Nature - autonomous learning

200 the dis/unity of geographybodies of knowledge, as well as appearing to withstand empirical testing.The latter is the view that if knowledge of the physical environment ispractically useful – as when a theory or model of landslides successfullypredicts when future landslides will occur – then this is the main criteriaof its worth.The above discussion in no way does justice to the raft of methodologicalissues and protocols that have ‘seeped’ into the research culture of physicalgeography (excellent discussions are offered by Haines-Young and Petch1986, Inkpen 2004 [chs 2–5] and Richards 2003a). But my main point,I think, holds true: namely, that most physical geographers question notwhether the physical environment is knowable but how best to grasp its realnature.As Raper and Livingstone (2001: 237) put it,‘physical geographers. . . see representation as connecting real entities and mental conceptswithin a framework of realism about the external world’. Symptomatic ofthis is the fact that the ideas of Paul Feyeraband (1924–94) have cut littleice with physical geographers. Feyeraband, an outspoken historian ofscience, sought to expose the ‘myth of method’ in the natural sciences. Inhis provocative book Against Method (1975) he argued that the protocols ofscientific method have been consistently flouted by practising scientists.For Feyeraband scientists are methodological pluralists who adhere tono one investigative procedure, however much they may claim to do. AsHaines-Young and Petch (1986: 99) summarise:‘the only methodologicalrule that can be defended in all circumstances [for Feyeraband] is ...thatanything goes’ in science. Feyeraband, in short, saw the method-myth as a ruseused to persuade society that scientific knowledge can offer uniquelyobjective insights into how the world works. Rather as physical geographershave ignored the challenge of SSK thus far, so too have they bracketedFeyeraband’s objections for the most part (see Haines-Young and Petch1986: ch. 6). 11 It’s not difficult to understand why: after all, Feyerabandthrows into question the idea that science is about fact not fiction, truth notlies. This said, many (if not all) physical geographers would accept that theirinvestigations involve more than the exercise of a cool, dispassionaterationality that obeys only the evidence gathered. See Box 4.3 for afascinating example.