Report - Fire Brigades Union

SECTION B — FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE POLICY
Current system capabilities in business case inaccurate
58) One of the main reasons cited by numerous ministers for
the project was that the current systems did not support
the latest technology. There were nine technology items
cited in each region’s business case Part 1, being:
MDTs / VMDS
Information Available to Fireground
AVLS
Status Updates
Dynamic Mobilising
EISEC
GIS (Ctrl Only)
GIS (Integrated into Service)
Full Premise based Gazetteer.
59) This information is inaccurate, misleading and has never
been corrected. Some items are incorrect and others are
inaccurate in that the facilities were available but the FRS
chose not to purchase them e.g. Dynamic mobilising,
EISEC and Premise based gazetteer.
60) Ministers then used this data to cite one of the reasons for
the justification for the project was ensuring all fire controls
had the most up to date functions. Had the correct
information been established from knowledgeable sources
then this justification would have been non-existent.
61) Since the project award all the items listed above are
available on all the existing suppliers systems, most as
standard items if local fire and rescue services judge them
to be important enough to purchase them.
62) The Department could have amended GD92 which sets
out requirements for control systems to ensure all systems
could have been gradually upgraded in the normal way to
meet these requirements. They have not done so, they still
could.
How did we get to where we are now?
63) The approach and project management were flawed from
the outset. The entire project was bundled into a single
contract with a prime contractor leading a consortium.
Such was the scale of the project, there were probably no
more than a handful of companies worldwide which could
have bid for a project of this size with a realistic chance of
success.
64) This approach effectively meant that every existing
experienced supplier of control systems to the UK fire
service market eg Fortek or Remsdaq, would be excluded.
They were.
65) It also meant there was a very high likelihood that the
prime contractor chosen would have no experience in
delivering a control system to a fire service in the UK or,
possibly, anywhere in the world. This is what transpired.
66) Project management was supplied by a series of
departments with little historical knowledge of the fire
service, informed – if that is not putting it too strongly – by
transient civil servants and consultants with no experience
of delivering any fire service control system of any size,
anywhere. It was overseen by a series of transient ministers.
67) There were some FRS secondees in various numbers at
various stages. Of the 60 people assigned to the project in
the first few years, only 12 were from a fire service
background. What weight was attached to their work,
opinion or views is not known.
68) Once the decision had been taken to ‘bundle’ the contract
in such a way – with the inherent flaws we have outlined –
the use of a consortium or prime contractor to facilitate
such a large and ambitious project is entirely in order.
69) However, the project differed from the fire service norm at
that time in that the prime contractor (EADS) appears to
have largely a supply/ install contract only. Central project
management was and is being carried out by CLG using
their own staff along with some seconded FRS staff and
consultants.
70) There were clearly major issues with the technical
specifications the contractors were asked to deliver too.
The project scope has been changed before, after and
since the IT contract was signed. There also appeared to
be no ‘real world’ assessment of the true complexity of the
project nor of realistic timescales to deliver what was being
demanded.
71) The results are clear for everyone to see: no clear and
consistent understanding of how emergency fire controls
work, lack of leadership, controls, objectives and relevant
technical expertise. Even with such a flawed process, a
single “turnkey” contract could have removed some of the
issues and led to a clear target to be achieved or penalties
to be levied.
72) Instead, CLG FiReControl project managers were a barrier
between the contractors EADS tasked with delivering the
technology and the end users –fire and rescue services.
Direct collaborative working between EADS and the FRS
was blocked by CLG until the creation of Solution
Establishment Workshops (SEWs) in the summer of 2009.
73) The central point of the creation of the SEWs is not that
the process started, but that it took until the project was on
its knees before CLG allowed this method of direct
collaborative working to be put in place.
74) Poor CLG project management was compounded by what
should have been the close relationship between the
FiReControl and Firelink projects. Delays to the Firelink
project have had a knock-on effect on FiReControl and
vice-versa.
75) It is clear from our discussion with a number of those
involved in both projects that there was a lack of
transparency, openness and communication between the
two projects for prolonged and critical periods. The
responsibility for that lies heavily at departmental and
ultimately ministerial level.
68 FBU Annual Report 2011