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18 July 1960 was a sober day for Chinese leaders. It was on that day that theparticipants in the Beidaihe conference were informed of the Soviet move. ChairmanMao commented, “We should not forget the great help the Soviet party and the Sovietpeople gave to us historically. Now there is no more help, and we have to adopt theguideline of self-reliance and build the country with diligence and thrift. There is no otherway except this. […] We cannot beg Khrushchev, neither can we beg the United States,”the Chairman went on. “Why must we have foreign aid? We should follow the road ofLenin and Stalin to build socialism within a single country.” 123The Soviet recall of all experts from China could be viewed by Beijing as nothingbut a revelation of the Soviet attempt to force China into submission by taking advantageof its economic difficulties. In hindsight, Khrushchev’s decision achieved the oppositeeffect: it not only greatly hurt China’s pride and enraged China, but also gave Mao theopportunity to mobilize the nation by calling for self-reliance and building the countrywith diligence and thrift. “Chinese do not believe in evil, and are not afraid of pressure,”Mao declared. “[We] should just have moral courage.” 124Khrushchev’s move failed to divide the Chinese leadership. Rather, it onlycompelled it to unite in the face of outside pressure. One thing Khrushchev mightnevertheless have calculated correctly was that the Chinese, in the wake of the domesticdifficulties caused by the Great Leap Forward, had no choice but to swallow the bitter pill.It can be imagined how this suppressed resentment against the Soviets would one dayemerge and destroy Sino-Soviet relations.Berlin. The document has been introduced and published by the CWIHP. See Chen Jian, “A Crucial Step toward theBreakdown of the Sino-Soviet Alliance: The Withdrawal of Soviet Experts from China in July 1960,” CWIHP Bulletin,Issues 8-9, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 246, 249-250.123 Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan, p. 335124 Ibid., p. 337.41
On 10 August, Chairman Mao reviewed Sino-Soviet relations at the concludingsession of the month-long Beidaihe conference. “The problems of the Sino-Sovietrelationship are neither big nor small. The sky will not fall down, and [we] do not need toworry endlessly,” he asserted. “It’s no more than not giving equipment, throwing the CCPout of the gate of the socialist camp, the Sino-Soviet Friendship and Mutual AssistanceTreaty blowing in the wind, carrying out military threats against China, even attacking ustogether with the United States. If talking in extreme terms, it’s no more than thosethings.” 125 Premier Zhou shared the chairman’s analysis, though he was less emotional. Ina secret report to the fourth national foreign affairs meeting held in Beijing four days later,the premier said, “The withdrawal of experts does inflict damage on us. [But] this is atemporary phenomenon…It is causing damage to [the Soviet Union] also. Khrushchevhas lifted a rock only to drop it on his own feet.” 126When Vice Premier Chen Yi proposed a resolution on Sino-Soviet relations,Chairman Mao turned down Chen’s suggestion. “It’s easy to make a resolution,” Maosaid, but then “the essay will become a dead one (wenzhang jiu zuo si le),” likening it toleaving no flexibility. 127 Remarking that the Soviet Union’s rush to pass a resolution onlyrevealed its weaknesses and fear, Chairman Mao said that for the time being, only120,000 party officials should be informed about the situation. “This is called leavingadequate leeway (liu you yudi). It’s needless to be in such a rush,” the Chairman stated.125 Ibid., p. 339. The JPA also has a document of Vice Premier Chen Yi’s 14 August 1960 talk at the fourth nationalforeign affairs working meeting in which Chen related to the meeting details of the Beidaihe conference, especially thetalks by Mao and other leaders at the concluding session of the conference. See “Chen Yi tongzhi ba yue shisi rijianghua” (Comrade Chen Yi’s August 14 Talk), Juanhao 103 long, Disici quanguo waishi huiyi fuze tongzhi fayanbaogao (The Speeches and Reports by the Responsible Comrades at the Fourth National Foreign Affairs Meeting),July-August, 1960, Quanzong hao 3124, Quanzong mingchen: Sheng waishi bangongshi, JPA.126 “Zhou zongli baogao” (The Report by Premier Zhou), Juanhao 103 long, Disici quanguo waishi huiyi fuze tongzhifayan baogao, July-August, 1960, Quanzong hao 3124, Quanzong mingchen: Sheng waishi bangongshi, JPA.127 “Chen Yi tongzhi ba yue shisi ri jianghua,” Juanhao 103 long, Disici quanguo waishi huiyi fuze tongzhi fayanbaogao, July-August, 1960, Quanzong hao 3124, Quanzong mingchen: Sheng waishi bangongshi, JPA.42
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