Expendable Remotely Piloted Vehicles for Strategic Offensive ...

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particularly bombers—limit the number and locations of bases they canoperate from. Operational security can be a nightmare, as was the case inDhahran on the first night of Desert Storm: “A commercial pilot captaininga waiting jumbo jet from a coalition nation impulsively complained tothe airport’s tower controllers about a flock of RAF Tornadoes . . . thatsuddenly cut ahead of him from a taxiway and took off into the dark, afterburnersflaring.” 30As stated earlier, all services could covertly launch RPVs from a varietyof air-, ground-, and sea-based platforms. In essence, a limitless varietyand mix of launch and control options exist. One conceptual example isthe McDonnell Douglas RC-17 UAV Carrier. This is a UAV launch and recoverymodule envisioned for the C-17 Globemaster. As stated in companyliterature, the module is capable of supporting six UAVs, a UAV fuel storagetank, and in-flight launch and recovery of UAVs. 31F-117 Stealth FightersF-117 stealth fighters were critical airpower assets during DesertStorm. On opening night they attacked the most heavily defended andhardened targets. The F-117 stealth “fighter” is somewhat a misnomer becauseits primary purpose is to drop laser-guided bombs. 32 It avoids afight at all costs; and it is designed to be survivable, not by sheer speedor maneuverability but instead by being nearly invisible. In order to makedetection more difficult, the F-117 operates only at night.An RPV may complement the F-117 by providing the ability to attackduring the day and in all weather conditions. For greater survivability itcould be designed and developed with more advanced stealth characteristics;the absence of a cockpit allows more freedom to create signature suppressivedesigns. If intentionally developed to have the radar signature ofa manned aircraft, it could act as a decoy or harassment aerial vehicle. Inthis role it would intentionally attract antiaircraft threats towards itself.The New World Vistas study points out that a UAV “can be designed symmetricallyto accelerate in any direction immediately,” and that “survivabilitycan be increased by increasing maneuverability beyond that whichcan be tolerated by a human pilot.” 33Cruise MissilesOn the first day of Desert Storm, the Navy launched 105 Tomahawkland attack missiles (TLAM), and the Air Force fired 35 air-launchedcruise missiles into Iraq. The launching of cruise missiles was significantbecause “unlike manned aircraft, the little missiles could not be recalled.Once these missiles left their launch canisters or fell away from their B-52 motherships, there was no turning back: the coalition was at war.” 34RPVs can be recalled, redirected, or even self-destructed. Remote pilotcontrol, rather than sophisticated guidance systems, could make themcost substantially lower than the $1.2 to $1.5 million for a cruise missile.34
The transmissions used by a controller to operate the RPV could provideinformation feedback before, during, and after an attack. RPVs could alsobe designed to carry larger as well as a greater variety of payloads, includingnonlethal weapons.In summary, while opposing nations attempted to put their strategicairpower doctrines through the test of World War II, the technology of thetime was insufficient to provide the desired precision. The British felt justifiedin their policy to conduct indiscriminate night area bombings. TheUnited States, having developed the Norden bombsight and the B-17bomber, felt justified in adopting daylight precision bombing against carefullyselected industrial targets. In the Pacific, however, the United Stateseventually converted to an indiscriminate bombing policy which includedcity fire bombings and the eventual use of the atomic bomb.The first theories of strategic bombing had to rely upon technologicaldevelopments to come of age relative to early concepts. Today, the debatecontinues on airpower’s role in war. Does airpower have more to offer inoffensive or defensive roles? Can it have a greater impact in war throughindependent operations or in support of a ground campaign? While thestrength and intensity of support for one view over the other will vary fromconflict to conflict, there will nearly always be sufficient grounds to arguefor operations directed against strategic targets that are only accessible byair.The US Army’s Combat Studies Institute produced a study on the evolutionof military doctrine from 1946–76. “The great value of doctrine,” itconcluded, “is less the final answers it provides than the impetus it createstoward developing innovative and creative solutions.” 35 Airpower advocatesshould not restrict doctrine and tactics to current means and,likewise, they should not tie technology to established doctrine. GeneralArnold emphasized these points when he gave his final report to the secretaryof war in 1945. The Air Force must keep “its doctrines ahead of itsequipment,” he stated, “and its vision far into the future.” 36 Strategic offensiveairpower, whether for strategic bombardment or strategic paralysis,is an integral part of the USAF and its doctrine. RPVs possess the potentialto be an innovative and creative solution for future strategicoffensive airpower problems.Notes1. Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Armitage, Unmanned Aircraft (London: Brassey’s DefencePublishers, 1988), 25; and Conrad C. Crane, Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: AmericanAirpower Strategy in World War II (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1993),85–86.2. Armitage, 24–25.3. Crane, 13.4. Col Phillip S. Meilinger, School of Advanced Airpower Studies Course 631 classnotes, August 1995.5. Crane, 1.35
Page 1 and 2: Expendable Remotely PilotedVehicles
Page 3 and 4: ContentsChapterDISCLAIMER . . . . .
Page 5 and 6: AbstractThe future holds an acceler
Page 7 and 8: AcknowledgmentsI thank all the stud
Page 9 and 10: aircraft. Incorporating the added d
Page 11 and 12: UAVs were more easily defined when
Page 13 and 14: Chapter 4 answers the question: Why
Page 15 and 16: Chapter 2History and BackgroundWe h
Page 17 and 18: The Wright brothers are deservedly
Page 19 and 20: aerial bombs), the British took the
Page 21 and 22: UAVs during World War II to a few g
Page 23 and 24: On 27 October of that year, another
Page 25 and 26: United States to look beyond reconn
Page 27 and 28: ary 1996, Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, A
Page 29 and 30: 29. Shaker and Wise, 28.30. Michael
Page 31 and 32: Chapter 3Strategic Offensive Airpow
Page 33 and 34: ombs, as well as a high sortie rate
Page 35 and 36: It thus follows that future air cam
Page 37 and 38: possible for small formations to ac
Page 39: spite the successes, it is easily p
Page 43 and 44: 33. Air Force Scientific Advisory B
Page 45 and 46: diverted 75 percent of its B-29s aw
Page 47 and 48: Table 6Remotely Piloted Vehicle Adv
Page 49 and 50: million dollars each. The unit flya
Page 51 and 52: Relative Ranks for Fewer Design Con
Page 53 and 54: mission) the open bomb bay doors si
Page 55 and 56: Relative Ranks for Flight Noise Are
Page 57 and 58: Owens also stated that the military
Page 59 and 60: All forms of manned and unmanned ai
Page 61 and 62: Relative Ranks for Reliability Area
Page 63 and 64: KEY: ● Major Advantage Counterba
Page 65 and 66: 7. “Report: Military Crashes Down
Page 67 and 68: 62. McGonigle, 34.63. Ibid., 33.64.
Page 69 and 70: expendable RPVs, American political
Page 71 and 72: cybornaut activates engine thruster
Page 73 and 74: Chapter 6ConclusionConstant evaluat
Page 75: one role. A countless combination o

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