The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a ... - CiteSeerX

people, and [they will] say that we are for the purpose of competing for leadership.” 221Chen Yi added, “In most circumstances, [we] should still defend the Soviet authority anddefend Sino-Soviet unity. But on important issues, such as the Cuban issue, [we] mustseize the opportunity to expose him severely but without mentioning him by name.” 222Conclusion: The Quarrelling Brothers and the Sino-Soviet SplitThis examination of new Chinese evidence has shown that much of theconventional wisdom about the Sino-Soviet split may need to be revised, as it discountedthe genuine strategic need of Beijing to rein in the tendency toward an open split. Mostaccounts state that after 1959 the Chinese and the Soviets were on a collision course, witheach convinced that a break was inevitable. However, new Chinese evidence shows thatthe Chinese, at least up until early 1961, placed hopes on Khrushchev and repeatedlyintended to repair their relationship with the Soviets. It was not until late 1962 that theChinese came to a firm conclusion that Khrushchev had become a full-fledged revisionist.It also was not until then that the Chinese became extremely pessimistic about improvingSino-Soviet relations.The new Chinese sources also show that Chinese moves toward “partial détente”from 1959 to 1961 went beyond tactical maneuvers calculated to place the blame over abreak on the Soviets, as the literature usually holds. Indeed, China had a genuine strategicneed to preserve Sino-Soviet unity in order to neutralize the American threat to China’ssecurity, at a minimum, and, at a maximum, to advance the world socialist revolution. Itis because of these genuine strategic needs that the Chinese were far more reluctant tobreak with Moscow than generally understood.221 Ibid.222 Ibid.68