Nature - autonomous learning

218 the dis/unity of geographyand images to create understandings of a world that is, paradoxically,unintelligible outside those words, concepts and images (see Inkpen 2004:ch. 2). Baker’s contentious arguments challenge the realist beliefs of mostphysical geographers and are similar in their thrust to Demeritt’s ideas andthose of Feyerabend. More generally, they resonate with the ‘discursiveconstruction of nature’ ideas discussed in the previous chapter.As such, theyoffer one of the few points of contact between the de-naturalising tenorof human-geography research into nature and the community of physicalgeographers.Yet one suspects that most physical geographers see Baker asa maverick not to be take too seriously.As with Demeritt’s research, Baker’sis doubtless seen as too threatening to physical geographers’ conventionalself-understanding.A DIVIDED DISCIPLINELet me summarise what we’ve learnt in this chapter.The ontological andepistemological debates discussed above show that physical geographersare by no means naïve realists. Likewise, the discussion of method inthe section ‘Producing realistic environmental knowledge’ gave some senseof how reflexive (or self-critical) physical geographers are regarding theirinvestigative procedures.Yet for all this, these geographers mostly take itas given that the biophysical world is a real and objectively knowable entity.Whether studying ‘natural’ or modified environments, they see their roleas producing accurate knowledge about the earth’s surface.As we saw in thesection ‘Environmental realism’ their willingness to use the term ‘science’to describe the process and products of their research is indicative of thisfact.Added to this, we saw in the section ‘The social construction of scientificknowledge’ that physical geographers have generally ignored or deflectedattempts to question the possibility that accurate knowledge of the biophysicalworld is, ultimately, an achievable goal.This is doubtless why theinteresting ontological debates within the physical geographic communityrevolve mostly around how the biophysical world is structured rather thanwhether it exists as a realm in its own right.It would be easy to overstate the differences between physical and humangeographers regarding the knowledges of nature they produce. Insensitivelyused, labels like ‘realism’ and ‘social constructionism’ can suggest thatphysical geographers have nothing whatsoever in common with theirhuman counterparts. Clearly, there are major differences of approach. But