Expendable Remotely Piloted Vehicles for Strategic Offensive ...

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In the early 1900s, military historian J. F. C. Fuller accurately recognizedthat replacing cavalry with armored forces would encounter institutionaldifficulties. “To establish a new invention,” he wrote, “is like establishinga new religion—it usually demands the conversion or destructionof an entire priesthood.” 6 This sentiment remains applicable among theairpower “priesthood” of today. In an atmosphere of competition for fundswith manned aircraft, it is logical that there currently exists a reluctanceto embrace UAVs. In turn, this institutional bias has resulted in a failureto recognize their latent capabilities.Nearly all new inventions which provided some form of “high ground”advantage in war (i.e., balloon, dirigible, and airplane) were first used asreconnaissance platforms. Military leaders eventually recognized theirtrue potential and would effectively use them in other new and innovativeairpower roles. Even the balloon had interesting applications in World WarI. Because they were such tempting targets for enemy aircraft, balloon observersresorted to carrying weapons. In April 1917 “a French balloonistnamed Peletier was credited with downing an attacking ‘Albatross’ with ashot from his Winchester.” 7 Allied units also conceived and deployed lethalballoon basket decoys, occupied by a dummy observer and filled with severalhundred pounds of explosives. One British unit reported of dramaticallydestroying a German attacker with this type of “aerial mine,” whichit had electrically detonated from the ground. 8Institutional bias and initial lack of vision for more diverse applicationsappear to be common trends for new forms of airpower. Even manned aircrafthad initial difficulties gaining military acceptance and recognition asinfluential weapons of destruction. Shortly after the birth of poweredflight, Gen Ferdinand Foch reflected the classic disdain that cavalrymenhad for the airplane. He dismissed the Wright brothers’ invention as goodfor sport but of no value for the Army. 9Airpower in general underwent major growing pains as theorists attemptedto determine its role in warfare. The airplane’s first use in war was as a flyingplatform for observation and artillery spotting. In the United States, theairplane was first adopted by the Army Signal Corps, who used it for reconnaissance.As airpower’s potential became more apparent, aircraft acceptancegrew; and militaries eventually applied them in more diverse combatroles, such as close air support and strategic bombing.Today, all advanced nations better understand and appreciate airpower.This understanding, however, is limited primarily to manned aircraft. TheUS military currently uses RPVs for reconnaissance and has yet to exploretheir full range of offensive and defensive capabilities. By examining itspast, we can attempt to discover reasons for the limited state of RPV development.The author raises two questions for this area of research: WereRPVs initially developed for reconnaissance roles (as was the case forother airpower means)? Did lack of military vision restrict diversificationof RPVs into other roles? Table 2 is a listing of significant UAV historicalevents from which this study will attempt to answer these questions.10
The Wright brothers are deservedly famous in aviation history. By comparison,the first developers of UMA (e.g., René Lorin of France, Professor A.M. Low of Great Britain, Lawrence Sperry and Charles F. Kettering of theUnited States) are virtually unknown by even those in the airpower profession.10 All these early pioneers experimented with military applications, andtheir first concepts of UAVs were as expendable “flying bombs.” Still, it is remarkablehow quickly after the “dawn of aviation” at Kitty Hawk in 1903 thatunmanned as well as manned airpower evolved for use in war.Prior to World War I—and even before the required technology fully existed—Lorin,a French artillery officer, first proposed the concept of flyingbombs to attack distant targets. 