tore nordenstam explanation and understanding in the history of art

(P3) “Normal conditions” obtain between now and t'.
(L) For any agent A, intention X, action Y, and time t, if A from now on intends
to realize X at t and considers the doing of Y no later than t' necessary for this,
and if “normal conditions” obtain between now and t', then A will do Y not later
than when he thinks the time t' has arrived.
(C) No later than he thinks time t' has arrived A does Y. 53
Tuomela’s third premise (P3) takes care of the cases which von Wright refers to in the
conclusion: “unless he forgets about time or is prevented”, and a number of similar cases
(e.g. that A had no other intention which he ranked higher than doing X). This is
obviously an improvement upon the original version of the intentionalist pattern. The
improvement which Tuomela considers to be most interesting is, however, the addition of
premise L. L is not an empirical statement which can be refuted by citing counterinstances;
any suggested counterinstances will be explained by showing that some of the
normal conditions are not fulfilled. (Cf. the discussion of Hempel above.) The statement
L is non-contingent and therefore “not very interesting from the point of view of the
empirical explanation of action”, as 'Tuomela points out. 54
The reason for the suggested improvement is, then, not the pragmatical one of improving
on existing explanations in the human sciences or to aid practising human scientists in
getting a better understanding of what they are doing when they explain. The reason is
logical. Only if a lawlike premise like L is added to the intentionalist pattern will it be
logically conclusive, according to some critics.
Now if a statement like L is not empirical, what is its logical status ? Dray looked upon
the general principles presupposed in intentionalist explanations as statements which
elucidate the notion of rational action. It would belong, then, to our concept of rational
action that if an agent intends to reach a certain goal and if he considers that the only way
53
R. Tuomela, Human Action and its Explanation, Reports from the Institute of Philosoophy, University of
Helsinki, No. 2, 1974, pp. 18-23.
54
Tuomela, op. cit., p.23.