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Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing - RAND Corporation

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Motivation <strong>and</strong> Approaches 13execute the most dem<strong>and</strong>ing transformation in recent U.S. history 2 —asymptom of the fact that no machinery was in place to deploy nonmilitarypersonnel to areas such as Iraq; thus, the staff was inadequateas a staff. Interviews with former CPA officials, as well as the experiencesof the principal author who served with the CPA, also highlightthe extent of the problem. For example, the Office of Security Affairs,later renamed the Office of National Security Affairs, contained onlyone person willing to stay for a year (the Senior Advisor’s executiveassistant). 3 Others stayed from three to nine months, with the averagebeing less than six months. 4 The office of the advisors to the Ministryof Interior (MOI) had similar longevity, with only four out of a totalrequirement of 281 (the top number authorized, although the advisoryteam to the MOI never had more than 68 people) staying for a year. 5Ambassador L. Paul Bremer’s Office of Planning <strong>and</strong> Policy Assessmentdid not have anyone staying for a year. 6Evidence about the other descriptors of an A-Team memberalso indicates severe problems. With regard to experience, the Officeof National Security Affairs was, among other things, charged withbuilding the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) from scratch, advisingAmbassador Bremer on strategic-level security issues, establishinga stipend program for form soldiers of Saddam’s army, <strong>and</strong> establishingthe policy <strong>and</strong> programs for, <strong>and</strong> negotiating agreements to,transition <strong>and</strong> reintegrate (TR) Iraqi militiamen out of their armedorganizations into civil society. Although the MoD effort was competentlyled, some of the staff members involved in it lacked theappropriate qualifications <strong>and</strong> background. For example, two of thethree U.S. personnel working on the project were missile-defenseexperts rather than experts in the areas they were charged with—2 Tunstall’s recollection as deputy team leader.3 We note that many qualified people volunteered to go to Iraq, but almost none volunteeredto deploy for a year.4 Kelly’s observations <strong>and</strong> recollections as a member of this office from January to June2004.5 Email from former senior CPA official, May 2005.6 Interviews with senior CPA officials, April–May 2005.

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