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Der Fuehrer - Hitler's Rise to Power (1944) - Heiden

Der Fuehrer - Hitler's Rise to Power (1944) - Heiden

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THE BLOOD PURGE 749ployers that he would no longer dabble in politics, and his salary wasgenerous enough <strong>to</strong> make him keep this promise; he had a wife and twosons and did not carry much life insurance. Von Schleicher had askedhis host <strong>to</strong> see <strong>to</strong> it that nothing leaked out about this meeting which hehad not desired; he seemed deliberately <strong>to</strong> have spoken aboutunimportant matters — at least that is what Francois-Poncet later <strong>to</strong>ldthe Foreign Office. After the events we are studying, Hitler kept theFrench ambassador in Berlin for many years and treated him withconspicuous kindness, which would not have been the case if thisFrenchman, forgetting his diplomatic duties, had been involved in aconspiracy against the government <strong>to</strong> which he was accredited. Acommission of German officers later investigated the matter andestablished that von Schleicher had acted honorably and had notcommitted treason. But Hitler later summed up his motives as follows:when three trai<strong>to</strong>rs meet with an ambassador of a foreign power andconceal the fact from him, Hitler, 'then I give orders <strong>to</strong> have these menshot, even should it be true that at such a meeting, hidden from me, onlythe weather, ancient coins, and similar subjects were discussed.'Hitler made this declaration in cutting <strong>to</strong>nes on July 13 when he spokein the Reichstag; but in the same speech he said that he had not though<strong>to</strong>f the shootings until late in the night of June 30 — that is <strong>to</strong> say, at atime when he must have known of the meeting with Francois-Poncet fora long time. This was one of many cases in which his intelligenceservice got wind of part of a perhaps important incident, but failed <strong>to</strong> gethold of the decisive element in it which was later falsely added byinference. What is characteristic of <strong>Hitler's</strong> methods in this affair is thatsuch pieces of half-information completed by inference were not used asa basis for justifiable preventive measures, but for the most far-reachingdecisions concerning the life and death of hundreds of people and themorale of the entire nation. On June 30, says Hitler, he resolved <strong>to</strong> takeextreme measures only at the last minute, under the pressure of extremedanger — after having said that he <strong>to</strong>ok these measures because themeeting with Francois-Poncet had aroused his suspicions. These twodeclarations are inconsistent — but actually <strong>Hitler's</strong> entire explanationof the events described below is inconsistent; it is con-

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