US Nuclear Weapons in Europe - Natural Resources Defense Council

U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe • Hans M. Kristensen/Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005
Finally, there is the question of burden sharing and whether this long-held principle of
NATO nuclear planning is eroding. Although a third of the U.S. forward-deployed
nuclear bombs in Europe are earmarked for deliver by half a dozen non-nuclear NATO
countries, many of those countries are showing signs of retreating from of the nuclear
mission. Nuclear weapons were removed from Greece in 2001, Italy only has nuclear
weapons on one national air base, Germany also only has nuclear weapons left on one
national air base and closed another base in 2003. And Germany may phase out its
nuclear mission altogether with its planned replacement of the Tornado aircraft with the
Eurofighter in the next decade.
Turkey no longer stores nuclear weapons on its national air bases, and the Turkish
government has made decisions during the last couple of years that strongly call into
question the credibility of nuclear operations from Turkey territory. During the 2003 war
against Iraq, Turkey refused to give the United States permission to move major ground
forces through Turkey into northern Iraq. And as recently as in December 2004, the
Turkish government announced that it would “not back any U.S. military action on
Iran.” 230 NATO’s nuclear posture in Europe is partially justified as a potential deterrent
against proliferating countries, and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey is the only NATO nuclear
air base within striking range of Iran. The credibility of that deterrent – even if one
believes it existed – seems to have eroded with Turkey’s stand.
In conclusion, a final review of the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in
Europe is long overdue. This time, the U.S. Congress and European parliaments must
ask tough questions about the rationale for the deployment. They should not be content
with vague justifications from the past about nuclear weapons “preventing war” or
“providing a political link between Europe and North America.” The focus must be on
exactly who the enemy is and where the targets are for these weapons, which essential
and unique benefits the weapons provide to NATO’s security that cannot be met through
other means, and how the training in peacetime of pilots from non-nuclear countries to
deliver nuclear weapons in wartime matches European and U.S. nonproliferation
messages.
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