news to me.” Even the usually reserved Zhou erupted angrily: “What data do you trustmore—Indian or ours?” When <strong>Chinese</strong> Foreign Minister Chen Yi accused Khrushchev of“time-serving” (opportunism-prisposoblenchestvo), 69 the Soviet leader burst out, “ChenYi is Minister of Foreign Affairs <strong>and</strong> he can weigh his words. He did not say it atr<strong>and</strong>om.” <strong>The</strong> exchange between Khrushchev <strong>and</strong> Chen Yi quickly became heated. “Ifyou consider us time-servers, comrade Chen Yi, then do not offer your h<strong>and</strong>. I will notaccept it,” Khrushchev declared. Chen Yi replied firmly, “Neither will I. I must tell you Iam not afraid of your fury.” Khrushchev threw back, “You should not spit from the heightof your Marshal title. You do not have enough spit.” 70Immediately after seeing Khrushchev off on 4 October, Mao convened a specialPolitburo meeting to discuss their talks. <strong>The</strong> meeting concluded that Khrushchev heldillusions about Eisenhower <strong>and</strong> did not see the essence of American imperialism.Believing that Khrushchev had demonstrated his tendency toward revisionism, the<strong>Chinese</strong> leadership nevertheless held that China should still adopt a guideline of attachingthe greatest importance to unity, carrying no debates <strong>and</strong> observing events withcalmness. 71Khrushchev, on his return to Moscow, stopped in Vladivostok <strong>and</strong> delivered aspeech on 6 October. He spoke about his recent visits to the United States <strong>and</strong> China, <strong>and</strong>claimed that Sino-Soviet friendship was developing <strong>and</strong> consolidating day by day.<strong>Chinese</strong> leaders, however, were particularly attentive to possible hidden messages inKhrushchev’s speech. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Chinese</strong> embassy in Moscow sent back a detailed report about69 Zubok notes that it is not clear what the word exactly meant in <strong>Chinese</strong>. In both Wu Lengxi <strong>and</strong> Li Yueran’s accounts,the term Chen Yi used was “qianjiu zhuyi” (accommodationism). Zubok, “<strong>The</strong> Mao-Khrushchev Conversations,” p.248; Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan, p. 226; Li Yueran, Zhongsu waijiao qinliji, p. 193.70 Zubok, “<strong>The</strong> Mao-Khrushchev Conversations,” p. 269.71 Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan, pp. 228-229.25
the speech on 8 October. <strong>The</strong> report noted that Khrushchev had claimed that “it wasunwise to long for war <strong>and</strong> to be prepared to fight like a bellicose rooster.” <strong>The</strong> reportreceived special attention from Mao, who ordered it circulated to Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai,Chen Yi, <strong>and</strong> Peng Zhen, among other top <strong>Chinese</strong> leaders, <strong>and</strong> asked them to “read itwithin two days” <strong>and</strong> “think it over” in preparation for a meeting with Mao. 72Khrushchev’s Vladivostok speech seemed to have confirmed the <strong>Chinese</strong> leaders’ beliefthat the Soviet leader had a tendency toward revisionism, but the <strong>Chinese</strong> leadership stillbelieved that the policy of attaching most importance to unity <strong>and</strong> observing events withcalmness should be maintained.<strong>The</strong> Khrushchev-Mao summit of 2 October 1959 has been widely regarded asevidence of a radically deteriorating relationship between Beijing <strong>and</strong> Moscow. 73 ChenJian argues that after the summit, Mao saw little chance to avoid serious confrontationwith Moscow. 74 Westad argues that by late 1959, Mao had been determined to instigatepublic dissension between Beijing <strong>and</strong> Moscow to place blame for the eventual break onthe Soviet Union. 75 Recent <strong>Chinese</strong> evidence seems to suggest, however, that even afterthe summit, Mao had a quite optimistic view of Sino-Soviet relations, believingKhrushchev might change the course. 76 True, the <strong>Chinese</strong> had many grievances againstthe Soviets, most notably Khrushchev’s siding with India in the Sino-Indian borderdispute <strong>and</strong> pursuit of détente with the United States. Nevertheless, <strong>Chinese</strong> leaders hadmore reasons to believe that the fundamental interests of the two socialist powers were72 “Zai zhusu shiguan guanyu hrluxiaofu haisenwei jianghua qingkuang baogao shang de piyu” (Comments on theReport by the Embassy to the Soviet Union Concerning the Situation of Khrushchev’s Talk in Vladivostok), JMZW, vol.8, pp. 564-565.73 Zagoria, <strong>The</strong> Sino-Soviet Conflict, pp. 277-287; Zubok, “<strong>The</strong> Mao-Khrushchev Conversations,” pp. 244-272; ChenJian, Mao’s China <strong>and</strong> the Cold War, pp. 82-83.74 Chen Jian, ibid., p. 82.75 Westad ed., <strong>Brothers</strong> in Arms, p. 24.76 Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan, p. 233.26
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National Foreign Affairs Working Me
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China), vols. 8-9. Beijing: Zhongya
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Luthi, Lorenz, The Sino-Soviet Spli