Nature - autonomous learning

204 the dis/unity of geographyEpistemologically, physical geographers are a diverse group. For manyhuman geographers, the stereotypical Wellington-boot-wearing physicalgeographer is an empiricist.That is, s/he believes that we can only truly knowwhat we can see with our eyes (either directly or through the use of photographs,microscopes, recording devices etc.). But this stereotype is wideof the mark, as we’ll also discover momentarily.Why, it might be asked, am I straying into philosophical waters at thispoint in the chapter? Aren’t I moving away from discussing the ‘realenvironments’ that physical geographers are interested in? My answer tothe latter question is ‘no’ and to the former is twofold. First, the epistemologicaland ontological debates among physical geographers reveal someof the key differences in how they understand the ‘real nature’ of the nonhumanworld.These differences are not a denial that there is a real physicalworld ‘out there’ but, rather, broad disagreements about how we mightknow that world and how it is structured. Second, these debates link directlyto the methodological issues discussed in the previous section ‘Producingrealistic environmental knowledge’. In other words, these debates showus that for physical geographers a ‘proper’ understanding of the physicalenvironment is not just a matter of method but also of the wider assumptionsguiding the practical use of method.What follows is by no means acomplete inventory, but it gives a sense of the sophisticated debates aboutthe biophysical environment current in physical geography among a strongminority of researchers.These researchers are especially evident in physicalgeography’s largest subfield, geomorphology.Ontological issuesThere are four ontological debates worth mentioning that cut to the heartof how physical geographers understand the ‘nature’ of the biophysicalworld.Though these debates are about the most appropriate (i.e. realistic)way to think of that world, I suggest that – in keeping with this book’soverall argument – that we see them as rival imaginaries of the biophysicalworld. I should preface my presentation of these debates by pointing to onecorollary of the fact that physical geography is, in large measure, a fieldscience not a laboratory science. Physical geography must deal with a subjectmatter that is multi-scalar – stretching from the smallest spatio-temporalscales to the largest (see Figure 4.5). Although, physical geographersnarrowed their focus after the ‘spatial science’ revolution of the 1950s and