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confrontation over Taiwan in 1958, the CFAG’s report twice mentioned the danger of“imperialist war mongers” (namely the United States) provoking a world war or aregional war. Moreover, Chinese leaders feared that US strategy was to create “twoChinas” and to occupy Taiwan permanently. Deputy Foreign Minister Luo Guiboconcluded in an internal talk on 4 March 1959 that “the goal of the United States is toattempt to seize possession of Taiwan permanently.” 19 Both Luo’s talk and the CFAGreport recognized the United States as the primary enemy of China. Chen Yi also arguedat an internal meeting that the US was China’s “foremost and also last enemy.” 20 Such abelief was not merely based on the ideological consideration that the United States was“the head of imperialism.” Equally, if not more important, was that Beijing saw Americandesigns regarding Taiwan as being hostile and threatening to Chinese strategic andsecurity interests. It believed, as Luo’s words bluntly put it, that the United States soughtto separate Taiwan—where ruler Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) had beenclamoring for “recovering the mainland” and overthrowing the communist regime inBeijing—from the mainland permanently by promoting a so-called two Chinas plot.In such a strategic situation, Sino-Soviet unity would have greatly improvedChina’s strategic position. Luo Guibo acknowledged in his talk that “the active support ofand coordination in our diplomacy by the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries isalso an important factor to the victory of our diplomacy.” 21 Recent sources and studiesalso show that the Soviet Union was more active and enthusiastic in supporting Chinesemilitary operations against the offshore islands of Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu),19 “Luo Guibo fubuzhang zai di’erci waishi gongzuo huiyi shang de fayan” (Deputy Minister Luo Guibo’s Talk at theSecond Foreign Affairs Working Meeting), 4 March 1959, ibid.20 “Chen Yi fuzhongli zai di’erci quanguo waishi gongzuo huiyi shang de baogao (jilu gao)” (Vice Premier Chen Yi’sReport at the Second National Foreign Affairs Working Meeting (Recorded Copy)), 7 March 1959, ibid.21 “Luo Guibo fubuzhang zai di’erci waishi gongzuo huiyi shang de fayan”, 4 March 1959, ibid.9
strongholds of Guomingdang (KMT) armies, during the second Taiwan Strait Crisis inthe fall of 1958. 22 In the first few weeks of August, the Soviet Union promised a series oftransfers of military equipment to China, including long-range artillery, amphibiousequipment, air-to-air missiles, and combat aircraft, together with Soviet military advisers,in hopes of aiding China’s upcoming operations against the Jiang Jieshi regime. 23 In earlySeptember 1958, Khrushchev received Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union LiuXiao in the Crimea and offered Soviet assistance to strengthen Chinese air forces in theTaiwan Strait so that American and Nationalist naval forces might be deterred. 24Recently published Chinese sources reveal that Chinese leaders went to greatlengths to preserve the status of the Soviet Union as the leader of the socialist camp. InJanuary 1959 Khrushchev informed the Chinese leadership of his decision to announce atthe coming 21 st Congress of the CPSU that the Soviet Union would no longer be the headof the socialist camp and that the CPSU would cease to be the center of the internationalcommunist movement. The CCP quickly sent Zhou Enlai to Moscow to dissuadeKhrushchev from doing so. 25In his first meeting with Mikhail Suslov, a senior member of the Politburo of theCC CPSU, Zhou conveyed the view of the Chinese leadership that “under currentconditions, it is inappropriate to revoke the formulations (tifa) of having the Soviet Union22 The earlier literature takes the view that Khrushchev withheld military support from China in the summer of 1958because he worried that Mao might draw the Soviet Union into a nuclear war with the United States. Recent research,however, reveals that Khrushchev was actually supportive of Beijing’s brinkmanship strategy. See Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 217; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 226-227.23 Mark Kramer, “The USSR Foreign Ministry’s Appraisal of Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split, September1959,” CWIHP Bulletin, Issues 6-7, Winter 1995/1996, pp. 170-185.24 Khrushchev’s offer, however, was politely declined by Mao in a reply to Khrushchev ten days later, presumably dueto Mao’s sensitivity to the penetration of Soviet influence into Chinese military. Liu Xiao, Chushi sulian banian (EightYears of Diplomatic Mission to the Soviet Union) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi, 1998), pp. 74-78.25 The Institute of Documentary Research of the CC CCP ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949-1976 (A Chronological Recordof Zhou Enlai’s Life, 1949-1976) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1997), vol. 2, p. 203.10
Page 1 and 2: COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJ
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Page 5 and 6: #46 Laurent Rucker, “Moscow’s S
Page 7 and 8: AbstractRelying on newly available
Page 9 and 10: with the Soviet Union. It was not u
Page 11 and 12: “To Have the Soviet Union as the
Page 13: The document shows that Chinese lea
Page 17 and 18: dog tries to jump over the wall, re
Page 19 and 20: that “some comrades seem to belie
Page 21 and 22: sharp vigilance against the schemes
Page 23 and 24: Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai laid out
Page 25 and 26: consolidate the unity of the social
Page 27 and 28: peaceful settlements in both instan
Page 29 and 30: have believed that Khrushchev’s B
Page 31 and 32: the speech on 8 October. The report
Page 33 and 34: twenty-two years did not take milit
Page 35 and 36: supports China’s development.”
Page 37 and 38: moves. 97 At a meeting in early Mar
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Page 41 and 42: 1960. 109 In an unusual move, on 9
Page 43 and 44: At a June 8 meeting of the permanen
Page 45 and 46: Reappraisal of Sino-Soviet Relation
Page 47 and 48: On 10 August, Chairman Mao reviewed
Page 49 and 50: too much. But even if one word he s
Page 51 and 52: The Chinese leadership had decided
Page 53 and 54: the Soviets’ eagerness to avoid a
Page 55 and 56: “great nation chauvinism” (dagu
Page 57 and 58: enemy.” 163After the conclusion o
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more and more convinced that Khrush
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evisionist line.” 198 In answerin
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intense.” Kennedy demanded that K
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sophisticated strategic calculation
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people, and [they will] say that we
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Moscow conference raised the Chines
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APPENDIX I: A Description of the Co
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Author’s NoteDong Wang, who recei
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National Foreign Affairs Working Me
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China), vols. 8-9. Beijing: Zhongya
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Luthi, Lorenz, The Sino-Soviet Spli
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