Expendable Remotely Piloted Vehicles for Strategic Offensive ...

In the early 1900s, military historian J. F. C. Fuller accurately recognizedthat replacing cavalry with armored forces would encounter institutionaldifficulties. “To establish a new invention,” he wrote, “is like establishinga new religion—it usually demands the conversion or destructionof an entire priesthood.” 6 This sentiment remains applicable among theairpower “priesthood” of today. In an atmosphere of competition for fundswith manned aircraft, it is logical that there currently exists a reluctanceto embrace UAVs. In turn, this institutional bias has resulted in a failureto recognize their latent capabilities.Nearly all new inventions which provided some form of “high ground”advantage in war (i.e., balloon, dirigible, and airplane) were first used asreconnaissance platforms. Military leaders eventually recognized theirtrue potential and would effectively use them in other new and innovativeairpower roles. Even the balloon had interesting applications in World WarI. Because they were such tempting targets for enemy aircraft, balloon observersresorted to carrying weapons. In April 1917 “a French balloonistnamed Peletier was credited with downing an attacking ‘Albatross’ with ashot from his Winchester.” 7 Allied units also conceived and deployed lethalballoon basket decoys, occupied by a dummy observer and filled with severalhundred pounds of explosives. One British unit reported of dramaticallydestroying a German attacker with this type of “aerial mine,” whichit had electrically detonated from the ground. 8Institutional bias and initial lack of vision for more diverse applicationsappear to be common trends for new forms of airpower. Even manned aircrafthad initial difficulties gaining military acceptance and recognition asinfluential weapons of destruction. Shortly after the birth of poweredflight, Gen Ferdinand Foch reflected the classic disdain that cavalrymenhad for the airplane. He dismissed the Wright brothers’ invention as goodfor sport but of no value for the Army. 9Airpower in general underwent major growing pains as theorists attemptedto determine its role in warfare. The airplane’s first use in war was as a flyingplatform for observation and artillery spotting. In the United States, theairplane was first adopted by the Army Signal Corps, who used it for reconnaissance.As airpower’s potential became more apparent, aircraft acceptancegrew; and militaries eventually applied them in more diverse combatroles, such as close air support and strategic bombing.Today, all advanced nations better understand and appreciate airpower.This understanding, however, is limited primarily to manned aircraft. TheUS military currently uses RPVs for reconnaissance and has yet to exploretheir full range of offensive and defensive capabilities. By examining itspast, we can attempt to discover reasons for the limited state of RPV development.The author raises two questions for this area of research: WereRPVs initially developed for reconnaissance roles (as was the case forother airpower means)? Did lack of military vision restrict diversificationof RPVs into other roles? Table 2 is a listing of significant UAV historicalevents from which this study will attempt to answer these questions.10