Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing - RAND Corporation

2 Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing: Developing U.S. Civilian Personnelministry), and train and advise that government, all while facing arising level of violence from a variety of sources. 2Over the 7-1/2 months between November 15, 2003, when thecoalition agreed to return sovereignty to Iraq, and June 28, 2004, whenthe CPA closed down, its staffing documents called for almost 3,000members, most of whom were civilians. 3 However, one former memberof the Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis of the CPA estimatesthat personnel on hand never topped 55 percent of the requirement,whereas the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported thatabout a third of the needed positions were not filled. 4 In finding peoplefor that staff, the CPA, and its parent organizations and the Departmentof Defense (DoD), had to answer basic human-resources questions,including:••••Which billets are to be filled from government departments andagencies, and which from the private sector?What skills are needed?What billets, if any, must be filled with U.S. personnel?What billets, if any, should be filled with political appointees?2 ORHA and then the CPA faced a number of insurgencies, criminal efforts, and othersources of violence, all occurring simultaneously.3 There was no one CPA manning document; rather, a dynamic spreadsheet was maintainedin Washington with input from Baghdad. The implication of not having formal requirementsthat drive personnel recruiting will be discussed subsequently. It does not appear thata clear articulation of the final requirement for staff was ever produced, which precludedthese requirements being validated and filled.4 Email exchange with former CPA staff responsible for maintaining CPA statistics forAmbassador L. Paul Bremer. Different reports indicate different percentages of personnelin place. For example, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report from June 2004(Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues) indicatesthat staffing never topped two-thirds of the requirement. However, this same reportindicates much smaller numbers of required personnel than do other sources. See Table A.1in the Appendix for a summary of the numbers reported by the GAO. We note as well thatthe Personnel Assessment Team Report to the Secretary of Defense (U.S. Department of Defense,2004) at one point asserts that 68 percent of authorized positions were filled. But this statisticincludes some military personnel, and it fails to include several hundred additionalauthorized personnel not yet added to the roster.