Report - Fire Brigades Union

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SECTION B — FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE POLICY Current system capabilities in business case inaccurate 58) One of the main reasons cited by numerous ministers for the project was that the current systems did not support the latest technology. There were nine technology items cited in each region’s business case Part 1, being: MDTs / VMDS Information Available to Fireground AVLS Status Updates Dynamic Mobilising EISEC GIS (Ctrl Only) GIS (Integrated into Service) Full Premise based Gazetteer. 59) This information is inaccurate, misleading and has never been corrected. Some items are incorrect and others are inaccurate in that the facilities were available but the FRS chose not to purchase them e.g. Dynamic mobilising, EISEC and Premise based gazetteer. 60) Ministers then used this data to cite one of the reasons for the justification for the project was ensuring all fire controls had the most up to date functions. Had the correct information been established from knowledgeable sources then this justification would have been non-existent. 61) Since the project award all the items listed above are available on all the existing suppliers systems, most as standard items if local fire and rescue services judge them to be important enough to purchase them. 62) The Department could have amended GD92 which sets out requirements for control systems to ensure all systems could have been gradually upgraded in the normal way to meet these requirements. They have not done so, they still could. How did we get to where we are now? 63) The approach and project management were flawed from the outset. The entire project was bundled into a single contract with a prime contractor leading a consortium. Such was the scale of the project, there were probably no more than a handful of companies worldwide which could have bid for a project of this size with a realistic chance of success. 64) This approach effectively meant that every existing experienced supplier of control systems to the UK fire service market eg Fortek or Remsdaq, would be excluded. They were. 65) It also meant there was a very high likelihood that the prime contractor chosen would have no experience in delivering a control system to a fire service in the UK or, possibly, anywhere in the world. This is what transpired. 66) Project management was supplied by a series of departments with little historical knowledge of the fire service, informed – if that is not putting it too strongly – by transient civil servants and consultants with no experience of delivering any fire service control system of any size, anywhere. It was overseen by a series of transient ministers. 67) There were some FRS secondees in various numbers at various stages. Of the 60 people assigned to the project in the first few years, only 12 were from a fire service background. What weight was attached to their work, opinion or views is not known. 68) Once the decision had been taken to ‘bundle’ the contract in such a way – with the inherent flaws we have outlined – the use of a consortium or prime contractor to facilitate such a large and ambitious project is entirely in order. 69) However, the project differed from the fire service norm at that time in that the prime contractor (EADS) appears to have largely a supply/ install contract only. Central project management was and is being carried out by CLG using their own staff along with some seconded FRS staff and consultants. 70) There were clearly major issues with the technical specifications the contractors were asked to deliver too. The project scope has been changed before, after and since the IT contract was signed. There also appeared to be no ‘real world’ assessment of the true complexity of the project nor of realistic timescales to deliver what was being demanded. 71) The results are clear for everyone to see: no clear and consistent understanding of how emergency fire controls work, lack of leadership, controls, objectives and relevant technical expertise. Even with such a flawed process, a single “turnkey” contract could have removed some of the issues and led to a clear target to be achieved or penalties to be levied. 72) Instead, CLG FiReControl project managers were a barrier between the contractors EADS tasked with delivering the technology and the end users –fire and rescue services. Direct collaborative working between EADS and the FRS was blocked by CLG until the creation of Solution Establishment Workshops (SEWs) in the summer of 2009. 73) The central point of the creation of the SEWs is not that the process started, but that it took until the project was on its knees before CLG allowed this method of direct collaborative working to be put in place. 74) Poor CLG project management was compounded by what should have been the close relationship between the FiReControl and Firelink projects. Delays to the Firelink project have had a knock-on effect on FiReControl and vice-versa. 75) It is clear from our discussion with a number of those involved in both projects that there was a lack of transparency, openness and communication between the two projects for prolonged and critical periods. The responsibility for that lies heavily at departmental and ultimately ministerial level. 68 FBU Annual Report 2011
