US Nuclear Weapons in Europe - Natural Resources Defense Council

U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe • Hans M. Kristensen/Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005
suggesting that NATO review its nuclear policy and specifically the first-use option,
which has characterized NATO doctrine for decades. Their proposal collided with the
adjustments of U.S. and NATO nuclear strategy undertaken in the 1990s to use nuclear
weapons to deter not only nuclear but other types of weapons of mass destruction as
well. 164 Without the option to use nuclear weapons first, some feared, NATO would
relinquish its ability to deter attacks by chemical and biological weapons. The rejection
of the proposal was swift, and U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen stated:
"We think that the ambiguity involved in the issue of the use of nuclear
weapons contributes to our own security, keeping any potential adversary
who might use either chemical or biologicals [sic] unsure of what our
response should be. So we think it's a sound doctrine. It was adopted
certainly during the Cold War, but modified even following and
reaffirmed following [sic] at the end of the Cold War. It is an integral part
of our strategic concept, and we think it should remain exactly as it is." 165
On the one hand, the revolt suggested that the challenges facing the alliance almost 10
years after the end of the Cold War were not only external but that major NATO allies
were beginning to think anew about the role of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the
revolt provided an opportunity for the nuclear weapon states to reaffirm the status quo.
Eventually, Canada and Germany were persuaded to keep their differences of opinion
about nuclear doctrine private and to discuss them internally within the alliance. After
all, this was a time when NATO was about to present a new Strategic Concept to explain
to the world why it was still relevant in the twenty-first century.
The new Strategic Concept was formally approved at the NATO Summit in Washington,
D.C., in April 1999. From the perspective of reducing or eliminating reliance on nuclear
weapons, the Strategic Concept was a disappointment because it failed to change or scale
back the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Instead, it essentially
maintained the nuclear status quo repeating past accomplishments and reaffirmed a
continuing role in Europe for U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons and British warheads
on strategic submarines. 166
The failure to adjust nuclear policy was twofold in that the Strategic Concept also failed
to eliminate a nuclear role for non-nuclear NATO countries at a time when European and
U.S. nonproliferation efforts forcefully urged other non-nuclear countries to refrain from
developing nuclear weapons capabilities. Instead the Strategic Concept highlighted the
involvement of non-nuclear NATO states in nuclear weapons storage and strike planning:
“A credible alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of alliance solidarity
and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread
participation by European allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear
roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory, and in command,
control, and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and
committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the
European and the North American members of the alliance. The alliance will
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