tore nordenstam explanation and understanding in the history of art

(etc.) of reaching that goal is by using a certain means, then he will use that means;
otherwise he proves his irrationality. 55
It does, however, seem misleading to emphasize the notion of rationality in the way that
Dray did. An alternative account of why the intentionalist pattern is logically conclusive
could point to the fact that our concepts of intention and action are such that if an agent
really has an intention to do x, then he will do x unless he is prevented or changes his
mind etc. 56 If, for instance, an agent professes to have a certain intention and yet fails to
do what he says he intends to do when the appropriate occasion arises, then we would
have to say that his intention was not sincere – it was an idle wish, for instance – unless
we can find excusing circumstances which explain why he failed to carry out his
intention. The answer to the question about the logical status of the statement L is, then,
that it is an analytic truth: the truth of the statement depends upon the connections
between the key concepts in it, the concept of intention and the concept of action. In
Wittgenstein’s terminology, it is a grammatical sentence. 57
Tuomela and Apel do, however, not regard L as purely analytic. According to Apel, the
statement L hovers somewhere between the analytical and the empirical; he talks of “a
quasi-analytical universal quasi-law of rational action” and of “a contingent, nonuniversal
regularity of behavior that can serve as a quasi-law concerning socio-cultural
habits of action.” 58 He also suggests that we have to do here with “an ideal type of human
‘competence’ (to be compared with Chomsky’s concept of ‘grammatical
competence’).” 59 It is not easy to follow Apel here. It does not seem plausible to construe
L as a competence statement in the sense of a statement about some skill that a person
must have in order to he able to perform actions of a specified kind. Until clear
55
Cf. the quotation from Dray in note 46 above.
56
Cf. the discussion of the so-called Logical Connection Argument in von Wright, Explanation and
Understanding, pp. 107-118.
57
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, e.g. §§ 251 and 295.
58
K.-O. Apel, ”Causal Explanation, Motivational Explanation, and Hermenutical Understanding. (Remarks
on the Recent Stage of the Explanation-Understanding Controversy)”, in G. Ryle, ed., Contemporary
Aspects of Philosophy, Oriel Press, London 1977, p. 166.
59
Loc. cit.