US Nuclear Weapons in Europe - Natural Resources Defense Council

U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe • Hans M. Kristensen/Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005
determine the best route to fly.” 103 Likewise, EUCOM staff later visited Offutt Air Force
Base to discuss its concerns. STRATCOM reciprocated by sending staff to brief
EUCOM. Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (CINCEUR) indicated
“substantial agreement with the Theater Nuclear Support model” in early 1994, according
to STRATCOM. 104
To better establish close collaboration with the regional CINCs, STRATCOM planners
envisioned appointing a single point of contact to develop a uniform method of
interfacing with the theater CINCs that request deliberate planning of Theater Nuclear
Options (TNOs) for targets identified in their theater. A representative from CINCEUR
visited STRATCOM in February 1994 to discuss EUCOM’s specific concerns with the
support model and the support plan, and STRATCOM intended to follow up with a visit
to EUCOM “to tailor their support plan, particularly with regard to execution.” 105
During a visit to EUCOM in May 1994, the two unified commands briefed each other on
the various elements of their mission. EUCOM staff presented briefings on EUCOM’s
roles and missions, nuclear weapons requirements, and Theater Missile Defense
Initiative. STRATCOM staff gave briefings on the Theater Nuclear Support Model and
Counterproliferation Initiatives. 106
These meetings helped resolve their differences, and by examining the discussions we
can better understand the reasons why the United States adjusted nuclear war planning in
Europe and its periphery to the post–Cold War era. The May 1994 meeting dealt with
issues such as U.S. Air Force support of NATO nuclear missions with DCA based in the
United States. The aircraft would, under the various Operational Plans (OPLAN), deploy
to staging bases in Europe. The CINCEUR adjusted STRATCOM’s support plan to
operate nuclear aircraft in other countries, and both sides agreed to modify the plan so
that nuclear deployment and overflight of other countries would be “subject to agreement
of the host nation.” A draft nuclear support annex to OPLAN 4122 (rapid reinforcement
of Europe in a general war) was being finalized. 107
The participants also discussed EUCOM’s support of Central Command’s (CENTCOM)
nuclear mission in the Persian Gulf region, including deployment of command and
control aircraft from the EUCOM’s area. At the time, a final draft of the nuclear annex to
OPLAN 1002 for countering a Persian Gulf conflict was being finalized by the Joint
Staff, and EUCOM and STRATCOM agreed to exchange PAL materials for use in
nuclear strike “missions not executed from CINCEUR’s AOR [Area of Responsibility]
using CINCEUR delivery platforms/weapons.” 108 This apparently meant that nuclear
weapons stationed in Europe also had roles outside of Europe in the CENTCOM area,
which includes Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
With these issues sorted out, it was time to implement the planning. On June 28, 1994,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman issued Change 4 to the Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan nuclear Annex C (JSCP CY 93-95). This guidance formally assigned the Theater
Nuclear Support mission to STRATCOM. 109 The new directive included guidance for
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