SECTION B — FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE POLICY Firelink/FiReControl 76) The original timetable to complete FiReControl by December 2007 was tied to the completion of Firelink, the new digital radio system, which had a delayed completion date of December 2007. Firelink is providing the vast majority of the benefits claimed for RCCs and is very technically challenging in its own right. 77) While we know Firelink radio technology can work for brigade level controls there has to be a question mark over its capacity to work across several fire services regionwide. There are already genuine question marks about the capacity of Airwave, which is now a private monopoly supplier to the emergency services, given the increasing burdens being placed on it. 78) Delays to Firelink do have a knock-on effect on FiReControl. Some of these were set out in a national project manager’s update, Firelink Strategic Snapshot – December 2007. This acknowledged that a number of fire services did not update their existing controls – known as legacy systems – because the new RCCs were meant to be in place by the end of 2007. 79) Delays to both the Firelink and FiReControl projects meant “interim solutions” had to be put in place to cope with the late-running of both projects. Additional work had to be carried out for what was described as the “longer extended interim solution”. 80) Problems identified in the Firelink Phase A operational rollout included: Fit out of eight pilot vehicles in each FRS: “temporarily stalled in the first tranche of regions due to delays by Airwave in providing test scripts.” Issues with training “eg lack of training equipment.” 81) Problems were identified in the Phase B launch date (the fit out of the main vehicle fleets). This was “progressively delayed as a result of… over ambitious forecasting and inadequate groundwork by Airwave… delays in submission of test scripts for Phase A acceptance work… knock-on effects of the (preceding) police resilience programme.” 82) These issues meant “Airwave roll out forecasts have been drifting increasingly out of synchronisation with events on the ground since the late summer”. The result was a “realism adjustment” – a euphemism for a further delay. Firelink project managers reported they had been able “to persuade Airwave fully to reflect the reality of where we are and their track record to date by adding a significant amount of contingency to their forecasting.” 83) This strategic snapshot is also revealing in a number of other points. Concerns about the fitting of aerials to officers’ cars threw up other concerns about “the evolving FiReControl concept of operations appears now to be shifting beyond the current Firelink scope of supply based on a wider interpretation of the term ‘resilience’. Separate work is therefore now in hand… to clarify the FiReControl concept of operations…” 84) The concept of operations would play a major role in setting out the technical specifications for the contract agreed with EADS. That it was still evolving at this stage – there was still no fixed concept of operations – would make it much more difficult to establish the technical solution. 85) The same report includes part of a letter from Richard How, the senior civil servant heading up the FiReControl project on a day to day basis. This letter, to the Firelink team, reveals there were already concerns about delays for FiReControl arising a matter of months after EADS secured the contract. 86) It revealed that Mr How had written to the Firelink team at the end of August 2007 about “concerns that the release dates for a number of products – in particular Convergence and Data Schema – from EADS were later than planned.” Mr How told the Firelink team, operating from within the same department and upon which FiReControl depended, that EADS provided some information but that it would “be counter-productive” to share that with them at that time. 87) By November Mr How could still not share the information. He could say that “Since then we have been working closely with EADS to develop a comprehensive set of robust plans in which we all have confidence… However, EADS is not as far advanced as they and we hoped they would be… this lack of information is preventing the FRS from developing their detailed activity and resources plans… the failure to deliver to date is inevitably creating concerns about the capability to deliver as they have contracted… the delay in providing information is compressing the time available that that (sic) the FRSs have to complete their activities…” 88) It would be unfair to Airwave and EADS not to point out that these documents only set out the views of CLG project managers. These comments may be unfair to one or both contractors, may not fully set out the full picture or be self-serving in other ways. 89) What is clear is the department was not ensuring the proper flow of full information between the key personnel and the key contractors working on two closely related projects. If anything, the department was a barrier to the flow of critical information between and within both projects. Overview – getting it wrong from the start 90) The project is defined to operate under the Prince 2 project management process. Like all project management processes these define tasks, timelines, costs, checkpoints/gateways, actions, personnel, risks and should include for contingencies. The documented hierarchy published in the Business Cases (Part 1 and Part 2) provides for the accountability. 91) The published delays do not account for the difference in time from the original proposal and the current end date. There must therefore have been significant delays during FBU Annual Report 2011 69
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The Fire Brigades Union Executive C
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MICK SHAW President MATT WRACK Gene
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Section D Pensions 91 Section E AIF
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8 FBU Annual Report 2011
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