ISSUE 191 : Jul/Aug - 2013 - Australian Defence Force Journal

According to PNG’s Development Strategic Plan, ‘the current lack in maritime surveillance
capacity is resulting in the loss of millions of kina in illegal or under-reported fishing
activities’. 81 The plan also stated that ‘[d]evelopment of the maritime surveillance capacity
… will support higher returns from PNG’s fishing resources’. 82 However, an Australian Senate
review in 2010 concluded that ‘[e]ven when States are provided with the vessels … they simply
do not have the financial, technological and human capacity to use them to their potential’. 83
This was exemplified in the four-day search-and-rescue operation following the sinking of the
Rabaul Queen, when not one of the participating 15 ships and 13 aircraft was provided by
the PNGDF. 84
Capability gaps
In addressing the capabilities needed to demonstrate PNG’s authority in its maritime domain—
and to protect the environment and users of that domain—the PNG Government has a number
of options, which should not be limited to a PNGDF solution. Contemporary trends show
maritime security ‘is becoming more civilianised’ and ‘many non-military agencies are involved
in providing some dimension’. 85 Without being prescriptive, it would make sense for PNG’s
national agencies to mirror, where possible, the coordination and integration of Australia’s
agencies. 86 Moreover, regardless of which agencies have enforcement capabilities, the national
coordinating body must be able to apply these elements to PNG’s national interests.
PNG’s most recent Medium Term Development Plan, released in 2010, outlined the capabilities
needed to address a range of threats to PNG, particularly in the maritime domain. Specifically,
it called for an increase in personnel to enable the PNGDF to ‘effectively execute its mandated
roles of border surveillance and patrols and sovereignty protection’, and outlined a staged
approach to capability enhancements to align with the Development Strategic Plan’s
2030 targets. 87
In oversighting the identification and acquisition of these capabilities as they relate to maritime
security, the national coordinating body must consider a range of capabilities that provide the
right mix of surveillance, patrol and response. The size and nature of PNG’s maritime domain
requires high speed and broad coverage capabilities for awareness and surveillance tasks,
followed by quick-acting enforcement and response capabilities.
In a 2008 Australian Strategic Policy Institute report, relating to maritime capabilities in the
broader South Pacific, Bergin and Bateman contended that ‘one size does not fit all’. 88 Although
this advice reflected differing requirements across Pacific Island states, it is equally relevant to
determining the right mix for PNG, whose diverse maritime and offshore zones require a range
of capabilities. Essentially, an effective maritime surveillance and enforcement system should
comprise three basic elements: an air surveillance capability, a surface response capability, and
the facility to coordinate a response. 89
The PNGDF’s record of air operations and reliability would suggest that the commercial
operation of air surveillance assets is the most effective strategy for PNG. Appropriate
contractual arrangements would provide dedicated air hours and platform availability, as
well as emergency response for search-and-rescue and other maritime incidents, with a good
model being Australia’s Coastwatch organisation. 90 Such an approach would also demonstrate
a whole-of-government approach to asset tasking and effective resource management, where
‘surveillance planning takes account of the aggregated needs of all clients and the combined
effect of all flights’. 91
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