US Nuclear Weapons in Europe - Natural Resources Defense Council
US Nuclear Weapons in Europe - Natural Resources Defense Council
US Nuclear Weapons in Europe - Natural Resources Defense Council
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U.S. <strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Weapons</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> • Hans M. Kristensen/<strong>Natural</strong> <strong>Resources</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Council</strong>, 2005<br />
Short of reduc<strong>in</strong>g nuclear weapons across the board or withdraw<strong>in</strong>g them altogether, the<br />
most likely outcome may be the removal of the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g nuclear weapons from hostnation<br />
bases. Under that scenario, only the United States would cont<strong>in</strong>ue to store nuclear<br />
weapons at its ma<strong>in</strong> operat<strong>in</strong>g bases <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>. The persistent emphasis by NATO<br />
officials about the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of burden-shar<strong>in</strong>g would appear to argue aga<strong>in</strong>st this option,<br />
but it is the direction that NATO has been mov<strong>in</strong>g toward for years. S<strong>in</strong>ce 1993,<br />
Munitions Support Squadrons (MUNSS) have been withdrawn from all or some of<br />
German, Greek, Italian, and Turkish air bases and the nuclear weapons moved to the<br />
ma<strong>in</strong> U.S. operat<strong>in</strong>g base <strong>in</strong> the area. To complete this transition, the MUNSS at Kle<strong>in</strong>e<br />
Brogel Air Base <strong>in</strong> Belgium, Volkel Air Base <strong>in</strong> the Netherlands, Büchel Air Base <strong>in</strong><br />
Germany, and Ghedi Torre Air Base <strong>in</strong> Italy could be transferred to ma<strong>in</strong> U.S. operat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
bases <strong>in</strong> each area or returned to the United States.<br />
The BRAC process co<strong>in</strong>cides with another major review <strong>in</strong> 2005: The Quadrennial<br />
<strong>Defense</strong> Review (QDR). Launched every four years, the congressionally mandated QDR<br />
reviews the nation’s defense strategy, budget, force structure and modernization plans.<br />
<strong>Nuclear</strong> forces are also reviewed, but both the Cl<strong>in</strong>ton and Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istrations<br />
conducted separate <strong>Nuclear</strong> Posture Reviews <strong>in</strong> 1994 and 2001, respectively. The Bush<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrations planned a new <strong>Nuclear</strong> Posture Review for 2005, but this now appears to<br />
have been comb<strong>in</strong>ed with the 2005 QDR. The deployment <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> will likely be<br />
reviewed aga<strong>in</strong> as part of the QDR.<br />
Whether or not the BRAC or QDR<br />
process results <strong>in</strong> a reduction, the most<br />
serious challenge to the cont<strong>in</strong>ued<br />
deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> ironically comes from<br />
NATO itself. In June 2004, a little<br />
noticed “issue paper” published by<br />
NATO disclosed that the read<strong>in</strong>ess<br />
level of the nuclear strike aircraft had<br />
been reduced to “months” rather than<br />
weeks, days, or hours. 218 Dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
Cold War, the read<strong>in</strong>ess level was<br />
measured <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>utes (for a small<br />
number of aircraft on quick-alert) and<br />
<strong>in</strong> hours or days for the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
force. Under the new and reduced<br />
read<strong>in</strong>ess level implemented <strong>in</strong> 2002,<br />
Table 11:<br />
NATO <strong>Nuclear</strong> Aircraft Read<strong>in</strong>ess<br />
NATO says it has reduced the number and the read<strong>in</strong>ess<br />
level of its nuclear strike aircraft <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, most<br />
recently <strong>in</strong> 2003. Source: NATO.<br />
it would supposedly take “months” for NATO to use the fighter-bombers to launch a<br />
nuclear strike (see Table 11).<br />
A read<strong>in</strong>ess level of “months” suggests that some of the mechanical and electronic<br />
equipment on the fighter aircraft needed to arm and deliver the nuclear bombs may have<br />
been removed and placed <strong>in</strong> storage.<br />
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