Expendable Remotely Piloted Vehicles for Strategic Offensive ...

Chapter 3Strategic Offensive AirpowerA high-altitude attack by American bombers against Cologne has been turnedback by the fierce antiaircraft fire defending the city, and no bombs weredropped. The accompanying fighter cover, however, composed of small and exceedinglyfast twin-tailed aircraft, came over the city at low altitude in a strafingattack. So good were the defenses that every single fighter was shot down; muchdamage was done by these falling aircraft, all of which exploded violently.—German News Release (1944)The interesting “rest of the story,” to the strategic attack reported by theabove German news report is that bombs were actually dropped while nofighters were shot down. The mission was against the Eifeltor railwaymarshaling yard near Cologne on 28 May 1944. The USAAF assembled 54B-17 bombers from three bombardment groups stationed at Molesworth,Kimbolton, and Grafton Underwood in the United Kingdom. The bombs,however, were 108 specially built UAVs. Specifically, they were 2,000-pound glide bomb drones with 12-foot plywood wings and twin tail fins.Attacking the city from beyond the outskirts, the bombers were able tostay clear of antiaircraft fire while launching the glide bombs. The Germansevidently mistook the drones for fighter escort. 1The well-documented Cologne mission is significant but not because ofthe physical destruction it inflicted. The results were actually disappointingdue to the fact that all the drones actually missed the intended target.The significance is that the United States took an operational first step towardsrealizing that UAVs had strategic offensive airpower potential. Thiscame at a time when USAAF were suffering high losses of aircraft andcrews. In the month just prior to the attack on Cologne, the Eighth AirForce lost 577 aircraft—missing or damaged beyond repair. More than 60percent of these losses were heavy bombers. 2The strategic attack on Cologne has further significance in its very selectionas a strategic target. An American airpower theorist highlighted thecity as a potential target in a 1917 bombing plan. This was before theUnited States had an official strategic bombing doctrine and before itsmilitary even possessed the aircraft to support such a plan.Col Edgar S. Gorrell developed his bombing plan in November 1917; itwould later serve as the precursor to the precision-bombing doctrine producedby the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS). The plan focused on thebombardment of Germany’s manufacturing centers in order to break themorale of its civilian workers. “Some towns’ morale seemed especially vulnerable,”according to Gorrell, “and he surmised from press reports thatbombing Cologne ‘would create such trouble that the German Governmentmight be forced to suggest terms.’ ” 325