“nearly 450 aircraft were lost and 2,900 valuable aircrew lives weresacrificed.” 28In a separate program, the German army also produced its own retaliatoryweapon—the A-4—which was later called the V-2. The V-2 was essentiallya ballistic missile. Although less vulnerable and more physicallydestructive, the V-2 was a significant burden on Germany’s war-makingcapability. It was expensive, it used extremely complex technology, it requiredscarce materials, and it greatly overstressed Germany’s electricand component industries. Comparing the V-1 and V-2 in terms of cost(in German marks) and labor: the V-2 cost 10,000 marks compared to1,500 <strong>for</strong> the V-1, and it required 13,000 hours of slave labor comparedto 280 <strong>for</strong> the V-1. 29 In terms of total destructive potential, because Germanyproduced and launched significantly fewer V-2s (3,200 compared to22,400 V-1s), the V-1 delivered many times more explosive loads. 30 Ironically,because there was no apparent defense against the V-2, the Alliesdiverted few resources to counter it.In addition to the V-1 cruise missile and V-2 ballistic missile, Germanyemployed other UAV weapon systems during World War II. Despite lessonslearned in 1933 from the British test of the unmanned floatplane againstnaval defenses, the Royal Navy and the US Navy both suffered significantlosses from German glide bombs. The two most prominent glide bombsystems were the Fritz X remotely guided bomb and the HS 293 remotelypiloted jet-propelled aircraft. 31 Luftwaffe airborne controllers releasedthese radio-controlled weapons and directed them by line of sight ontosurface targets. From September 1943 through August 1944, Germanglide bombs sunk or significantly damaged the following naval vessels:Italian flagship Roma, Italian ship Italia, USS flagship Savannah, HMSUganda, hospital ship Newfoundland, HMS Warspite, HMS Janus, HMSJervis, hospital ship St. David, sister ship Leinster, HMS Egret, and others(not identified by name). 32A number of German UAV experimental systems also demonstrated potential,but none were far enough advanced to become operational be<strong>for</strong>eWorld War II ended. German RPV research into acoustic, television, infrared(IR), radar, and wire guidance systems would eventually be used tocreate remotely controlled and autonomous weapon systems in existencetoday. The United States and the Soviet Union were the primary beneficiariesof this work, as many prominent German scientists eventually endedup in one of these two countries. 33Allied UAV research and development (R&D) ef<strong>for</strong>ts conducted duringWorld War II were not as advanced as German accomplishments. Someare noteworthy, however, <strong>for</strong> their innovative concepts. In February 1941the US Navy pursued research into UAV television transmission. This ledto the development of an assault drone, which was remotely controlledwith the aid of video guidance. The Navy demonstrated the first successfulUS kamikaze-type mission by flying such an aircraft into a target. Despitethis research, the United States limited operational employment of14
UAVs during World War II to a few glide bomb missions and the use ofconverted war-weary or time-expired B-17s and B-24s.Project Aphrodite was the US ef<strong>for</strong>t to convert war-weary manned aircraftinto unmanned flying bombs. 34 Ironically, the United States initiatedthe special project to develop a means to attack hardened German V-weapon launch sites which were practically invulnerable to normal bombingattacks. By the time the US Army Air Forces (USAAF) could launch itsfirst war-weary in July 1944, Allied aircraft and airmen losses from attemptsto knock out V-1 sites were considerable. 35Stripped of all unnecessary equipment, USAAF personnel reconfiguredB-17 bombers with a radio control system and loaded them with 20,000pounds of explosives. One pilot and a technician launched the aircraft towardsenemy target areas and bailed out be<strong>for</strong>e crossing the Englishcoastline. An escort B-17 remotely controlled the flying bomb towards itsdesignated target. No war-weary aircraft ever scored a direct hit on its intendedtarget, and the Aphrodite project was plagued with tragic as wellas somewhat comical results.On the side of tragedy, launch crews from the first 10 war-weary B-17missions suffered the death of one pilot in a crash and the injury of sevenothers during bailout. US Navy participation in Project Aphrodite involvedradio-controlled PB4Y (B-24) Liberators. Lt Joseph P. Kennedy, brother offuture president John F. Kennedy, was killed on the first naval Aphroditemission in August 1944; his B-24 prematurely exploded be<strong>for</strong>e he couldbail out over England. According to military historian Conrad C. Crane,“fears of his father’s reaction caused much consternation at many militaryheadquarters,” and the Navy subsequently suspended the project. 36Three war-weary missions provide a humorous side to ProjectAphrodite. In the first case, “one enterprising controller, finding that hecould not dive his robot, flew it around an unsuspecting German flak batteryuntil a direct hit destroyed both the war-weary and the battery.” Inthe second event, one war-weary went out of control and eventuallycrashed and exploded in Sweden; “Swedish military authorities just senta polite note with regrets that they could find no trace of any crewman.”The last incident also involved a war-weary that went out of control anddisappeared. In this case the escort B-17 finally discovered the UMA circlingthe English town of Ipswich, whereupon “a frantic controller barelymanaged to dump it into the North Sea.” 37In spite of a series of later improvements (adding a television monitor,altimeter readout, and remote control throttles), war-weary aircraftwere very vulnerable to German defenses and thus proved highly ineffective.In light of mission failures, Lt Gen James H. “Jimmy” Doolittledelivered sharp criticism upon the Aphrodite project: “It seems to methat this whole project is put together with baling wire, chicken guts,and ignorance.” 38Despite the lack of operational UAV successes in World War II, theUnited States conducted valuable research and increased its knowledge15
- Page 1 and 2: Expendable Remotely PilotedVehicles
- Page 3 and 4: ContentsChapterDISCLAIMER . . . . .
- Page 5 and 6: AbstractThe future holds an acceler
- Page 7 and 8: AcknowledgmentsI thank all the stud
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- Page 13 and 14: Chapter 4 answers the question: Why
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- Page 23 and 24: On 27 October of that year, another
- Page 25 and 26: United States to look beyond reconn
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- Page 29 and 30: 29. Shaker and Wise, 28.30. Michael
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- Page 33 and 34: ombs, as well as a high sortie rate
- Page 35 and 36: It thus follows that future air cam
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- Page 39 and 40: spite the successes, it is easily p
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- Page 45 and 46: diverted 75 percent of its B-29s aw
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- Page 49 and 50: million dollars each. The unit flya
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- Page 57 and 58: Owens also stated that the military
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- Page 65 and 66: 7. “Report: Military Crashes Down
- Page 67 and 68: 62. McGonigle, 34.63. Ibid., 33.64.
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cybornaut activates engine thruster
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Chapter 6ConclusionConstant evaluat
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one role. A countless combination o