, for at kunne se, hvad der er af skibe 

At tage lods 

• Nogen skippere, der ikke er kendt med området, er nervøse hele vejen. De fleste sejler uden lods i dette 

farvand. Mange af de skibe, der laver sjove manøvrer har nok den fejl, at skibsføreren er faldet i søvn. 

Men det vil de næppe svare på 

• Alt hvad der ikke er normalt er farligt. Lodsen ser altid efter, hvad der ikke er normalt på sit billede. Mange 

reagerer på de mærkelige skibe og passer på, men de kalder dem ikke op. Mange skibe sejler vanvittigt. 

De er nok gået til køjs. Og så hjælper det jo ikke at kalde dem op 

• Man må godt sejle uden for de anbefalede ruter 




Side 30 


• Hvor går skibene nu, når de skal ind og hente lods Tre steder nord for Bornholm, tager de lods op. Tankskibe 

er mest omhyggelige 

• Man kan tage lods fra Bornholm til Gdansk. Mange med 15 m dybgang følger ruten, og de fletter lidt senere. 

Men der er en åbenhed øst for Bornholm, man kan også sagtens krydse over og ned og hente. Men 

man skal dreje noget før og vurdere, hvad vand man har omkring sig 

Beredskab 

• Responstiden for danske oliemiljøoprydningsskibe nord eller syd om Bornholm er lang, for der er ikke stationeret 

skibe i området. Det er fordi Hammerhavet ikke længere regnes for et "sort område". Der er ikke 

planer om at ændre olieberedskabet. Man har jo også svenskernes beredskab 

Bøjer 

• Hvis en coaster (400 - 500 t) rammer en bøje, så går den ned 

• Der er to bøjer på turen gennem Bornholms Gat. Der er en i hjørnet på precautionary area ved Svart 

Grund og en ved Davids Banke 

Generelle konsekvenser af uheld 

• En alvorlig skade betyder, at skibet ikke kan sejle videre ved egen kraft 


• Der har stået skibe alle steder rundt om øen, på den svenske kyst og på grundene. Men det er ikke så galt 

mere, for navigationsudstyret er i dag meget bedre end tidligere 

• De grundstødninger, der har været på selve øen er primært hændelser, der har noget at gøre med at nogen 

begår en fejl, når de går fra havnen. Kun de to hændelser syd for Hasle, på Rønne Banke og på Davids 

Banke er reelle grundstødninger 

• Christiansø og omliggende øer er klippeøer med stor vanddybde på alle sider 

• Det er bedre at ramme en grund lige på end med siden, for hvis man river siden op, synker man 

• Der er 3 klasser af grundstødninger: Flade sandbanker, klippeskær (som ved Hasle), og kollision med en 

klippe, der nærmest er at betragte som en væg. dvs. en påsejling. Konsekvenserne er forskellige 

• Der er masser af sten på Rønne Banke, men mest inde under land 

• På Davids Banke kunne nogen løbe op i et skib, der er fanget der. Det kan næppe ske andre steder. Men 

hvis skibene kommer tæt efter hinanden, kan det ske 




Side 31 


• Ved at sænke et skib mister man ikke sejlrenden i Bornholms Gat, for der er dybt 

• Kan en grundstødning på Davids Banke betyde, at skibet knækker På en sandbanke vil man glide af og 

energien går til at løfte skibet. Skibet skal stikke mindst 16 m, hvis det skal sejle på grund, evt. kun 15 m: 

Det knækker nok ikke, for det kan vanskeligt komme op og ride på grunden. Her skal der skelnes mellem 

bulkcarrier og tankskibe. Bulkcarrier sker der mere med, de går nemmere i stykker. Man har et tilsvarende 

problem når man losser skibet. Det skal gøres i rigtig rækkefølge, ellers bliver de udmattede og knækker. 

Men der er en begrænset sandsynlighed for at det går galt. Det er nok mest selvværdet, det går ud over, 

hvis man sejler på Davids Banke. De materielle skader vil være buler i bunden og stål, der skal skiftes. 

Væsentligt mindre materiel skade. 1 million dollar pr løbende meter bule. Og så tabt indtjening, når skibet 

er ude af drift. For personer kan nogen falde og slå sig. 

• Et containerskib kunne tabe lasten. Containerskibe 10 m. En dækslast kunne også falde af. Persontransporter 

stikker ikke så dybt, at de kan sejle på Davids Banke. Krydstogtskibe stikker generelt 8 m. 

