US Nuclear Weapons in Europe - Natural Resources Defense Council

U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe • Hans M. Kristensen/Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005
The meeting of NATO’s Defence Planning Commission in ministerial session in October
13, 1996, declared that the remaining nuclear weapons “are no longer targeted against
anyone and the readiness of NATO’s dual capable aircraft has been recently adapted.”
At the same time, NATO reemphasized that U.S. nuclear forces based in Europe provided
“an essential and enduring political and military link between the European and the North
American members of the alliance.” This posture would, the ministers stated, “for the
foreseeable future, continue to meet the requirements of the alliance.” 142
European Changes Increase Importance of U.S. Fighter Bombers
A curious effect of NATO’s nuclear reductions and relaxations of readiness levels of the
remaining dual-capable aircraft (DCA) was that it increased the importance of the nuclear
fighter-bombers based in the United States. “With the downsizing of theater nuclear
forces worldwide,” the U.S. Air Force stated in 1995, “the capability of CONUS-based
DCA resources to deploy rapidly was imperative.” 143 DCA based at Seymour Johnson
Air Force Base in North Carolina and Cannon Air Force Base in New Mexico were
tasked to deliver nuclear bombs in support of European and Pacific command
contingencies.
Fighter-bomber squadrons were urgently needed in the regional wars in the Middle East
and Balkans at the time. This caused Air Combat Command (ACC) to recommend a
reduction in the nuclear readiness level of DCA based in the United States so that the
more important conventional missions could be fulfilled. A second reason was that ACC
thought the DCA readiness levels were in general too high for any real-world threats.
The Joint Staff gradually accommodated some of these concerns by lowering somewhat
the readiness level of DCA based in the United States. But the commitment to “maintain
the total number of CONUS-based DCA squadrons [deleted] seems strong,” ACC
reported. The alternative readiness posture would assign the most capable aircraft to
perform the nuclear mission, with the Joint Staff making aircraft type a contingency of
reduced readiness requirements. 144 What flowed from this reorganization was that fewer
aircraft were maintained at a higher-force readiness level to allow ACC and U.S. Atlantic
Command (USACOM, later U.S. Joint Forces Command) greater flexibility in meeting
nuclear and conventional war-fighting requirements. 145 These changes were incorporated
into the updated Nuclear Appendix (Annex C) to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
(JSCP), effective January 1, 1997. 146
Subsequent queries sent to the regional CINCs about their need for nuclear fighter wing
support revealed that the European Command was “the only unified command to express
a requirement for DCA support.” As a result, Joint Staff in April 1998 decided to change
the JSCP Annex C to reduce the readiness requirement. Once again, the Joint Staff
decided to maintain “the entire CONUS-based DCA force for worldwide commitment” to
supplement tactical nuclear operations in “any theater.” The new guidance became
effective April 24, 1998. 147
48