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ISSUE 191 : Jul/Aug - 2013 - Australian Defence Force Journal

ISSUE 191 : Jul/Aug - 2013 - Australian Defence Force Journal

ISSUE 191 : Jul/Aug - 2013 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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The sophistication of this initial, primarily US military effort, involving assets commanded<br />

through US Africa Command, cannot be overstated. It was ‘remarkably rapid both in its rampup<br />

and execution’. 25 Planning occurred over three weeks and execution over a few days.<br />

Considerable maritime and air assets were positioned and briefed, enabling the full spectrum<br />

of military capabilities to be accessed. Yet target development was difficult, especially as incountry<br />

intelligence was dated. While the initial US involvement was significant, so too was its<br />

continuing involvement, albeit in a largely supporting role. 26<br />

Without joint tactical air commanders on the ground to laser designate targets, other<br />

solutions were found. Seven specialist aircraft and four uninhabited aircraft were employed<br />

for intelligence and targeting. But despite this number of aircraft, the sheer scale of the<br />

theatre and the speed of events meant that intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and<br />

reconnaissance (ISTAR) coverage was limited to a layered picture for 10 hours a day. 27<br />

Development of military capability<br />

Several weapon systems made their combat debut in the Libyan campaign. Their increased<br />

lethality and precision underscored the demand for continuous development, risk and<br />

expenditure if effective outcomes are required. First deployments included the guided missile<br />

submarine USS Florida; the Block IV Tomahawk cruise missile, otherwise known as TLAM-E,<br />

with its ability to change targets on command (more like an armed unmanned aerial vehicle);<br />

the Eurofighter Typhoon jet; and the Growler electronic warfare system. Of these, Australia is<br />

purchasing the Growler system (and has similarly capable missiles and 4.5 generation combat<br />

aircraft).<br />

The recent decision by Australia to acquire the Growler electronic warfare system for the<br />

Super Hornet aircraft, at a cost of around $1.5 billion, shows that the lessons of having a<br />

powerful capability to suppress hostile aircraft and land-based radars to support achieving<br />

air superiority have been accepted. Australia will become second only to the US to have the<br />

Growler electronic attack capability on Super Hornets. For Australia, the Growler becomes<br />

available for operations in 2018. 28<br />

The US deployment of the EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft in Libya, for 700 combat<br />

missions, provided its first combat experience. 29 Given the extreme sensitivity of having such<br />

a potent capability in the region, Australia needs to build confidence with regional militaries<br />

so that air superiority missions can be exercised.<br />

Many existing capabilities were confirmed by their employment in Libya. As discussed above,<br />

having highly-capable special forces allow for discreet, flexible and useful options. Achieving<br />

combat aircraft loiter time over targets is best achieved from aircraft carriers or close bases. In<br />

Libya, however, this was attained by the US providing about three-quarters of the aerial tanker<br />

support. 30 Australia’s five new KC-30A Multi Role Tanker Transport aircraft have achieved initial<br />

operational capability. 31 Again, US assistance was critical in providing ISTAR, electronic warfare<br />

aircraft and supplies of precision-guided weapons when European stocks ran low. 32<br />

In the maritime environment, a potentially significant feature was the use by Gadhafi’s forces of<br />

fast attack craft to mine coastal waters. The navies of the UK, Holland and Belgium, in particular,<br />

were employed in mine countermeasure operations to keep sea lines of communications open<br />

for humanitarian support. 33 Australia maintains a modest mine countermeasure capability,<br />

31

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