ISSUE 191 : Jul/Aug - 2013 - Australian Defence Force Journal

seven case studies. And it seems reasonable to conclude that the campaign has not had undue
influence on US doctrine in the sense that it is explicitly over-cited; rather, it is more that some
of its lessons have been used to support certain contemporary views on ‘the winning of hearts
and minds’, which has resulted by extension in criticism of the influence of the campaign
where those views seemingly originated.
The contemporary relevance of the Malayan Emergency experience
Notwithstanding the proportionality of its influence on the development of counterinsurgency
doctrine, there are a number of lessons from the Malayan Emergency that are still relevant today.
That is particularly so when the campaign is appreciated by applying Michael Howard’s ‘three
general rules’ of study of military history, namely ‘in width … in depth … [and] in context’. 42
Indeed, a nuanced and broad understanding of previous counterinsurgency campaigns is ‘an
essential starting point when devising successful counterinsurgency strategy for current and
future campaigns’. 43
An excellent example is the work by academics Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian in
identifying 14 ‘themes’ that can be drawn from previous counterinsurgency campaigns. 44
Almost all are readily discernible in the Malayan Emergency. 45 However, four particularly
important lessons relate to adaptation to local situations and learning, the achievement of
population security/control, the role of coercion, and the cost of winning hearts and minds.
Adapting to local situations and learning
A most relevant lesson from Malaya is the crucial nature of adaptation and learning in
‘expeditionary’ counterinsurgency operations. 46 Lieutenant Colonel James Corum, writing for
the US Army War College, asserts that ‘one of the most important innovations, and a key
element of the success of the British in Malaya, was the establishment of a jungle training school
at Kota Tinggi in 1948’. 47 The writings of Marston and Corum outline how this was possible
(through prior jungle fighting expertise of the Indian and British armies in World War 2) and
what a fillip this Malayan theatre ‘centre of excellence’ provided to the security forces. 48
The success of the British Army’s adaptation in Malaya—much cited in Nagl’s renowned book
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife—provides a compelling model for establishing a framework
for learning and adaptation as early as possible in any counterinsurgency campaign. 49 Indeed,
the relevance of this example to the contemporary environment is borne out by the success of
the counterinsurgency schools that were established by coalition forces mid-way through the
Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns.
Achieving population security/control
A second specific relevant lesson relates to the attainment of population control as an essential
condition to defeating an insurgency. A salient lesson for the counterinsurgency campaign in
Afghanistan and for the future can be gleaned from the Malayan example of establishing an
effective indigenous police force. In Malaya, it performed a policing function in population
centres, in order to achieve population control and thus deny access to the insurgents. This
then freed up the Commonwealth security forces to conduct enemy-centric operations to
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