Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing - RAND Corporation

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60 Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing: Developing U.S. Civilian Personnelall needed skill sets—DoD runs a large school system, health systems,commercial transportation systems, city-sized military bases with a fullspectrum of services, and so forth. However, it would not be as capablein other areas, such as recruiting diplomats. Other departments oragencies might not be as capable. The second model comes out bestaccording to our criteria, although the model has some shortcomingsin the realm of accountability. These assessments are summarized inFigure 4.1.A key component of strategic alignment is workforce planning,which OPM defines as follows: “The organization identifies the humancapital required to meet organizational goals, conducts analyses toidentify competency gaps, develops strategies to address human capitalneeds and close competency gaps and ensures the organizationisappropriately structured.” As articulated in Chapter Two, workforceplanning in Iraq was neither rigorous nor particularly effective. Personnelrequirements articulated by senior advisors were seldom validatedor reviewed in an organizational context. Because workforce requireFigure 4.1Assessment of Personnel-Management ModelsResponsive toAmbassadorCapability torecruitAccountable tolead agencySingle agencyLead agencyDecentralizedResponsive, capable,and accountableSomedifficultiesNotviableRAND MG580-4.1
Process, Structure, and Management—What Can Be Done Today? 61ments and competencies were not identified clearly, the task of recruitingindividuals with the technical skills and competencies needed toaccomplish organizational goals was more difficult than it should havebeen. Personnel assessment consisted largely of word-of-mouth referralsand recommendations rather than use of structured assessmenttools and conduct of qualifications reviews, which more effectivelymight have identified true A-Team members.More importantly, the hard work needed to determine what typeof organization would be needed—analogous to what the military callsa force generation process, which looks at requirements and determineshow the organization that meets the challenge should be structured—was not done. Because it was not done, no demands were placed onthe personnel system that would have caused it to fulfill the personnelneeded for the CPA.The failure of the U.S. government policy community to engagegovernment personnel managers in both the planning phase and theexecution of the operation in Iraq points to areas in which improvementscan be made. Had the CPA structure been created so that itplaced well-articulated, strategically aligned demands on the personnelsystems of applicable agencies (e.g., security officials on DoD, advisorsto the Ministry of Education on the U.S. Department of Education,advisors to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs on theU.S. Department of Labor), performance would likely have been muchbetter. The capability to find and field such personnel exists in thepersonnel systems of the various U.S. government departments andagencies. Accordingly, structure and process matter when establishingcivilian staffs, and planning for both standing capabilities and individualoperations should involve personnel managers able to advisepolicymakers.Likewise, we need to know what type of workforce planningwould be needed to place only those demands for maximizing performanceon U.S. government personnel systems. One way to envision theproblem clearly is to think of a staffing plan, which we will call a jointmanning document, or JMD (following common DoD usage) based ona well-thought-out workforce plan. Such a pre-prepared JMD shouldbe a product of deliberate planning, which takes place as a normal and
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THE ARTSCHILD POLICYCIVIL JUSTICEED
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Stabilization andReconstruction Sta
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PrefaceThe United States participat
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ContentsPreface ...................
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ContentsviiCHAPTER FIVEConclusions
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Tables3.1. Number of U.S. Governmen
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AcknowledgmentsThe authors acknowle
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AbbreviationsACTAWCCACCFRCJTF-7CMPT
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AbbreviationsxxvMNSTC-IMoDMOINATOND
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CHAPTER ONEThe ProblemThe United St
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The Problem 3• How long are perso
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The Problem 5The authors’ first-h
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The Problem 7sonal correspondence w
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