The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a ... - CiteSeerX

Khrushchev during the Soviet leader’s October 1959 trip to China, evidently did not holda high regard for Khrushchev, “I can see that he is despicable, stops at nothing, cankowtow to imperialism, and blackmail his own comrades.” 171 “But,” Chen Yi cautionedhis comrades, “It should be seen that he has his own good side, and can be changed andcan be united,” adding, “We used to see less on this score, and this is not correct.” 172Chinese leaders believed the Moscow conference had placed constraints on Khrushchev.Zhou Enlai also told Chen Yi that it was premature to assert that Khrushchev would beready to compromise with the United States and throw away China. 173 AssessingKhrushchev’s behavior since the Moscow conference, Chen Yi noted, “Generallyspeaking, he [Khrushchev] still wants to oppose imperialism…if he opposes imperialism,we push him forward. You come to shoulder the flag, and I come to shoulder the flag.Don’t argue.” Chen Yi was also keenly aware of the threat of the United States andwarned against the US plan for “two Chinas.” Kennedy “needs to have a little détente tosave himself, to unite the West, and to be prepared to attack us,” Chen Yi stated. 174China decided to adopt a policy of détente toward the Soviet Union after theMoscow conference, and concentrated on addressing China’s economic difficulties andsettling border issues with neighboring countries. The Soviet Union also made efforts toremedy the rift. In a letter to the Chinese government dated on 12 January 1961,Khrushchev indicated that the Soviet Union would be willing to aid China in producingMiG 21 “Fishbed” fighter planes. Zhou Enlai, in a 5 February reply, agreed to send adelegation to Moscow to conduct follow-up negotiations in mid-February and noted that171 Item No. 15 “Chen Yi tongzhi guanyu guoji xingshi he waijiao zhengce de baogao” (Comrade Chen Yi’s ReportConcerning International Situation and Foreign Policy), ibid.172 Ibid.173 Ibid.174 Ibid.56