Der Fuehrer - Hitler's Rise to Power (1944) - Heiden

CHANCELLOR AT LAST 535site. The above-quoted statement continues: 'In the same connectionHerr von Schleicher gave his opinion that collaboration with theNational Socialist Party on the basis of a parliamentary majority wouldbe the best solution.'Parliament . . . majority . . . and therefore Hitler! It was Hitler's ownplan, and for years it had also been Schleicher's plan. There was nothingimprobable or surprising about it. For Hitler, the plan meant dictatorshipby way of parliament, after the example of Napoleon III and thecounsels of the Wise Men of Zion; for Schleicher, the curbing of theNational Socialists by way of parliament, as, so often in the history ofparliamentarianism, radical parties had been curbed by the necessity offorming a majority. When Hindenburg brusquely dismissed Schleicher,he, too, hoped that Hitler was now curbed; he had some reason tobelieve that this time Hitler would not refuse Chancellor von Papen hissupport, at least for the moment. It was Schleicher who, representinghimself as the spokesman of the Reichswehr, opposed the Papen projectand forced the old man reluctantly toward Hitler. There were threepossibilities, he said, of solving the government crisis. The third and lastwas a presidial cabinet with full powers to dissolve the Reichstag, andthereby bend the Reichstag to its will — this Hindenburg had justrefused him. But after the unfortunate experience of the past, the Papenexperiment must on no account be repeated. Therefore, Schleicher,according to his own story, considered these two possibilities: T. Agovernment with a parliamentary majority which probably could beestablished only under the leadership of Adolf Hitler. 2. The formationof a minority government based on a strong popular tendency; thislikewise could be achieved only under the leadership of Adolf Hitler,but with the support of the Right groups. This would have a chance ofsuccess only if the President were to abandon his resistance toentrusting Adolf Hitler with the chancellorship.'Hindenburg was still resisting the appointment of Hitler; Schleichernow urged him to consent. Schleicher was a man whose political actsalways had an arriere-pensee, if Goebbels is to be believed, he had sentHitler a warning, two days earlier, not to accept an appointment. Up tothe last moment, perhaps, he played a