The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a ... - CiteSeerX

the Soviets’ eagerness to avoid an open split and to deliberately test the Soviets’ nerve. 146Recent Chinese evidence, however, seems to point to another possibility: that the Chinese,having been captive to their own misperceptions and mistrust of the Soviets, might havebeen oversensitive and thus overreacted.Just like their Soviet comrades, the Chinese had a large stake in preventing anopen split. Mao had reminded the Chinese delegation before its departure that the goal atthe Moscow conference was to achieve agreement, not split. 147 The Politburo meeting of27 October had even decided that if the Moscow conference went well, Liu Shaoqi wouldpay a formal visit to the Soviet Union in the capacity of president of the PRC. 148 So it ishard to believe that the Chinese intended to derail the Moscow conference from the verybeginning. Rather, the Chinese evidence suggests that to some extent, the Chinese hadbecome captive to their own misperceptions and mistrust of the Soviets.After Khrushchev’s surprise attack at the Bucharest conference, the Chineseleadership had come to believe that the Soviet leader was a “conspirator” who was goodat perpetuating intrigues and conspiracy, not only within the CPSU, but also againstfraternal countries. Before the departure of the Chinese delegation, the CCP Politburo hadconvened several meetings and had expected that at the Moscow conference Khrushchevwould use the majority to press the CCP into submission. 149 Therefore, when Khrushchevdisplayed warmth toward the Chinese delegation, their first reaction was reservation andsuspicion. The Chinese seemed to believe that Khrushchev must be carrying out a146 Vladislav M. Zubok, “‘Look What Chaos in the Beautiful Socialist Camp!’ Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet Split,1956-1963,” CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 10, March 1998, pp. 152-162.147 Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan, p. 365.148 Yang Kuisong, Mao Zedong yu mosike, p. 457.149 Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan, pp. 368-369.48