Expendable Remotely Piloted Vehicles for Strategic Offensive ...

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Chapter 5Future Notional ScenarioThese new ships were ugly as he--. Just an open framework with clamps to holdyou in place, swiveled lasers fore and aft, small tachyon power plants below thelasers. Everything automated; the machine would land us as quickly as possibleand then zip off to harass the enemy. It was a one-use, throwaway drone.—Joe HaldemanThe Forever WarThe Roman god Janus, who is associated with new beginnings, has twofaces gazing in opposite directions—one looks back and the other looksforward. The concept of a one-use, throwaway RPV offers a new beginningfor airpower. Although this concept is certainly not new, air forces haveyet to fully explore it. Previous chapters of this study focused on pastevents to establish the foundation for this concept. While the most difficultfunction of theory is to anticipate or predict the results of its application,this chapter attempts to provide a look beyond conventional modesof operation.In order to perceive how controllers may pilot RPVs in the future, thisstudy presents a future notional scenario involving expendable RPVs forstrategic attack. The author introduced cybornautics and cybornaut inchapter 1, and the scenario will include these concepts in its theoreticalresponse to a wartime situation. Research and technology labs are currentlylooking at a wide variety of ways that humans can better interfacewith future aerial vehicles, unmanned as well as manned. Although thisscenario presents only one hypothetical situation, it offers an indicationof many potential events to come. To set the scenario’s stage, the authorfirst presents assumptions and a brief background.The first assumption is that it will be economically feasible to field a significantnumber of expendable RPVs in the future. The second assumption(closely tied to the first) is that they will be cheap, one-use, throwawayassets. Chapter 4 of this paper (“System Cost” section) providedcursory evidence that this will be possible. These assumptions are criticalbecause the concept would literally never get off the ground if militaryleaders attempted to develop a small quantity of very expensive assets forkamikaze missions. The author views the concept of a large inventory ofinexpensive RPVs as the best supplement to existing systems. In the latterpart of chapter 3, this study gave indications as to how these assetscould have contributed to a past operation like Desert Storm.New systems must compete for funding against existing assets as wellas those in current development. This competition becomes increasinglyintense as defense budgets continually shrink. To evaluate the concept of63
expendable RPVs, American political and military leaders must understandand appreciate what capabilities these assets can and cannot provide.The leaders must then weigh these capabilities against the value ofother systems and programs. Expendable assets provide a greater benefitwhen they are lower in cost and greater in quantity.For example, the author assumes that expendable RPVs could cost from$100,000 to $250,000 each and a quantity between 1,000 and 10,000 isa viable production number. The resulting total cost range would be $100million and $2.5 billion. Added to this sum would be the cost for controlstations. Control station per unit cost would logically be higher than theRPV; this is given that developers would locate the brains of the systemhere and not in each and every one of the RPVs. Theoretically, the militaryservices would require 100 control stations, and they would cost from$1 million to $10 million each. This would add $100 million to $1 billionto the cost of RPVs. These costs could be higher or lower depending uponactual design requirements. In order to optimize cost and capability, weshould develop a higher RPV to control station ratio.Background for the scenario is as follows: The author purposely has notestablished a specific time frame for this scenario; it is set sometime in thefuture. Modular control stations exist on air-, land-, and sea-based platforms.Military and industrial designers have come up with space-basedplatform concepts, but political leaders have yet to give approval for development.Platform types currently include buildings, mobile vans,transport aircraft, and naval vessels. Some platforms have only one RPVcontrol station while others have as many as six situated together. SeveralC 2 modules also exist on various platforms. Only one will direct RPV airoperations in an air campaign while the others serve as alternates andrelay stations. In any C 2 module, decision makers can view the big-picturestatus of all expendable RPVs, as well as be able to focus in on what eachindividual cybornaut is doing.Notional ScenarioCurrent worldwide resources and inventories (from the airpower armsof all services) consist of 100 control stations, 300 trained cybornauts,and 10,000 expendable RPVs. In the scenario’s theater of operations, theservices have assigned 30 cybornauts to 10 modular control stations(three to each station), which they have dispersed in various locations andplatforms around the region. Each cybornaut pulls an eight-hour shift,providing the capability to conduct continuous round-the-clock operations.The president has given approval for the military services to conducta strategic attack on an adversary. The approved plan involves twophases. The first phase is an immediate attack with unmanned assets; thesecond phase is an attack with manned aircraft commencing in 24 hours.The C 2 module immediately sends the signal to launch 100 expendable64
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Expendable Remotely PilotedVehicles
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ContentsChapterDISCLAIMER . . . . .
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AbstractThe future holds an acceler
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AcknowledgmentsI thank all the stud
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aircraft. Incorporating the added d
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UAVs were more easily defined when
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Chapter 4 answers the question: Why
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Chapter 2History and BackgroundWe h
Page 17 and 18: The Wright brothers are deservedly
Page 19 and 20: aerial bombs), the British took the
Page 21 and 22: UAVs during World War II to a few g
Page 23 and 24: On 27 October of that year, another
Page 25 and 26: United States to look beyond reconn
Page 27 and 28: ary 1996, Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, A
Page 29 and 30: 29. Shaker and Wise, 28.30. Michael
Page 31 and 32: Chapter 3Strategic Offensive Airpow
Page 33 and 34: ombs, as well as a high sortie rate
Page 35 and 36: It thus follows that future air cam
Page 37 and 38: possible for small formations to ac
Page 39 and 40: spite the successes, it is easily p
Page 41 and 42: The transmissions used by a control
Page 43 and 44: 33. Air Force Scientific Advisory B
Page 45 and 46: diverted 75 percent of its B-29s aw
Page 47 and 48: Table 6Remotely Piloted Vehicle Adv
Page 49 and 50: million dollars each. The unit flya
Page 51 and 52: Relative Ranks for Fewer Design Con
Page 53 and 54: mission) the open bomb bay doors si
Page 55 and 56: Relative Ranks for Flight Noise Are
Page 57 and 58: Owens also stated that the military
Page 59 and 60: All forms of manned and unmanned ai
Page 61 and 62: Relative Ranks for Reliability Area
Page 63 and 64: KEY: ● Major Advantage Counterba
Page 65 and 66: 7. “Report: Military Crashes Down
Page 67: 62. McGonigle, 34.63. Ibid., 33.64.
Page 71 and 72: cybornaut activates engine thruster
Page 73 and 74: Chapter 6ConclusionConstant evaluat
Page 75: one role. A countless combination o
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