2 <strong>Stabilization</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reconstruction</strong> <strong>Staffing</strong>: Developing U.S. Civilian Personnelministry), <strong>and</strong> train <strong>and</strong> advise that government, all while facing arising level of violence from a variety of sources. 2Over the 7-1/2 months between November 15, 2003, when thecoalition agreed to return sovereignty to Iraq, <strong>and</strong> June 28, 2004, whenthe CPA closed down, its staffing documents called for almost 3,000members, most of whom were civilians. 3 However, one former memberof the Office of Policy, Planning <strong>and</strong> Analysis of the CPA estimatesthat personnel on h<strong>and</strong> never topped 55 percent of the requirement,whereas the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported thatabout a third of the needed positions were not filled. 4 In finding peoplefor that staff, the CPA, <strong>and</strong> its parent organizations <strong>and</strong> the Departmentof Defense (DoD), had to answer basic human-resources questions,including:••••Which billets are to be filled from government departments <strong>and</strong>agencies, <strong>and</strong> which from the private sector?What skills are needed?What billets, if any, must be filled with U.S. personnel?What billets, if any, should be filled with political appointees?2 ORHA <strong>and</strong> then the CPA faced a number of insurgencies, criminal efforts, <strong>and</strong> othersources of violence, all occurring simultaneously.3 There was no one CPA manning document; rather, a dynamic spreadsheet was maintainedin Washington with input from Baghdad. The implication of not having formal requirementsthat drive personnel recruiting will be discussed subsequently. It does not appear thata clear articulation of the final requirement for staff was ever produced, which precludedthese requirements being validated <strong>and</strong> filled.4 Email exchange with former CPA staff responsible for maintaining CPA statistics forAmbassador L. Paul Bremer. Different reports indicate different percentages of personnelin place. For example, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report from June 2004(Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, <strong>and</strong> Oversight Issues) indicatesthat staffing never topped two-thirds of the requirement. However, this same reportindicates much smaller numbers of required personnel than do other sources. See Table A.1in the Appendix for a summary of the numbers reported by the GAO. We note as well thatthe Personnel Assessment Team Report to the Secretary of Defense (U.S. Department of Defense,2004) at one point asserts that 68 percent of authorized positions were filled. But this statisticincludes some military personnel, <strong>and</strong> it fails to include several hundred additionalauthorized personnel not yet added to the roster.
The Problem 3• How long are personnel to stay in Iraq? How much should theybe paid?Bearing out the contrasts in the above quote, several instances ofthe shortcomings of the U.S. effort illustrate problems that involvedstaffing: the abilities of the staff in the field, the ability of offices back inthe states to continue to function because of staffing shortages, <strong>and</strong> theability to match staff experience with that perceived as being appropriateby indigenous leaders. For example,• members of a personnel-evaluation team that visited the CPA inJanuary 2004 characterized the staff as a pickup organization inplace to design <strong>and</strong> execute the most dem<strong>and</strong>ing transformationin recent U.S. history.• bureaucratic <strong>and</strong> tactical considerations of running some individualoffices within DoD caused some office directors to activelydiscourage personnel from joining the CPA <strong>and</strong> overshadowedthe strategic goal of achieving success in Iraq.• in many cultures (such as those in the Middle East), age, seniority,<strong>and</strong> gender indicate gravitas <strong>and</strong> importance. Young, inexperiencedpeople in senior jobs are not taken seriously or, worse,are perceived as showing a lack of seriousness on the part of theUnited States.BackgroundThe United States has intervened in other countries <strong>and</strong> has conductedstate-building efforts for well over a century. 5 Most recently, it participatedin several interventions <strong>and</strong> state-building efforts duringthe 1990s to aid in controlling the consequences of state breakdown.The rationale for U.S. engagement in peace-building <strong>and</strong> statebuildingefforts received a new urgency after the attacks of September5 The Mexican War may be the first large-scale intervention, but certainly from the time ofthe Spanish-American War <strong>and</strong> U.S. deployments to Cuba <strong>and</strong> the Philippines this has beena task the United States has taken on with some frequency.