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SECTION B — FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE POLICY which provides written data concerning the incident and which resources are being mobilised. if there is a fault with the system this will be done by telephone). If the crews are not present at the station they will be contacted via the radio in the appliance. At all times the crews are together in one place. They differ from wholetime firefighters in the evening when they are mobilised in the same way as firefighters working the retained duty system (RDS). Retained duty system (RDS) firefighters are rarely at the fire station together (other than, for example, on the weekly drill night for a few hours). This varies across the country but is invariably required to be 5-10 minutes or 1-2 miles travel distance. An RDS firefighter (when available for calls) must be located within a given radius of the fire station whether at home, work or undertaking other activities. An RDS firefighter will invariably be at a separate location when alerted from other members that will form the appliance crew. They are mobilised by multitone pagers (alerters). Once paged the RDS firefighter will promptly attend the fire station and take details of the call there. RDS firefighters can change their status throughout the course of the day subject to having provided availability for an agreed (minimum) total number of hours for the week. FBU submission The FBU is informed that the Station End Equipment fitted into fire stations to mobilise crews will be exactly the same in a retained station as it is in a wholetime duty (or day crewed) station. This means that unless crews are actually on station to hear the turn out system they will not respond. (This is why RDS firefighters have to have a separate alert and mobilising arrangements.) This has led to CLG having to patch up and rethink how FiReControl will cope with turning out (mobilising) RDS fire crews. We are informed by CLG that it is envisaged that changes to the availability status of RDS crew members will be done by internet or telephone. This pre-supposes that the RDS member will have a telephone and/or internet access. It is very common if not universal that local controls have one control operator monitoring the availability of RDS personnel at all times including in those control rooms where availability is integrated into the system. This matter has not been considered in the CLG staffing model. We are informed that CLG are now asking EADS to devise a solution to retained availability management systems and that they are writing a programme. This will be similar to some existing systems used now in controls such as the Rappel System or Garton systems. If it is correct that such systems already exist and if both CLG and EADS had had clear understanding of end user requirements regarding availability and mobilising of retained duty system personnel then why did they not incorporate it into the project initially? What is the additional cost of this work? Information provide by the Fire Brigades Union to CLG Select Committee 24 February 2010 Specific Examples of End User Requirements not being met by FiReControl 3. Matters arising from the Equality Impact Assessment Terms and Conditions The FBU can broadly support the recommendations, however not without some qualification. These being: 1. The report concludes (page 9) Even if a gender equality impact assessment had been undertaken at the earliest possible stage, it is unlikely that the potential adverse gender impact identified would have altered the course of the project. CLG would have needed to balance the requirement to improve national resilience and enhance the capability of fire control against the potential equality impacts identified. The issue of whether FiReControl will/could provide improved national resilience and enhanced capability aside, the fact that it is intended that staff will be removed from their current employer (on transfer) and be placed on transferred terms and conditions which are vulnerable to change will mean that these workers – predominantly women – face the prospect of worsening conditions including pay. This was made clear to us by an ex-Chair of the West Midlands LACC who publicised the fact that the intention of the proponents of the RCC project was to slash costs by changing pay rates to those in call centres as soon as is practicably possible – which are approximately 50% less than current salaries. This could be avoided if staff were employed by application of the staff retention model commonly used in the NHS. 2. The report encourages changes to shift patterns. The current shift patterns which should transfer are widely regarded by staff as being satisfactory. RCC Building Design Specification In December 2009 CLG published an Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) for the project. In relation to the buildings this highlighted for example: EIA – para 3.7.2 Concludes that an Access Defect Rectification Plan is implemented by CLG. This is in response to the realisation that eight out of nine RCC buildings do not conform to the DDA in relation to access, door switches/swipes and hearing induction loops etc. CLG were given a blank piece of paper at design stage and the department’s persistent failures in managing the project included a failure to oversee these points in the first eight buildings blaming contractors for interpreting the act wrongly! Only London RCC escaped as it had not yet been completed. Recommendations 3.7.1. That immediate steps are taken to ensure the required access standards are met first time in the construction of the London Regional Control Centre. 74 FBU Annual Report 2011
