Expendable Remotely Piloted Vehicles for Strategic Offensive ...

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time. Along with this idea has been the concern that loss of direct humancontrol may lead to machines turning upon humanity:Can we allow an autonomous battlefield creation to roam the battlefield searchingout the enemy who is defined by a software algorithm? What are the implicationsand what cost are we willing to incur for a wrong or errant machine decisionmade by this hardware? Has it been calculated? The escalation of largeweapon systems run by internally controlled elements is inevitable; so also isthe escalation of effect to be felt should that system revert to an unpredictedoperational mode. 1While there may come a day when the above questions need definite answers,critics of unmanned weapon systems may be more willing to acceptexpendable RPVs in the interim.Notes1. V. Daniel Hunt as quoted in Steven M. Shaker and Alan R. Wise, War Without Men:Robots on the Future Battlefield (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), 174.67
Chapter 6ConclusionConstant evaluation of military forces must be conducted as a precaution againstthe wasteful use of national resources or costly errors of judgment, either ofwhich might prejudice the welfare of the nation. The positive results of the evaluationsmust be reflected in the kinds of forces that are provided for the militaryinstrument in being. The results must be reflected also in other forces which areauthorized for future production and employment, and in the nature and prioritiesof research and development programs bearing on forces and weapons systems.These processes are necessary for the nation to produce forces which willmeet the time, type, and quality requirements of the strategy.—Air Force Manual 1-2US Air Force Basic Doctrine1 April 1955The overall conclusion of this study is the sum of all chapter conclusions.First, the current limited state of UAV development was not due tolack of forethought nor to technological restraints but was more the resultof circumstantial events. Second, just as airpower represents uniquestrategic and offensive capabilities, RPVs represent an ideal means to deliverthese capabilities. Third, developing RPVs as one-use, throwaway assetsincreases their advantage to fulfill strategic attack roles. The finalconclusion is that the use of expendable RPVs for strategic offensive airpowerroles is a viable concept. The author urges those who understandand advocate airpower to continue research and evaluation into this conceptas well as other potential means of airpower.As the quest continues to exploit airpower to its true potential, the characterof war continues to change. The United States was the clear victorin the Cold War against the former Soviet Union. With the realization ofthis historic event, many Americans believed that the United States governmentcould cut defense spending, focus less on foreign affairs, andconcentrate more on domestic issues. It is now evident that American interventionand involvement in international affairs will likely continue wellinto the future. Less direct threats to national security than those of theCold War define profound challenges to the future organization and applicationof military forces. Airpower must effectively accommodate andimplement future technologies in order to properly respond to thesethreats.This study began with a look into the history and background of UAVs.Analysis revealed that the limited state of their development was primarilydue to circumstantial events, as opposed to technological restraints.If American leaders had truly desired to develop remotely piloted bombers,remotely piloted fighters, or remotely piloted transports, they could haveaccomplished such technological feats long ago. Certain historical events,69
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Expendable Remotely PilotedVehicles
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ContentsChapterDISCLAIMER . . . . .
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AbstractThe future holds an acceler
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AcknowledgmentsI thank all the stud
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aircraft. Incorporating the added d
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UAVs were more easily defined when
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Chapter 4 answers the question: Why
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Chapter 2History and BackgroundWe h
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The Wright brothers are deservedly
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aerial bombs), the British took the
Page 21 and 22: UAVs during World War II to a few g
Page 23 and 24: On 27 October of that year, another
Page 25 and 26: United States to look beyond reconn
Page 27 and 28: ary 1996, Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, A
Page 29 and 30: 29. Shaker and Wise, 28.30. Michael
Page 31 and 32: Chapter 3Strategic Offensive Airpow
Page 33 and 34: ombs, as well as a high sortie rate
Page 35 and 36: It thus follows that future air cam
Page 37 and 38: possible for small formations to ac
Page 39 and 40: spite the successes, it is easily p
Page 41 and 42: The transmissions used by a control
Page 43 and 44: 33. Air Force Scientific Advisory B
Page 45 and 46: diverted 75 percent of its B-29s aw
Page 47 and 48: Table 6Remotely Piloted Vehicle Adv
Page 49 and 50: million dollars each. The unit flya
Page 51 and 52: Relative Ranks for Fewer Design Con
Page 53 and 54: mission) the open bomb bay doors si
Page 55 and 56: Relative Ranks for Flight Noise Are
Page 57 and 58: Owens also stated that the military
Page 59 and 60: All forms of manned and unmanned ai
Page 61 and 62: Relative Ranks for Reliability Area
Page 63 and 64: KEY: ● Major Advantage Counterba
Page 65 and 66: 7. “Report: Military Crashes Down
Page 67 and 68: 62. McGonigle, 34.63. Ibid., 33.64.
Page 69 and 70: expendable RPVs, American political
Page 71: cybornaut activates engine thruster
Page 75: one role. A countless combination o
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