Nature - autonomous learning

188 the dis/unity of geographygeographers rarely bother to debate the issue of science at all.Why is this?The reasons, I think, are purely disciplinary. Historically, physical geographers– as Richard Chorley famously quipped – have instinctively reachedfor their soil augers when debates threaten to get too philosophical andabstract. In addition to this, the de-naturalising turn of contemporaryhuman geography could be ignored by physical geographers so long asthere was no suggestion that their own representations of nature wereconstructions. In other words, because of their immersion within a distinctdisciplinary context, physical geographers have rarely been obliged tospell out how and why the knowledge they produce is a faithful depictionof biophysical realities.In recent years this has changed. In a series of important essays, DavidDemeritt – a human-cum-environmental geographer at King’s College,London – has applied the insights of SSK to physical geographers’ research(Demeritt 1996; 1998; 2001c; 2001d). In other words, Demeritt hasextended the ‘nature-sceptical’ sensibilities of many human geographers tothat part of geography whose reputation rests on its claim to tell us hownature ‘really works’. He has been able to do this because, unlike mosthuman geographers, he has an earth-science background (includingexpertise in climate modelling developed when he worked for EnvironmentCanada).What makes Demeritt’s research compelling is that he scrutinisesthe practice of physical geographers. In other words, his arguments aboutthe construction of scientific knowledge are not made at the philosophicallevel but are demonstrated empirically. For this reason, his arguments aredifficult for physical geographers to ignore – as indicated by Schneider’s(2001) terse response to one of Demeritt’s papers (on how scientificknowledge about global warming is constructed). I mention Demeritt’sphysical-science expertise and his focus on scientific practice becausesome earlier criticisms of physical geographers scientific approach wereignored. For instance, in 1993 Gillian Rose drew upon the work of feministhistorians of science to argue that physical geographers’ knowledge isinherently masculinist. But because her arguments were theoretical theyarguably lacked the precision required to persuade physical geographersthat she might be on to something important.I cannot do justice to the richness of Demeritt’s arguments here. So letme open just one window onto them, first by summarising the maintheses of SSK, and then by showing how Demeritt applies SSK to one aspectof environmental research. SSK originated with the pioneering studies of