The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a ... - CiteSeerX

more and more convinced that Khrushchev was adopting a strategy of crushing Albania,China’s most staunch ally into submission, then targeting China itself. 188The 22 nd Congress of the CPSU, held on 17–31 October 1961, proved to be aturning point. Although Beijing seemed to have foreseen the probability of Sovietpressure on Albania, it had not imagined that Khrushchev would go so far. 189 Indeed, onOctober 12, Zhou Enlai informed Ho Chi Minh on the way to the CPSU Congress that hisforthcoming visit to Moscow was for the purpose of congratulating the 22 nd Congress,and that China was “prepared to stress unity and opposition to imperialism, which [was]advantageous to the struggle against the enemy.” 190 Khrushchev’s move certainly bore therisk of open rift with China if Beijing did not back down. Calculating that Beijing’ssevere economic crisis and dire need of Soviet trade, credit, and assistance may haverendered its bargaining position much weaker, Khrushchev was determined to“blackmail” his Chinese ally into surrender. 191The Soviet leader, however, underestimated the determination and fierce pride ofthe Chinese leadership. 192 The outraged Chinese leaders believed Khrushchev’s moveagainst Albania was intended to “kill the chicken to frighten the monkeys” (shaji jinghou)and force China into submission. 193 Zhou Enlai offered a rather veiled and reservedrebuttal in his 19 October address to the congress, stating “any unfair and one-sidedcharges against any fraternal party are of no benefit to unity and of not benefit to theresolution of the problems. It cannot be considered the sober attitude of Marxism and188 Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan, p. 457.189 Scholars used to believe that Khrushchev’s attack on Albania at the 22 nd congress of the CPSU came as a surprise toBeijing. Recent Chinese memoirs literature, however, reveals that Beijing had actually foreseen that Moscow might“oppose Albania” at the congress. See Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, pp. 370-371; Wu Lengxi, ibid., pp. 468-470.190 Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 2, p. 440.191 Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 374.192 Ibid., p. 375.193 Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan, p. 475.60