Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing - RAND Corporation

96 Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing: Developing U.S. Civilian Personneldential Directive stated that the U.S. Mission in Baghdad andits temporarily established Iraq Reconstruction ManagementOffice [would] assume those authorities and responsibilities thatwill continue after the termination of the CPA. The directive alsostates that the United States Central Command shall continue tobe responsible for U.S. security and military operation efforts. 16By spring 2004, the security situation in Iraq had deterioratedto the point that the State Department had to revise downward thenumber of international police experts willing to travel to Iraq. Therevised targets were 500 U.S. and 500 non-U.S. professional advisors,plus another 200 international police trainers. In August 2004, however,only 376 U.S. advisors and 57 U.S. trainers were in Iraq, alongwith about 50 non-U.S. advisors and trainers. 17Table A.1Personnel Composition of Direct CPA Support in Baghdad, March–June2004Type of Personnel 03/08/04 04/06/04 05/04/04 06/02/04Special Hiring Authority 3161 226 237 240 203Coalition detailees 172 160 141 120U.S. detailees (not including DoD) 149 208 207 209DoD military 293 377 326 292DoD civilian 168 81 88 92Contractor 62 73 72 66IRDC 29 27 30 27Personnel in process 98 76 57 41Total 1,196 1,239 1,161 1,050SOURCE: Coalition Provisional Authority, as cited in GAO, Rebuilding Iraq:Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues, Report toCongressional Committees, Washington, D.C.: GAO-04-902-R, June 2004, p. 39.NOTE: According to CPA officials, the data presented above are about 90 percentaccurate, owing to the difficulties of tracking personnel entering and exiting Iraq.16 GAO (2004), p. 39.17 Jones et al. (2005), p. 132.