Expendable Remotely Piloted Vehicles for Strategic Offensive ...

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impacted F-117 operations in the first two weeks of the war, althougheven late in the campaign, it posed problems.” 22 The aircraft alone is expensive;Hallion lists the cost (1992 figure) of an F-117A at $42,600,000. 23The aircraft requires specialized training, maintenance, logistics, and supplysupport in terms of both equipment and personnel. While we cannoteasily put the value of a human life into monetary terms, all airmen wouldgenerally agree that a pilot is of greater value than the aircraft he or sheflies. Given the high value placed on the F-117 and its human operator,Desert Storm planners used the stealth fighter only against high-valuetargets, such as air defense headquarters, C 2 centers, and integrated airdefense networks. Because of its value, the F-117 also requires additionalsecurity measures, which limits locations where the United States willbase it. Its high status is now at a level whereby the shootdown of astealth fighter in a conflict, no matter how arguably unlikely this may be,could cause serious repercussions both militarily and politically. In turnthis could limit the type of conflict the United States will employ it in, aswell as limit the type of targets the United States will employ it against.Other primary US manned aircraft for strategic attack are the B-1 andB-2 bombers. Initial development of the B-1 began in 1962, but PresidentJames E. “Jimmy” Carter Jr., canceled the program before productioncould begin. President Ronald Reagan resurrected the B-1 program, and100 advanced models became operational in 1986. During Desert Storm,the B-1 sat on alert as part of its role in the US strategic nuclear triad. Italso lacked nonnuclear weapons versatility; therefore, the B-52 onceagain was the bomber called upon to serve in war.The B-2 was not yet operational during Desert Storm. Unlike the B-1,had it been in service it very likely would have played a role. “GeneralHorner in Riyadh said the one aircraft that he most could have used inthis campaign was the B-2 stealth bomber.” 24 The B-2 is designed to operateas a single ship against heavily defended, high-value target sets; andit has the capability to deliver conventional bombs. With proper missionplanning, it can hit multiple aim points in a single pass. One B-2 pilot assertsthat the bomber “has all the advantages of an F-15E in terms of precision,with all the advantages of the B-52 in load, coupled with the advantagesof the F-117 in stealth.” 25 However, while the B-2 can carry eighttimes the bomb load of an F-117, it costs over 14 times as much. 26 Becauseof its markedly high value, it would likely take a major regional conflictof at least similar magnitude to the Gulf War in order for political andmilitary leaders to agree on B-2 employment.Operation Desert Storm—Opening NightThe most defining moment of strategic attack in war is the instant it isinitiated. On the opening night of Desert Storm, coalition forces used anincredible orchestration of airpower to achieve monumental results. De-32
spite the successes, it is easily possible to envision how strategic attackRPVs could have been of value. The following sections cover the significantairpower events during the first night of Desert Storm. Concepts of howRPVs could supplement Desert Storm operations, particularly in strategicoffensive airpower roles, will follow each section. Chapters 4 and 5 of thispaper will expand upon many of these RPV concepts and roles. 27B-52 BombersThe B-52 Stratofortress is an age-defying aircraft which embodies USAF“Global Reach, Global Power” doctrine. The decision to use a B-52 representsthe serious level of US political and military resolve. In order to participate inDesert Storm on opening night, B-52s launched from four international locations—themost distant being Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. While the releaseof payloads was over in minutes, the time required to travel to launch pointsand back took as long as 24 hours. In addition to a large and versatileweapons payload capability, the B-52—nicknamed “Buff”—conveys a greatdeal of psychological influence; this can be a positive influence on friendlyforces and a very negative influence on the enemy.Complementing manned bombers such as the B-52, RPVs could alsoperform strategic attack missions rapidly, accurately, and with intensity.All the US services could theoretically launch and control them from a varietyof platforms, which would provide more speed, flexibility, and precision.Used in large numbers they could also be a significant psychologicalforce, especially if they were used in harassment or decoy roles.Tanker SupportJust hours before the first strike, “one hundred sixty tankers—AmericanKC-10s, KC-135s, and KC-130s; British Victors, Tristars, and VC10Ks;and Saudi KE-3Bs among them—took off and flew to multiple refuelingtracks, staying out of range of Iraqi early warning radar.” 28 The tankerswere required to refuel hundreds of strike, suppression, and other supportaircraft. If tankers had failed or were somehow restricted in performingtheir vital mission, some manned attacks would have been impossibleto achieve.Depending upon their design and function, RPVs would not normallyrequire refueling. This would likely be the case if they were expendable,which could double their range and time over areas of operation since areturn trip would not be necessary. General McPeak, however, believes theUnited States should look into the concept of UAV refueling. A problemworth thinking about, he indicated, is “how to do pilotless air refueling—because range is very important.” 29Operational SecurityLaunches of multiple aircraft from any base can provide indications andwarning of an impending attack. The size and status of military aircraft—33
Page 1 and 2: Expendable Remotely PilotedVehicles
Page 3 and 4: ContentsChapterDISCLAIMER . . . . .
Page 5 and 6: AbstractThe future holds an acceler
Page 7 and 8: AcknowledgmentsI thank all the stud
Page 9 and 10: aircraft. Incorporating the added d
Page 11 and 12: UAVs were more easily defined when
Page 13 and 14: Chapter 4 answers the question: Why
Page 15 and 16: Chapter 2History and BackgroundWe h
Page 17 and 18: The Wright brothers are deservedly
Page 19 and 20: aerial bombs), the British took the
Page 21 and 22: UAVs during World War II to a few g
Page 23 and 24: On 27 October of that year, another
Page 25 and 26: United States to look beyond reconn
Page 27 and 28: ary 1996, Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, A
Page 29 and 30: 29. Shaker and Wise, 28.30. Michael
Page 31 and 32: Chapter 3Strategic Offensive Airpow
Page 33 and 34: ombs, as well as a high sortie rate
Page 35 and 36: It thus follows that future air cam
Page 37: possible for small formations to ac
Page 41 and 42: The transmissions used by a control
Page 43 and 44: 33. Air Force Scientific Advisory B
Page 45 and 46: diverted 75 percent of its B-29s aw
Page 47 and 48: Table 6Remotely Piloted Vehicle Adv
Page 49 and 50: million dollars each. The unit flya
Page 51 and 52: Relative Ranks for Fewer Design Con
Page 53 and 54: mission) the open bomb bay doors si
Page 55 and 56: Relative Ranks for Flight Noise Are
Page 57 and 58: Owens also stated that the military
Page 59 and 60: All forms of manned and unmanned ai
Page 61 and 62: Relative Ranks for Reliability Area
Page 63 and 64: KEY: ● Major Advantage Counterba
Page 65 and 66: 7. “Report: Military Crashes Down
Page 67 and 68: 62. McGonigle, 34.63. Ibid., 33.64.
Page 69 and 70: expendable RPVs, American political
Page 71 and 72: cybornaut activates engine thruster
Page 73 and 74: Chapter 6ConclusionConstant evaluat
Page 75: one role. A countless combination o

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