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articles in other fraternal countries. In the next few days, Khrushchev and Peng Zhenclashed, exchanging bitter attacks. As the leaders of the Eastern European communistparties stood up one after another to attack the Chinese, Khrushchev must have enjoyedhis revenge. The Soviet leader could not forget how he had been under the barrage of theChinese when he was in Beijing nine months earlier. 116After the Chinese delegation returned to Beijing, Mao convened a Politburomeeting on 30 June to discuss the Bucharest conference. Chinese leaders perceived theBucharest conference as a “surprise attack” against China by Khrushchev. The meetingconcluded that Khrushchev attempted to use the Bucharest conference to press China intosubmission, but the result turned out to be just the opposite. The Politburo meetinginformed high-ranking party officials about the Bucharest conference, explaining to themthat China’s differences with the CPSU were over significant, principled issues, whilemaking it clear that these differences were still of “one finger out of ten.” It wassurprising that Chinese leaders did not take a gloomier view. “Our guideline is to insist onprinciples and carry on necessary struggles, meanwhile to insist on unity because bothparties have the need, and there is indeed a basis for unity.” The meeting concluded,“Khrushchev is not immutable, and he might also change….The purpose of carrying onstruggles against him is still unity.” 117116 Yang Kuisong, Mao Zedong yu mosike, p. 452; Zubok, “The Mao-Khrushchev Conversations,” p. 248.117 Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan, pp. 298-300.39
Reappraisal of Sino-Soviet Relations: The Beidaihe Conference and the Withdrawalof Soviet ExpertsFrom 5 July to 10 August 1960, the CCP brought together high-ranking partyofficials in a central working meeting in Beidaihe, a seaside resort close to Beijing. TheSino-Soviet relationship was a major topic throughout the meeting.Beginning on July 14, Zhou Enlai delivered a three-day-long speech on Sino-Soviet relations. 118 Zhou stated that it was not coincidental that Khrushchev came to havea major quarrel with Chinese leaders in October 1959, because “at that time his bottomhad already been sitting on the side of the United States, no longer viewing the UnitedStates as his biggest, most dangerous enemy.” 119 In concluding his lengthy report, Zhounevertheless stressed unity:We should always hold high the flag of unity. Struggles are for unity, and it is notfor a split that [we] carry on struggles. But [we] should also be prepared for thepossibility that Khrushchev wants to engage in a split. Our goal is to strive forunity, to try to put off and delay a split, which is beneficial for China, beneficialfor the world revolution, as well as beneficial for the people of the SovietUnion. 120Despite their complaints against Khrushchev, Chinese leaders probably did notexpect that Moscow would take the extreme measure of withdrawing its experts fromChina. 121 Consequently, when a letter from the Soviet government arrived on 16 Julyinforming China that all Soviet experts would be recalled to the Soviet Union, theChinese were shocked. 122118 Wu Lengxi provided a detailed account of Zhou’s talk in his memoirs. Zhou Enlai nianpu also contains a briefsummary of Zhou’s talk. See Wu Lengxi, ibid., pp. 314-334; Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 2, pp. 331-333.119 Wu Lengxi, ibid., p. 332.120 Ibid., p. 333.121 Yang Kuisong, Mao Zedong yu mosike, p. 453.122 A copy of the note delivered by the Soviet Embassy in Beijing to the Chinese Foreign Ministry dated 18 July 1960was retrieved by German historian Dieter Heinzig in the archives of the East German Socialist Unity Party in East40
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Page 69 and 70: intense.” Kennedy demanded that K
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