6. Donald B. Rice, “Air Power in the New Security Environment,” in The Future of AirPower in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr.,eds. (Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air University Press, 1992), 11.7. Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.:Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 190. This is a partial copy of table 6.3 from Hallion’sbook. World War I statistics were not included because they came be<strong>for</strong>e strategic bombingtheories; also, the planes of that era generally had payloads no greater than 500pounds.8. Ibid. Numbers of combat sorties are from table 6.4 and lengths of conflicts are fromtable 6.3.9. Ibid. Figures used in calculating relative numbers <strong>for</strong> comparison are from table 6.4.10. Quote by retired Maj Gen Perry Smith, endorsing Col John A. Warden’s book, TheAir Campaign: Planning <strong>for</strong> Combat (San Jose, Calif.: toExcel, 1998).11. Hallion. Caption to last photograph of F-117A fighters.12. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Meridian, 1991), 212.13. Bruce M. DeBlois et al., Dropping the Electric Grid: An Option <strong>for</strong> the Military Planner(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, October 1994). The first project of its kind,specifically developed <strong>for</strong> the military planner to better understand electrical systems andhow to attack them, is “A Concept Prototype of the Electrical Power System.”14. Hallion, 250.15. James Kim, “Chess Match Measures More Than Who Wins,” USA Today, 9 February1996. The computer, named Deep Blue, possessed 32 microprocessors able to draw on32 gigabytes of memory and 128 gigabytes of hard disk space. A machine cannot match ahuman’s creativity, intuition, and experience. Kasparov stated, “The computer is not flexible,you can accurately guess what kind of decisions it will make.”16. Hallion, appendix, table 2, 283. Hallion thanks Col John A. Warden III and Lt ColDave Deptula <strong>for</strong> making the chart available to him.17. Ibid.18. “The Tale of Two Bridges and the Battle <strong>for</strong> the Skies over North Vietnam,” USAFSoutheast Asia monograph series, vol. 1, ed. A. J. C. Lavalle (Washington, D.C.: Departmentof the Air Force, 1976), 152–53.19. Ibid., 153.20. Hallion, 249.21. Gen Merrill A. McPeak, Selected Works 1990–1994 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air UniversityPress, 1995), 14.22. Hallion, 117.23. Ibid., 362.24. McPeak, 45. This quotation was part of a statement/question posed to General Mc-Peak in a 1991 DOD news briefing.25. John A. Tirpak, “With the First B-2 Squadron,” Air Force Magazine, April 1996, 41.26. Tirpak, 38–40. The B-2 flyaway cost is $600 million, and it can carry up to 162,000-pound bombs. This is compared to the F-117, which can carry two bombs and hasa cost of $42.6 million.27. Hallion, 162–200. First day scenario of Desert Storm is based on many sources ascompiled in chapter 6 of this book.28. Ibid., 165.29. McPeak, 351.30. Hallion, 165.31. McDonnell Douglas Aerospace (C-17 Improvements and Derivatives), A PocketGuide to Mission Module and Derivative Concepts. Although not classified, proprietaryrights by other industries working on future UAV concepts currently restricts disclosure ofspecific plat<strong>for</strong>ms being studied.32. Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines a fighter as “an airplane of highspeed and maneuverability with armament designed to destroy enemy aircraft.”36
33. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), report, New World Vistas: Air and SpacePower <strong>for</strong> the 21st Century, summary volume (Air Force SAB, 1996), 35.34. Hallion, 165.35. Maj Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–1976(Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 1979), 2.36. Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the UnitedStates Air Force, vol. 1, 1907–1960 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Aerospace StudiesInstitute, 1971), 168.37
- Page 1 and 2: Expendable Remotely PilotedVehicles
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