• Hvor meget plads skal man bruge til at dreje 5 skibslængder til at få drejet. Hvis der er mindre vand bliver 

det længere. Større skibe har nok en udkig ud over navigatøren, så der er bedre chance for at opdage, 

at man er på forkert kurs. Passagerskibe har 4 folk: 2 styrmænd+rorgænger+udkig. Man kan med lidt held 

nå at dreje på 1 - ½ mil, men det er tæt på 

• Rønne Banke. De er nok hyppigere at man går på grund her. Men der er mere vand. Så det er mest dem, 

der har glemt, hvor meget dybgang de har. Adlergrund skal de nok komme ud om 

• Christiansø. Scenariet er at man kan ramme sten og skær. Man kan blive slået i stykker, vælte glide og gå 

i stykker. Man kan ryge af skæret igen, men beskadiget. Der er dybt omkring 80 - 100 m. Øen rejser sig 

helt pludseligt, så at en grundstødnings effekt kan sammenlignes med en kollision. Der vil altså her kunne 

blive tale om en markant deceleration. 

• Hold sig i en vis radius, hvis man ikke har noget at gøre der. Hvis man driver derned, så er 1-2 knob er en 

mindre hastighed at ramme med, end hvis man sejler med 12 knob. Der vil nok gå lang tid, inden der kan 

komme en slæbebåd og hjælpe. Men der ligger vist en i området rimeligt regelmæssigt. Der er heller ikke 

så langt ind til klippekysten på Bornholm, og den kan man ikke gøre ren for olie, hvis der skulle ske et udslip 

Kollisioner 

• Konsekvenser for mennesker. Skrækscenariet er en kollision mellem 2 skibe med hver 1500 personer, 

f.eks. Poul Anker + krydstogtskib. Der er skibe nok i området, også svenskerne. Men det ville være et problem 

med en redningsoperation om natten, og især hvis det blæser. Hvis kollisionen sker for+side er det 

ene skib nok stadig flydende. Ved en påsejling er decelerationen meget større end ved en grundstødning 

og så er der nogen, der kan komme til skade 

• Er head-on kollisioner værst måske, men de er også meget usandsynlige. Det er nok mest 90 graders 

kollisioner med krydsende skibe, der udgør den største risiko, især for det skib, der bliver sejlet ind i 




Side 32 


• Er det sværere at sejle i område D efter trafiksepareringen end tidligere Næe, ikke i dag, der er for lille 

trafik, der kommer ind fra siderne 

• Man kunne prøve at lave en opgørelse over hvor mange skæve krydsninger der er før og efter trafiksepareringen 

• Head-on er ikke det værste skadesmæssigt. Man gør vel også noget for at reducere hastighed og vinkel 

inden man ramler sammen. Hvis et skib sejler op i et skib bagfra vil skibene blive suget sammen, og så er 

skaderne forholdsvis begrænsede. Det er risikomæssigt det samme at krydse og at flette - dog ikke hvis 

vinklen er under ca. 10 grader 

• Bundskader er dyre. Skader på siderne mere til at betale 

• Kollision med lystsejlere kan gå helt galt. De små vil forlise. Stor mod lille 

• Fiskerne har redningsflåder 

• Fiskerbåd 1-2 mand. Årstid spiller ind. Det er koldt at falde i vandet, især om vinteren. Man kan holde sig i 

live 1-1½ time om sommeren på en god dag. Om vinteren i 3 - 5 minutter. Men det er individuelt. Det påsejlende 

skib skal bruge 10 - 20 minutter for at få en båd i vandet. Og det er jo den, der er tættest på. At 

komme ud inde fra land tager meget længere tid 

• Hovedparten af lystsejlads finder sted om sommeren, og da er sigten generelt god bortset fra i tilfælde af 

"sommerdis" 

• I modellen arbejder man med 3 typer kollisioner - krydsende, head-on, overtaking. Krydsende trafik påvirkes 

i modellen ikke af separeringen og resultatet vil være det samme. Head-on - vil der være en reduktion, 

da der ikke er så meget overlap af fordelingerne mere. Overtaking - også en reduktion, idet der kan 

komme flere forbi i samme spor 

Nord eller syd om Bornholm 

• Hvis man trækker skibene for højt mod nord i forhold til Christiansø, så skal de sejle for langt og vil vælge 

en tur syd om Bornholm, og det har de måske for stor dybgang til 

• Polakkerne ønsker ikke skibe syd om Adlergrund. Polakkerne er bange for forurening og fremhæver, at de 

har mange vigtige habitatsområder 

• Det er svært at forholde sig til, at man umiddelbart møder krydsende trafik efter knækket i den vestlige 

del af område D 

• Der en disput om hvilket land, der ejer farvandet syd for Bornholm. Man ved i dag ikke, hvor grænsen går. 

