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noted. 184“The Bad Brother”: From the 22 nd Congress of the CPSU to the Sino-Indian BorderConflictMao’s worries about Khrushchev were indeed warranted. As the Berlin Crisisculminated in the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, Khrushchev, believing thatthe construction of the Wall marked the Western powers’ recognition of a continuation ofthe status quo, decided to abondon brinksmanship for diplomacy from a position ofstrength. 185 Increasingly worried about Chinese militancy, Khrushchev began to wonderif it would be better to pursue détente with the United States than continue to ally with amilitant Chinese line. 186On 31 October Moscow maneuvered to exclude China from participation in theWarsaw Pact, on the grounds that it was a potentially subversive influence. 187 The Sovietmove coincided with Khrushchev’s indirect assault on the Chinese at the 22 nd Congressof the CPSU, where he publicly attacked the PRC’s proxy, Albania. Moscow had beenincreasing its pressure on Albania in 1961. At the March Warsaw Pact summit, the SovietUnion passed a resolution condemning Albania. In May Moscow suspended aid toAlbania, eventually expelling Albania from the Warsaw Pact in August. Beijing had beenclosely watching the unfolding drama. Although the Chinese had often tried to persuadethe Soviets to reverse course on Albania, Beijing, as time passed by, seemed to become184 Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan, p. 463.185 Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962,” The CWIHP Working Paper No. 6, TheWoodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., May 1993.186 Zubok, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis”; Thomas W. Wolfe, “Two Approaches to Military Strategy,” in Zablockied., Sino-Soviet Rivalry, p. 56.187 Vojtech Mastny, “China, the Warsaw Pact, and Sino-Soviet Relations under Khrushchev,” in Parallel History Projecton NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Document Collection No. 11, China and the Warsaw Pact under Mao and Khrushchev,October 2002.59
more and more convinced that Khrushchev was adopting a strategy of crushing Albania,China’s most staunch ally into submission, then targeting China itself. 188The 22 nd Congress of the CPSU, held on 17–31 October 1961, proved to be aturning point. Although Beijing seemed to have foreseen the probability of Sovietpressure on Albania, it had not imagined that Khrushchev would go so far. 189 Indeed, onOctober 12, Zhou Enlai informed Ho Chi Minh on the way to the CPSU Congress that hisforthcoming visit to Moscow was for the purpose of congratulating the 22 nd Congress,and that China was “prepared to stress unity and opposition to imperialism, which [was]advantageous to the struggle against the enemy.” 190 Khrushchev’s move certainly bore therisk of open rift with China if Beijing did not back down. Calculating that Beijing’ssevere economic crisis and dire need of Soviet trade, credit, and assistance may haverendered its bargaining position much weaker, Khrushchev was determined to“blackmail” his Chinese ally into surrender. 191The Soviet leader, however, underestimated the determination and fierce pride ofthe Chinese leadership. 192 The outraged Chinese leaders believed Khrushchev’s moveagainst Albania was intended to “kill the chicken to frighten the monkeys” (shaji jinghou)and force China into submission. 193 Zhou Enlai offered a rather veiled and reservedrebuttal in his 19 October address to the congress, stating “any unfair and one-sidedcharges against any fraternal party are of no benefit to unity and of not benefit to theresolution of the problems. It cannot be considered the sober attitude of Marxism and188 Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan, p. 457.189 Scholars used to believe that Khrushchev’s attack on Albania at the 22 nd congress of the CPSU came as a surprise toBeijing. Recent Chinese memoirs literature, however, reveals that Beijing had actually foreseen that Moscow might“oppose Albania” at the congress. See Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, pp. 370-371; Wu Lengxi, ibid., pp. 468-470.190 Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 2, p. 440.191 Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 374.192 Ibid., p. 375.193 Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan, p. 475.60
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