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Features<br />

BlackHat 2010<br />

BlackHat USA 2010<br />

Learning<br />

from the Best<br />

The latest and greatest security issues By Kurt Seifried<br />

I’ve been to BlackHat twice now,<br />

and both times I have taken the same<br />

lesson home: If you think things are<br />

getting better in the field of computer<br />

security, you’re probably wrong. Over<br />

the years, progress has been made<br />

identifying bug types – currently the<br />

CWE lists 668 weaknesses in 120<br />

categories – and some progress has<br />

been made with projects to identify<br />

and remove them systematically (e.g.,<br />

OpenBSD has had remarkable success).<br />

However, you then come to<br />

the BlackHat conference and see a<br />

presentation like “HTTPS Can Byte<br />

Me,” in which Robert Hansen and<br />

Josh Sokol disclosed 24 vulnerabilities<br />

(Figure 1) that can compromise<br />

the integrity and security of SSLencrypted<br />

web traffic [2].<br />

The problem is not so much a failing<br />

within SSL, but unless you’re taking<br />

extreme measures to protect network<br />

traffic against analysis (e.g., padding<br />

traffic out, introducing time delays,<br />

etc.), chances are, attackers will be<br />

able to glean information even if they<br />

can’t read the traffic directly.<br />

Also, consider the case of the wellmeaning<br />

web browser that attempts<br />

to be helpful. I guess people hate typ-<br />

Figure 1: Final HTTPS slide – 24 issues in all.<br />

ing in personal information, so almost<br />

all browsers support “auto-complete,”<br />

which automatically fills out form<br />

fields (e.g., name, address, and credit<br />

card number). Unfortunately, this<br />

feature can be abused by attackers<br />

(imagine that), allowing them to steal<br />

personal information saved within<br />

your web browser if you visit a web<br />

page. Using JavaScript, they can set<br />

it up so you don’t even have to type<br />

anything in – combined with a hidden<br />

IFRAME, you might never realize<br />

that it happened.<br />

The security talks are especially worrying<br />

– the ones in which researchers<br />

don’t find new vulnerabilities<br />

but simply quantify existing ones.<br />

In the case of SSL certificates, they<br />

scanned the Internet and found 1.2<br />

million SSL-enabled websites [3] [4].<br />

Among the problems found were certificates<br />

for reserved addresses (e.g.,<br />

192.168.1.2, a reserved IP address<br />

used by multiple sites) that never<br />

should have been allowed. Also, they<br />

found 50 percent of servers configured<br />

to allow SSLv2 (known to be<br />

insecure for 14 years).<br />

Now, I’m not a glass half empty kind<br />

of guy, but seeing 50 percent of servers<br />

configured insecurely is<br />

a bit depressing (which is<br />

probably why most security<br />

people buy beer in pitchers,<br />

not glasses).<br />

BlackHat isn’t an unending<br />

stream of bad news,<br />

however. Many of the presentations<br />

not only present<br />

problems but also discuss<br />

the solutions. The perfect<br />

example was a presentation<br />

called “Lifting the Fog” [5], in<br />

which Marco Slaviero scanned for<br />

memcached (a memory-caching<br />

program widely used to speed up<br />

web-based applications). He found<br />

many memcached servers open to<br />

the world, and by using two poorly<br />

documented commands, stat detail<br />

on (which enables debugging) and<br />

stats cachedump (which lists all the<br />

key names), he was able to retrieve<br />

all the items stored in the memcached<br />

server. And by “all” I mean everything;<br />

according to his presentation,<br />

he retrieved 136TB of data from 229<br />

memcached servers.<br />

The good news is that securing your<br />

memcached is simple: Firewall it so<br />

that only local trusted systems can<br />

connect to it (and if you must use<br />

it over the Internet, set up a VPN to<br />

connect systems to it). This solution<br />

is not magical, but it drives home the<br />

point that you need to test and verify<br />

security measures using tools like<br />

Nmap [6] (which is how he found all<br />

the memcached instances).<br />

So, if you need an excuse (well, a<br />

work-related excuse) to go to Las Vegas,<br />

BlackHat, and Defcon afterward,<br />

they’re not only a lot of fun, but very<br />

educational. My only complaint is<br />

that with 10 tracks, chances are you’ll<br />

have to choose between two or more<br />

interesting talks, which is definitely a<br />

glass half full type of problem. n<br />

Info<br />

[1] Common Weakness Enumeration:<br />

[http:// cwe. mitre. org/]<br />

[2] HTTPS Can Byte Me:<br />

[https:// media. blackhat. com/ bh‐us‐10/​<br />

whitepapers/ Hansen_Sokol/ Blackhat‐USA<br />

‐2010‐Hansen‐Sokol‐HTTPS‐Can‐Byte‐Me<br />

‐wp. pdf]<br />

[3] SSL Observatory:<br />

[http:// www. eff. org/ observatory]<br />

[4] Internet SSL Survey 2010:<br />

[http:// blog. ivanristic. com/ Qualys_SSL_<br />

Labs‐State_of_SSL_2010‐v1. 6. pdf]<br />

[5] Lifting the Fog:<br />

[https:// media. blackhat. com/ bh‐us‐10/​<br />

presentations/ Slaviero/ BlackHat‐USA‐2010<br />

‐Slaviero‐Lifting‐the‐Fog‐slides. pdf]<br />

[6] “Nmap scripting” by Eric Amberg, Linux<br />

Magazine, February 2008, pg. 68<br />

34 Admin 01 www.admin-magazine.com

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