Polakkerne vil kun give Danmark 12 sømil. Danmark mener, vi har ret til halvdelen 

• Danmark har ret til at lave ruter ud til de 12 sømil. Men længere ude skal det være i samarbejde med naboerne 

og med IMO. Hvis vi begrænser friheden ødelægger det frihandelstanken 

• Man kan jo aldrig vide, hvem der bliver forurenet., hvis der sker et uheld. Man kan give en anbefalet rute 

med det formål at alle kan komme mere sikkert igennem farvandet 




Side 33 


• Søfartsstyrelsens interesse er ikke at lave trafikseparering syd for Bornholm 

• Man kunne lave en anbefalet rute svarende til en eller anden dybgang, men det er farligt 

• Polakkerne vil sende skibe med farligt gods nord om Bornholm - gælder for alle størrelser skibe - så får de 

heller ikke forureningen hjemme 

• Antallet af både bliver større nordpå 

• Grundstødninger tæt under land sydpå 

• Hvis 2 skibe tørner sammen ude i systemet, så får systemet skylden 

• Hvis der sker et uheld med olieforurening, så vil man gerne have det sker længst muligt fra kysten. Det giver 

længere respit tror man. men det er ikke sikkert det giver så meget, for olien når hurtigt ind til kysten, 

da strømmen er stærk 

• Fragtskibe har ikke noget at gøre i en inshore zone, når man ikke skal ind til lods eller til land. Her er 

mange lystbåde. Dvs. man vil ikke have fremmede skibe ind mellem Christiansø og Bornholm. Efter separationen 

må de gå nord om Christiansø og nord om Davids Banke 

• Samarbejde mht. regulering af trafikken i alle Østersølandene. Så det er et led i en større plan. 

• Skibe fra Gdansk vil spare 6- 7 sømil, svarende til under ½ times sejlads. Disse skibe udgør et bredt spektrum, 

men består især af ro-ro trafik samt småskibe med ensartede laster, herunder meget gødning 

• Skibe fra Klaipeda vil ikke spare noget ved at gå nord om Bornholm 

• Skibe fra Polen med dybgang > 10 m vil få større vanddybder og derved have lettere ved at navigere ved 

at gå nord om Bornholm. Med moderne navigationsudstyr er grænsen nok øget til > 12 m 

• Hvis der sker en ulykke, er det længere væk fra Polens kyst, så i tilfælde af udslip og forurening er det en 

fordel for Polen at få skibene nordpå 

• På den sydlige rute er det nødvendigt for skibe med dybgang > 10 m at zigzagge en del for at gå fri af 

nogle grunde 

• Ved den Polske kyst var det i gamle dage svært at tage pejling og bestemme hvor man var. Der var for få 

kendemærker. Med moderne navigationsudstyr er dette ikke noget problem 

• Skibe, der sejler nord om Bornholm kan sejle med større fart, derfor ønsker også mindre skibe at anvende 

denne rute 

• Det er uheldigt med mange små skibe igennem Bornholms Gat. Det øger sandsynligheden for kollisioner i 

området 

• Vælger man en rute syd om Bornholm betyder det, at man kun skal ind i ét fletteområde. Går man nordom 

skal man gennem to fletteområder. 

• Internationalt kan man træffe en sådan beslutning, men har DK og SE en fordel af, at skibene sendes denne 

vej 

• Syd for Adlergrund findes et andet lands skydeområde. DK kan ikke lægge en anbefalet rute igennem et 

skydeområde. Måske er det ikke så stort et problem med en anbefalet rute. Måske har de ikke så meget 

brug for et skydeområde. Men man har jo de internationale øvelser 




Side 34 


• Rusland planlægger en rørledning med gas. Den skal gå nord om Christiansø og syd om Due Odde. Den 

bliver gravet så dybt ned, at man kan trawle hen over den. 

