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Report - Fire Brigades Union

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SECTION B — FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE POLICY<br />

question by David Drew to make a statement as to how a<br />

national network was to be kept in place after the ending<br />

of the first set of leases in 2027 and the ending of the<br />

final leases in 2034, simply referred to the Landlord and<br />

Tenant Act.<br />

124)The signing of the PDS contracts at such an early stage<br />

has been catastrophic. No update of the Outline Business<br />

Case was produced before the decision and no more<br />

detailed work had been done on costings, timescales or<br />

the prospects for the technology.<br />

125)A draft Full Business Case was produced in 2006 and<br />

another update in 2007. Another was promised throughout<br />

2008 and eventually appeared. The IPF reports on all of<br />

these are attached.<br />

126)The Institute of Public Finance, in an independent report for<br />

the FBU, said in its assessment of the Private Developer<br />

Scheme (PDS) – the biggest price ‘ticket’ for the whole<br />

project – did not demonstrate value for money. The IPF<br />

also identified a £200 million increase in the total project<br />

costs in the FiReControl Business Case. The overall project<br />

costs did not rise above the £1.4billion identified in the<br />

previous 2007 Draft Business Case because an<br />

assumption was made which cut back on staffing costs by<br />

a further £200 million.<br />

127)Having hastily signed the property contracts, the IT<br />

contracts then waited for more than 18 months to be<br />

signed. There was therefore no chance of the RCC<br />

buildings being operational six months after practical<br />

completion and rents becoming payable.<br />

128)The IT contract was signed in March 2007 after much<br />

delay. As we pointed out earlier, by August 2007 CLG were<br />

already complaining about delays to DCMT1 and<br />

Convergence work. Why CLG expected such complex<br />

work to be completed within a few months has never<br />

been explained, but it was from the summer of 2007 that<br />

concerns about delays started to emerge.<br />

129)Our own response to the Full National Business Case is<br />

also attached. We will not go through that in detail but<br />

attach it as requested. It does raise significant questions<br />

about resilience, call handling capacity and call filtering by<br />

BT and Cable and Wireless Operators.<br />

Where do we go from here – basic principles<br />

130)First, a profound reality check is needed. There is<br />

little confidence left within the fire service that this<br />

project is going anywhere good and it’s not going<br />

anywhere soon.<br />

That is an opportunity to re-think what basic principles<br />

should underpin what happens next:<br />

regional level within a reasonable timescale and<br />

budget;<br />

3. You should only be prepared to take great risks and go<br />

to great expense if there is evidence – not assertion or<br />

mere conviction – that the rewards are so great as to<br />

justify the level of risk being taken;<br />

4. There must be a clear link between the key strategic<br />

priorities of local fire services and any future project<br />

configuration, including agreed measures of success;<br />

5. There must be clear ownership and leadership driven<br />

by the needs of local fire services and not by the needs<br />

of central government;<br />

6. There must be an effective engagement with all key<br />

stakeholders and a re-building of confidence and<br />

cooperation;<br />

7. End-users need to buy in to any future project and not<br />

have it used as an opportunity to drive down their<br />

working conditions or working environment;<br />

8. Project managers must continue to demonstrate skills<br />

and a proven approach to project management and risk<br />

management;<br />

9. There must be an agreed and realistic timetable,<br />

greater cooperation with all stakeholders including<br />

contractors with the aim of achieving a proper<br />

collaborative environment and not a return to a blame<br />

culture and key players being kept apart;<br />

10. Adequate provision of resources and skills to deliver<br />

what is required.<br />

The ten key principles we set out above should apply to<br />

any future configuration of how the benefits required from<br />

future systems are delivered. The key is delivering what<br />

local fire and rescues say they need going forward, utilising<br />

at least some of the work, and possibly some of the RCC<br />

buildings if appropriate.<br />

131)Alternatives to FiReControl are already being explored with<br />

or without the knowledge or cooperation of CLG. Our<br />

preferred option, on the basis of speed, cost and<br />

confidence in it as a solution, is to utilise upgraded existing<br />

controls.<br />

132)This is not a ‘do-nothing’ option. The union is also prepared<br />

to consider any Business Case presented which considers<br />

other options. We would urge that under any other options,<br />

including RCCs, if government does press ahead.<br />

133)A decision to press ahead regardless does not make<br />

success a certainty. The technology may never be made to<br />

work in the way required of it.<br />

1. There are political limits to how far local democratically<br />

controlled fire services are prepared to go towards<br />

regionalisation;<br />

2. There are technical limits to what can be achieved at a<br />

72 FBU Annual <strong>Report</strong> 2011

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