Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing - RAND Corporation

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18 Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing: Developing U.S. Civilian Personnelfrom the Army’s HR community. CPA Rear also provided the fullspectrum of support to the field.Understanding the ProblemUnless institutional problems are fixed and needed capability developed,some of the reasons for the failure of the personnel system to staffthe CPA properly may plague future U.S. operations as well. Understandingthe problem begins with that simple observation—the U.S.A-Team did not go to Iraq—and with the facts that the U.S. government’sefforts to get the word out, provide incentives, or use othermeans to get a competent staff to Iraq did not work. Furthermore,SSTR operations are not short-term. If it is to be successful in futureSSTR operations, the U.S. government needs to be able to field notonly an A-Team when it needs it, but also to replace that A-Team witha second A-Team, followed by a third and perhaps subsequent A-Teamsfor long, multiyear efforts. 13 Additionally, the need to maintain a competentstaff over a potentially long period is one of the considerationsthat influences the manner—if not the size—of conducting SSTRoperations taken on by the United States.Ongoing Steps to Address the ProblemThe inability of the United States (and its allies and coalition partners)to field large, competent staffs has been widely recognized. Below, wesummarize the U.S. and UK approaches to fielding SSTR capabilitiesin late 2005, when this research concluded, focusing on those elementsdirectly relevant to this research. The organizational process is movingalong rapidly in the United States, although creating an adequate civilianstaff remains among the most difficult and yet central aspects todeveloping a genuine interagency, coordinated response capability forSSTR operations.13 Note that the composition and size of staffs after the first iteration may vary significantly,depending on the success of initial efforts. The duration of deployments and the issue ofchanging staff requirements are discussed below.
Motivation and Approaches 19The United Nations has great capabilities for planning and conductingmany components of SSTR operations (e.g., humanitarianoperations; demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration of combatants;establishment of governance structures). It relies primarily onthe contributions of member states and ad hoc hiring to staff its efforts,although, as an organization in its own right, it brings significant technicalexpertise to such operations. In the following subsections, wedescribe efforts by U.S. and UK participants in UN operations to putin place coordinated interagency efforts.U.S. EffortsU.S. participation in several peace operations during the 1990s demonstrateda need for a coordinated interagency effort that would be inplace in the aftermath of an intervention intended to stabilize a country.Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), issued in 1997, 14established a strong role for the National Security Council (NSC)and a structure for such coordination. With the change of administrationsafter the 2000 elections, the effort ended, although the post–Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) efforts to provide for better interagencycoordination in SSTR operations revived some of the ideas in PDD-56.NSPD-44, on Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstructionand Stabilization, signed in December 2005, supersededPDD-56 and gave an interagency coordination role in SSTR operationsto the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilityin the U.S. Department of State (commonly referred to by its StateDepartment office symbol, S/CRS).An interagency office housed at the Department of State and ledinitially by the Coordinator, Ambassador Carlos Pascual, an experiencedSenior Foreign Service Officer and former Ambassador toUkraine, S/CRS has grown considerably, especially after the publicationof NSPD-44. During 2004, S/CRS put together a proposal for14 For the explanatory paper that accompanied the PDD, see The Clinton Administrations’Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive, May1997.
Page 1 and 2: THE ARTSCHILD POLICYCIVIL JUSTICEED
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Page 5 and 6: PrefaceThe United States participat
Page 7 and 8: ContentsPreface ...................
Page 9: ContentsviiCHAPTER FIVEConclusions
Page 13: Tables3.1. Number of U.S. Governmen
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Page 23 and 24: AcknowledgmentsThe authors acknowle
Page 25 and 26: AbbreviationsACTAWCCACCFRCJTF-7CMPT
Page 27 and 28: AbbreviationsxxvMNSTC-IMoDMOINATOND
Page 29 and 30: CHAPTER ONEThe ProblemThe United St
Page 31 and 32: The Problem 3• How long are perso
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Select BibliographyBinnendijk, Hans
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Select Bibliography 101Oliker, Olga
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