Ideer til nye sikkerhedsforanstaltninger 

• Mere overvågning fra land 

• VTS kan hjælpe på at folk begynder at følge søfartsreglerne. Det er en slags politi man kan true dem med 

• Man kunne overveje at etablere et precautionary area i område D 

• Man kunne lave en rute nord om Christiansø, der tvang de sydligste skibe lidt længere op 

• Man kunne lave en cirkel 5 - 6 sømil uden om Christiansø, hvori gennemsejling var forbudt 

• Forlag om at lave en anbefalet rute syd om Bornholm med indfletning i område A uden for området med 

de krydsende færger. Den løsning er det dog opfattelsen, at tyskerne ikke vil have 

• Man kan ikke skaffe lodser i tilstrækkeligt antal til at alle skibe kan tage lods. Men man skulle kunne bestemme, 

hvilke skibe der skal have lods, det burde ikke være frivilligt 

• Der skal flere billeder og kortere tekst i de publikationer, der lægges ud til skibene. Ikke interessant hvor 

der er sten på 2 m vand 

• Mere rabat på forsikringer til lystsejlere, hvis de har duelighedsbevis 

Bekymringer 

• Er der større risiko ved en mindre intensitet i spredt fægtning end ved en større intensitet i ordnede rammer 

Der skete jo ikke noget før. Nu har man lavet systemet om. Vil der så ske noget nu Det må her 

fremhæves at dette er en "mindretalsbekymring" og man jo har lavet systemet om for netop at reducere 

risikoen. Risikoen kan godt være stor selvom de helt store ulykker ikke er indtruffet. 

• Fletningen i områderne B og D sker med større intensitet. Det ville være mindre bekymrende, hvis fletteområdet 

var spredt mere ud 

• Bekymret over en voldsom forøgelse af trafikken. Ulykkerne sker, fordi nogen der dummer sig. Skibene 

ligger tættere nu med separeringen, og det må føre til noget 

• Det er bekymrende, at nogle store skibe er af den opfattelse, at søvigepligten er trådt ud af kraft, når de 

sejler i en trafiksepareret zone 

Diverse 




Side 35 


• Før havde man generelt begge retninger at skulle passe på. Nu ved man, hvor skibene, man skal krydse, 

kommer fra 

• Hov! Skal vi se på tiden før anbefaling om trafikseparering Dengang havde man 3 hovedspor, og da gik 

det ene helt tæt ind nord om Bornholm. Men den situation kan vi ikke analysere nu, for der har vi ikke data, 

og den er for lang tid tilbage. Så der er i virkeligheden en lang udvikling, hvor vi sammenligner med en 

mellemstation 

• Der er altså noget galt med AIS dækningen og billederne af skibenes tæthed. I områder langt fra kysten 

burde nogle af de gule områder være røde. Men der er en stor flade at sejle på. Bedre nu fordi man bedre 

ved hvor skibene er 

• Der er mange timer til at et skib rammer Tyskland. Ravagen er kun at navigatøren skal passere den modgående 

trafik, han går ikke på grund inden han rammer Tyskland 

• Der mangler nogen data om den østgående trafik på det før billede, vi har. Det var heller ikke en grundstødningsfare 

tidligere. Ingen kan huske, at der har været nogen hændelser 

• Bornholmstrafikken møder 8 færger om dagen i højsæsonen 

• Der er også færger fra Allinge til Christiansø og den fra Neksø til Kolopcheck hele året 

• Der ligger også et svensk skydeområdet oppe ved Ystad. Så skyder de ikke, medens færgen sejler igennem 

• Den vestlige del ved Kadetrenden. Her er dybdeændringer. 17 m kurven har ændret sig. I enden af dybvandsruten, 

og der er også et vrag, men det er længe fra det, der påvirker området omkring Bornholm, 

men kursen af skibene kan have ændret sejladsmønstret for at optimere vand under kølen 

• Hvorfor kun 2 spor, hvorfor ikke 4. Så man ikke skal krydse, med mindre det er nødvendigt. Det lyder tilforladeligt, 

for man flytter problemerne til et andet sted. Med lokalbriller på er det fint, men der opstår evt. 

andre problemer 

• Skibene bør være opmærksomme på, at de er under opsyn 

• Der er ingen "no blame" kultur til søs. Derfor får man ikke ordentlige forklaringer på uheld, kun bortforklaringer. 

Man vil nemlig ikke betale. Derfor kan man ikke lave en ordentlig opklaring og inddeling af årsager 

til ulykker 

• Der kommer i øvrigt nogle organiserede fisketure om sommeren, hvor man ligger og fisker på et godt sted. 

Men det er ikke stort. De ligger mest i kysttrafikzonen. De går ud fra Hasle

Risk Analysis of Sea Traffic in the Area around Bornholm, 2008. - VTT

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