11 In Germany, experiments on guidedaerial vehicles began in 1915 and included launches from airships. In theUnited Kingdom, experiments beginning in 1917 produced UMA withnewly designed, expendable engines. 12Table 2Significant Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Events1917 FIRST UNMANNED “FLYING BOMBS” DEVELOPEDTHE “DAWN” OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES1928 FIRST RADIO-CONTROLLED AIRCRAFT DEVELOPEDTHE BEGINNING OF REMOTELY PILOTED AERIAL VEHICLES1933 BRITISH DEMONSTRATE UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITYALSO DEMONSTRATE VULNERABILITY OF NAVAL SHIPS TO AERIAL ATTACK1935 FIRST MINIATURE, REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFTDESIGN NOT CONSTRAINED TO ACCOMMODATE PILOT1939 FIRST JET-PROPELLED UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLEGERMANY DEVELOPS V-1 BUZZ BOMB PROTOTYPE1941 FIRST VIDEO GUIDANCE CAPABILITY DEVELOPEDRESEARCH SPANS ACROSS ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM1944–45 FIRST OPERATIONAL USE OF JET-PROPELLED UNMANNEDAERIAL VEHICLE IN WAR; FIRST STRATEGIC TERROR WEAPONGERMANY LAUNCHES 10,500 V-1S AGAINST ENGLAND1951 US DEVELOPS FIRST JET-ENGINE TARGET DRONE“FIREBEE”WILL REPRESENT BASIC MODEL FOR DECADES1960 GARY POWERS SHOT DOWN IN U-2 OVER RUSSIAUS FOCUSES ON RECONNAISSANCE ROLE1964–73 US USES UNMANNED AIRCRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIAFIRST SUCCESSFUL AMERICAN USE1973 ISRAEL USES UNMANNED AIRCRAFT IN YOM KIPPUR WARFIRST SUCCESSFUL ISRAELI USE1976 SAC TRANSFERS CONTROL TO TACSUPPORT FOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES WANES1982 ISRAEL USES UNMANNED AIRCRAFT IN BEKÁA VALLEYSECOND SUCCESSFUL ISRAELI USE1990 US USES UNMANNED AIRCRAFT IN DESERT STORMSECOND SUCCESSFUL AMERICAN USE1995 US AIR FORCE ESTABLISHES UAV SQUADRONFIRST SUCH AIR FORCE UNIT SINCE 197611
Page 1 and 2: Expendable Remotely PilotedVehicles
Page 3 and 4: ContentsChapterDISCLAIMER . . . . .
Page 5 and 6: AbstractThe future holds an acceler
Page 7 and 8: AcknowledgmentsI thank all the stud
Page 9 and 10: aircraft. Incorporating the added d
Page 11 and 12: UAVs were more easily defined when
Page 13 and 14: Chapter 4 answers the question: Why
Page 15: Chapter 2History and BackgroundWe h
Page 19 and 20: aerial bombs), the British took the
Page 21 and 22: UAVs during World War II to a few g
Page 23 and 24: On 27 October of that year, another
Page 25 and 26: United States to look beyond reconn
Page 27 and 28: ary 1996, Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, A
Page 29 and 30: 29. Shaker and Wise, 28.30. Michael
Page 31 and 32: Chapter 3Strategic Offensive Airpow
Page 33 and 34: ombs, as well as a high sortie rate
Page 35 and 36: It thus follows that future air cam
Page 37 and 38: possible for small formations to ac
Page 39 and 40: spite the successes, it is easily p
Page 41 and 42: The transmissions used by a control
Page 43 and 44: 33. Air Force Scientific Advisory B
Page 45 and 46: diverted 75 percent of its B-29s aw
Page 47 and 48: Table 6Remotely Piloted Vehicle Adv
Page 49 and 50: million dollars each. The unit flya
Page 51 and 52: Relative Ranks for Fewer Design Con
Page 53 and 54: mission) the open bomb bay doors si
Page 55 and 56: Relative Ranks for Flight Noise Are
Page 57 and 58: Owens also stated that the military
Page 59 and 60: All forms of manned and unmanned ai
Page 61 and 62: Relative Ranks for Reliability Area
Page 63 and 64: KEY: ● Major Advantage Counterba
Page 65 and 66: 7. “Report: Military Crashes Down
Page 67 and 68:
62. McGonigle, 34.63. Ibid., 33.64.
Page 69 and 70:
expendable RPVs, American political
Page 71 and 72:
cybornaut activates engine thruster
Page 73 and 74:
Chapter 6ConclusionConstant evaluat
Page 75:
one role. A countless combination o
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