SECTION B — FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE POLICY 3.7.2. That the access defect rectification plan is implemented by CLG. 3.7.3. That the local authority controlled companies designate the rooms to be used as meeting and training rooms and consider either installing permanent inductive loop systems in those rooms, or purchasing a portable inductive loop and establishing an effective management system for it. General We believe that all recommendations in the Equality Impact Assessment should be implemented. Further we believe that CLG should make the staff retention model (other than in London) mandatory on all FRAs and respective LACCs. That out-standing EIAs required to be conducted by LACCs should be carried out as a matter of urgency. Information provided by the Fire Brigades Union to CLG Select Committee 25 February 2010 Specific Examples of End User Requirements not being met by FiReControl 4. CLG Staffing Model and associated staffing matters A. Staffing Numbers CLG’s position from the outset has been that as they are not the employing body nor the service provider that it is the LACCs who will make the decisions on staffing numbers. This is reflected in the Part 1 and Part 2 Final Business Cases. CLG have though produced baseline staff numbers which are produced according to its staffing model which they have proposed to LACCs. These are contained in the Part 2 Business Case, and are shown below: Current Region Transitional Steady figure (all local) figure figure controls in LACC region) West Midlands ?* 70 159 NE 63 55 110 Yorkshire and Humberside 75 71 142 SW 72 63 176.5 East Midlands 70 56 141 SE 85 75 227 ** London 92 81 125 est NW 96 84 187 East of England 83 63 148 ** Total 636 618 1415.5 * No figure given in Part 2 Business Case ** No figure given in Part 2 Business Case, figures provided from other sources – watch based staff numbers only – managerial and other staff to be added The FBU believes the numbers of staff on duty across the network is dangerously low and therefore the call handling capacity of RCCs will be much reduced from current levels and are the result of hypothetical modelling. The project relies heavily on IT and we are constantly told that control operators in any RCC will be able to answer a call from anywhere in the country. However, due to the seriously low indicative staffing numbers suggested by the CLG staffing model the system would reach saturation point very quickly and not be able to cope. Since the IT is only of any use at all when it can be answered quickly and interpreted by a control operator we believe end user requirements will not be met. For example the CLG have no power over the LACCs to set minimum crewing levels thus ensuring resilient staffing numbers across the network. It will be down to each individual RCC to decide how many staff they wish to have on duty at any one time, they could rely on the rest of the network to answer their calls, but if they all do this then the result will be overload and calls going unanswered. B. Staffing Numbers – beyond their sell-by date On 15 July 2009, the fire minister announced the latest delay. That same day CLG also announced the introduction of Solution Establishment Workshops in order to discuss end user problems/ perspective/ requirements: “The Minister also explained improvements to the project approach. Joint CLG and EADS (the main contractor) teams would be working on a day-today basis with the Fire and Rescue Service. A series of Solution Establishment Workshops have started at EADS, involving the CLG team, FRS representatives and EADS.” (Source: FRS Circular 43/2009) The staffing model was rolled out in April 2008. The staffing numbers were proposed to LACCs in July 2008 [they were included in the Part 2 (regional) Business Cases]. The Solution Establishment Workshops did not commence until August 2009 and are still not finished. The staffing numbers (and staffing model) will need to be re-visited once the outcomes of the Workshops have been finalised. It is the view of the FBU that CLG should acknowledge this fact and make an announcement to that effect. C. Audit, assessment and regulation of adequacy of staffing arrangements for national assurance. CLG maintains that resilience will be assured because of the performance standards that the LACCs will be required to meet and the existence of the contractual requirements of the LACC. FBU Annual Report 2011 75
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The Fire Brigades Union Executive C
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MICK SHAW President MATT WRACK Gene
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Section D Pensions 91 Section E AIF
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