Nature - autonomous learning

the dis/unity of geography 179less objectively. I focus on the physical side of geography because it wearsits realist credentials on its shirtsleeves. By ‘realist’ I mean beliefs (i) and (ii)above, the first being so-called ontological realism, the second being socalledepistemological realism. 1 This links closely with physical geography’sself-image as a science. It’s fair to say that most physical geographers regardthemselves as scientists. As Clifford (2001: 387) confidently asserts,‘thefirst presupposition is that physical geography is . . . a scientific activity’.Indeed, physical geography is about the only part of geography where theword ‘science’ is still used openly and unself-consciously to characterisethe conduct of research. Since the word is usually associated with the searchfor truth and objectivity about the material world it follows that physicalgeography eschews the apparent anti-realism that Slaymaker and Spencerassociate with social-constructionist approaches to nature. It also followsthat physical geographers aim to produce cognitive knowledge for themost part, taking it as read that statements of fact and statements of value(moral and aesthetic) should be kept separate. In effect, the naturalism ofphysical geography is the mirror opposite of the de-naturalising thrustof contemporary human geography (leaving environmental geographya schizophrenic field with, as it were,‘divided loyalties’).As Turner (2002:62) puts it,‘With physical geography esconced in the sciences and muchof human geography engaged in various experiments that challenge thisway of knowing, the gulf between the two appears to have widened’.In the next section I explore how physical geographers characterisetheir half of geography and how, in broad terms, they might defend theirquest for accurate knowledge about the non-human world. I then questionphysical geography’s epistemically realist credentials by exploring theidea that even scientific knowledge of nature is a social construction.Thisleads to a discussion of how physical geographers have sidestepped thesocial-constructionist critique of the knowledge they produce. I thenshow that the key debates in physical geography revolve around producingnot accurate knowledge of the biophysical world (since this possibilityis largely taken for granted) but more accurate knowledge of that world. 2I conclude by reflecting on how the co-existence of constructivist andrealist approaches to nature within geography is central to the ongoingestrangement of human and physical geography. Before I proceed I shoulddeclare a crucial gap in my discussion: because I treat physical geographyas a field science, I inevitably ignore important non-field based activities,like numerical and computer modelling.