The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a ... - CiteSeerX

evisionist line.” 198 In answering the question of whether a Sino-Soviet split wasinevitable, Liu raised three possibilities: one was to “preserve the status quo”; anotherwas a further deterioration of relations without a split; and the third was a public split.Liu wrote that when revisionists imposed a split, China should “strengthen the work offriendship toward the Soviet people” on the one hand, and “reject provocations” on theother. 199 In a talk on 30 January, Mao concurred with Liu’s assessments. The chairman,however, ruled out the Albanian approach. “Concerning our relationship with the SovietUnion, [we] do not necessarily adopt the Albanian way,” Mao stated. “That is to say [we]use every means to avoid the split and postpone the split, and it’s good even to maintain asituation of unfriendliness, but no split on the surface.” 200By late 1961 and into early 1962 Chinese leaders had become pessimistic aboutthe prospect of preserving Sino-Soviet unity. Indeed, events in 1962 quickly convincedthem that the nature of the relationship between China and the Soviet Union hadundergone a significant change. From mid-April to the end of May 1962, more than60,000 ethnically Kazakh Chinese Muslims residing in Ili Prefecture and Tacheng,Xinjiang fled to the Soviet Union. The causes of the exodus were complicated, and can beattributed to a number of reasons, including famine caused by failed economic policiesand Soviet encouragement and even support for the fleeing crowds. 201 However, the198 “Liu Shaoqi zai kuoda de zhongyang gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua tigang shougao (bufen), yi jiu liu er nian yiyue” (The Manuscript of the Outline of Liu Shaoqi’s Talk at the Enlarged Central Working Meeting (Part), January1962), in the Central Archives ed., Gongheguo wushi nian zhengui dang’an (The Precious Archives of the Fifty Yearsof the PRC) (Beijing: Zhongguo dang’an, 1999), vol. 1, pp. 788-789.199 Ibid., p. 791; Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan, p. 486.200 Wu Lengxi, ibid., p. 488.201 The English literature takes the view that the incident was largely caused by the famines brought the failed policy ofthe Great Leap Forward. Chinese historian Li Danhui, using recently declassified Chinese archives in Xinjiang, hasmade the argument that the Soviet Union agitated, and even supported the exodus by “suddenly, illegally increase(ing)the number of Soviet resident certificates issued.” See Constantine Pleshakov, “Nikita Khrushchev and Sino-SovietRelations,” in Westad ed., Brothers in Arms, p. 239; Li Danhui, “Dui 1962 nian Xinjiang yita shijian qiyin de lishikaocha—laizi zhongguo Xinjiang de dang’an cailiao” (A Historical Examination of the Origins of the 1962 Yili-62