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Report - Fire Brigades Union

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SECTION B — FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE POLICY<br />

which provides written data concerning the incident and<br />

which resources are being mobilised. if there is a fault with<br />

the system this will be done by telephone). If the crews<br />

are not present at the station they will be contacted via the<br />

radio in the appliance. At all times the crews are together<br />

in one place. They differ from wholetime firefighters in the<br />

evening when they are mobilised in the same way as<br />

firefighters working the retained duty system (RDS).<br />

Retained duty system (RDS) firefighters are rarely at the<br />

fire station together (other than, for example, on the<br />

weekly drill night for a few hours). This varies across the<br />

country but is invariably required to be 5-10 minutes or 1-2<br />

miles travel distance. An RDS firefighter (when available for<br />

calls) must be located within a given radius of the fire<br />

station whether at home, work or undertaking other<br />

activities. An RDS firefighter will invariably be at a separate<br />

location when alerted from other members that will form<br />

the appliance crew. They are mobilised by multitone pagers<br />

(alerters). Once paged the RDS firefighter will promptly<br />

attend the fire station and take details of the call there.<br />

RDS firefighters can change their status throughout the<br />

course of the day subject to having provided availability for<br />

an agreed (minimum) total number of hours for the week.<br />

FBU submission<br />

The FBU is informed that the Station End Equipment fitted<br />

into fire stations to mobilise crews will be exactly the same<br />

in a retained station as it is in a wholetime duty (or day<br />

crewed) station. This means that unless crews are actually<br />

on station to hear the turn out system they will not<br />

respond. (This is why RDS firefighters have to have a<br />

separate alert and mobilising arrangements.)<br />

This has led to CLG having to patch up and rethink how<br />

FiReControl will cope with turning out (mobilising) RDS fire<br />

crews.<br />

We are informed by CLG that it is envisaged that changes<br />

to the availability status of RDS crew members will be<br />

done by internet or telephone. This pre-supposes that the<br />

RDS member will have a telephone and/or internet access.<br />

It is very common if not universal that local controls have<br />

one control operator monitoring the availability of RDS<br />

personnel at all times including in those control rooms<br />

where availability is integrated into the system. This matter<br />

has not been considered in the CLG staffing model. We<br />

are informed that CLG are now asking EADS to devise a<br />

solution to retained availability management systems and<br />

that they are writing a programme. This will be similar to<br />

some existing systems used now in controls such as the<br />

Rappel System or Garton systems.<br />

If it is correct that such systems already exist and if both<br />

CLG and EADS had had clear understanding of end user<br />

requirements regarding availability and mobilising of<br />

retained duty system personnel then why did they not<br />

incorporate it into the project initially? What is the<br />

additional cost of this work?<br />

Information provide by the <strong>Fire</strong> <strong>Brigades</strong> <strong>Union</strong> to<br />

CLG Select Committee<br />

24 February 2010<br />

Specific Examples of End User Requirements not being<br />

met by FiReControl<br />

3. Matters arising from the Equality Impact Assessment<br />

Terms and Conditions<br />

The FBU can broadly support the recommendations,<br />

however not without some qualification. These being:<br />

1. The report concludes (page 9)<br />

Even if a gender equality impact assessment had been<br />

undertaken at the earliest possible stage, it is unlikely<br />

that the potential adverse gender impact identified<br />

would have altered the course of the project. CLG would<br />

have needed to balance the requirement to improve<br />

national resilience and enhance the capability of fire<br />

control against the potential equality impacts identified.<br />

The issue of whether FiReControl will/could provide<br />

improved national resilience and enhanced capability aside,<br />

the fact that it is intended that staff will be removed from<br />

their current employer (on transfer) and be placed on<br />

transferred terms and conditions which are vulnerable to<br />

change will mean that these workers – predominantly<br />

women – face the prospect of worsening conditions<br />

including pay. This was made clear to us by an ex-Chair of<br />

the West Midlands LACC who publicised the fact that the<br />

intention of the proponents of the RCC project was to<br />

slash costs by changing pay rates to those in call centres<br />

as soon as is practicably possible – which are<br />

approximately 50% less than current salaries. This could be<br />

avoided if staff were employed by application of the staff<br />

retention model commonly used in the NHS.<br />

2. The report encourages changes to shift patterns. The<br />

current shift patterns which should transfer are widely<br />

regarded by staff as being satisfactory.<br />

RCC Building Design Specification<br />

In December 2009 CLG published an Equality Impact<br />

Assessment (EIA) for the project. In relation to the<br />

buildings this highlighted for example: EIA – para 3.7.2<br />

Concludes that an Access Defect Rectification Plan is<br />

implemented by CLG. This is in response to the realisation<br />

that eight out of nine RCC buildings do not conform to the<br />

DDA in relation to access, door switches/swipes and<br />

hearing induction loops etc. CLG were given a blank piece<br />

of paper at design stage and the department’s persistent<br />

failures in managing the project included a failure to<br />

oversee these points in the first eight buildings blaming<br />

contractors for interpreting the act wrongly! Only London<br />

RCC escaped as it had not yet been completed.<br />

Recommendations<br />

3.7.1. That immediate steps are taken to ensure the<br />

required access standards are met first time in the<br />

construction of the London Regional Control Centre.<br />

74 FBU Annual <strong>Report</strong> 2011

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